A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE BELGIAN NAVY

by

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P R E F A C E

The behavior of people at work in any organization is fascinating.
Since almost all of us are interested in human behavior and expect to work during the most important part of our adult lives, the management of people has the potential to be a very stimulating subject.
As Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel, I am very priviliged to be daily involved in the management of those dedicated men and women, serving on board of the ships and in establishments of the Belgian Navy.
The efforts put in the Human Resource Management (HRM) of these fine service people are worth to be critically analyzed. And interesting findings and recommendations may be expected from new research concerning culture and leadership in this small but beautiful Navy.
I hope this dissertation will make an original contribution to the knowledge of managing and leading naval personnel.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In May 1993, the Belgian naval personnel is composed of 338 officers, 1.309 non-commissioned officers, 1.032 enlisted men, 995 conscripts, and 140 civilians.
In this total of 3.674 military persons, there are 228 women (11 officers, 86 non-commissioned officers, and 131 enlisted persons). This naval personnel speaks Dutch (some 70% of the total), and French (30%). However, during naval operations, the English language is used. This variety of personnel is also very specialized : officers are subdivided into 17 specialties, non-commissioned officers into 9 specialty groups and 47 specialties, and enlisted men into 53 specialties.
With continuously some 1.100 highly qualified people on board of our frigates, command and supply ships, and mine counter measure vessels (minehunters and minesweepers), and trying to put the right man or woman in the right place in all naval establishments, personnel management is a demanding but interesting job.
Until the 1980s, the Belgian Navy was structured in a rather complex, formalized, and centralized way. The configuration was that of a machine bureaucracy. [1]
The pervasiveness of rules and regulations often substituted for managerial discretion. There was little need for innovative and flexible decision makers below the level of senior officers. The machine bureaucracy was mostly efficient as long as naval personnel was confronted with problems for which programmed decision rules had already been established. High division of work, high formalization, narrow spans of control, and limited discretion provided regularity and security, especially for people who preferred regular work. Jobs in this structure did not require a high skill variety, task identity, task significance, and autonomy. Often, conflict and alienation could surface in reaction to the almighty, invisible administration. As a result of frustration from being treated like numbers or machines rather than unique human jewels with individual talents and aspirations,

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[1] Henry Mintzberg, Structure in Fives : Designing Effective Organizations (Englewood Cliffs : Prentice Hall, 1983), 170.

many excellent specialists left the Navy after five or eight years of service.
Since the end of the 1980s, the topmanagement of the Belgian Navy wanted to focus on solving the individual problems at the lowest level of the hierarchy. The world was changing fundamentally and rapidly. The threat of a global war seemed over, and governments were considering serious budget cuts and personnel reductions.
The Navy as an organization had actually changed too. The jobs on board and in the shore establishments increasingly required a high level of technological competence. With professionals, who through years of education and training mastered specific skills, the Navy could trust them to perform their activities more autonomously.
So, our configuration had gradually shifted to a professional bureaucracy. [2]

The real authority and responsibility for successfully accomplishing our mission at sea rest with the operating core, in fact the ships and their crews, because they have the critical skills that the Navy needs, and they have the relative autonomy - provided through decentralization and delegation - to apply their expertise. The only other part of this design that is well elaborated is the support staff (logistics and education), which activities are focused on serving the operating core.
In power-control terms, the professional bureaucracy requires top management to give up a considerable degree of control. On the other hand, there is a tendency for subunit conflicts to develop. Various professional functions may seek to pursue their own narrow objectives, often sublimating the interests of other functions and the Navy as a whole. The rules on board become increasingly the making of the professionals themselves. Standards of professional conduct and codes for ethical practices must be transferred to the naval specialists during their education and training. This needs sufficient flexibility and creativity in order to be able to anticipate or adjust to unique circumstances.
This design provides naval personnel with the best of two worlds : the benefits of being attached to an institutional organization, yet the relative freedom to

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[2] Ibid., 194.

execute tasks as the professionals in the operating core see fit, constrained only by quality standards and basic rules. This professional bureaucracy, then, allows naval personnel with high levels of education, unique individual skills, and strong needs for joy and pride in their work, to thrive in the Navy. In contrast with the machine bureaucracy, this design empowers its people and creates enriched jobs. For professionals who are competent and motivated, this structure encourages them to produce a high quality performance. As professional bureaucracy had become a reality, the Chief of Naval Staff decided to change his personnel policy. An interactive human resource management had to be designed, developed, and implemented.

The critical analysis of this problem is very important because this strategic approach is unprecedented in the history of the Belgian Navy; and consequently, no previous global studies on this specific matter exist. We intend to evaluate and investigate all consecutive steps made during the period from October 1989 till April 1993.

After the descriptive study of human resource management in the Belgian Navy in Chapter II, the findings of a thorough and extended research concerning organizational culture and leadership in the context of human resource development will be presented in Chapters III and IV.
Finally, new paths for continuous improvement in the Belgian Navy will be explored.

CHAPTER II

HUMAN RESOURCE MANGEMENT in the BELGIAN NAVY
(A Descriptive Study)

In my experience, people can face almost any problem except the problems of people.

Dr. W. Edwards Deming

A. The Change of Course

1. The New Philosophy Takes Form

By the end of 1989, Vice Admiral Jozef De Wilde, Chief of Naval Staff, makes a clear and unprecedented strategic choice concerning the personnel management for the years to come.

Every first-line officer and direct superior is a human resource manager who must act in an interactive and intrapreneurial way as coach, motivator, teambuilder and promotor of potential talents.

We believe that every individual in the Navy is a source of talent, energy, flexibility, and creativity which are needed for our productivity and the effective functioning of our organization.
In a work environment where everyone can experience recognition as a professional and as a unique human being, every leader must anticipate the subordinate's need for esteem, achievement, and self-responsibility, his or her desire to use and develop all visible and potential capacities, and the expectation of a fair reward for improvement and merit. In its simplest form, Human Resource Management (HRM) is seen as the management of and with the human potentiality that is present in the Navy.

From the start, the Admiral declares unambiguously that : "In the implementation of Human Resource Management, each leader must use his intellectual qualities, expertise, experience and problem solving capacities, with a critical attention to his own performance". [1]
Before determining the starting-point, all conditions for implementing change are checked, remembering the popular phrase : "Who really welcomes a change, except a wet baby ?"

All conditions for starting a change seem to be present :

* The necessity can be demonstrated : we are experiencing a professional bureaucracy, and recruitment as well as retention of quality people are weakening steadily.
* We can make an integral innovation : no experiments are needed that can cause more resistance.
* We can work step-by-step, in a controllable and acceptable way.
* We can put every step fast, without hesitation, so that people can see early results.
* The process is irreversible, and every action is unlimited in time.
* We can provide a good project management : the know-how and the motivation are present.
* We want to reserve "sufficient" (but in fact limited) capacity (personnel and finance).
* We want to create broad participation of all personnel categories.
* We plan to keep good balance between content and process.
* We plan to reserve sufficient time.

In addition to all that, we prepare a strategy against attitudes of resistance, especially focused on the removal of sources of uncertainty or anxiety.
As the Navy wants to present a nonthreatening image to the existing organizational activities, a conference presided by the Chief of Naval Staff is held on 27 October 1989 entitled "Innovating

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[1] Belgian Naval Staff, Human Resource Management : een introductie bij elke leidinggevende van de Zeemacht, 28 June 1990, Note no. ZS1/P 413769 (Brussels), 1.

Personnel Management".
The Admiral presents his arguments in terms of the benefits that are obvious for each individual, such as problem solving at the lowest possible functional level, and the particular responsibilities of the first-line officers. More than 250 leading Navy men and women are present. The Navy has invited professor Luc Derijcke, director of IPO-Management School Antwerp, who speaks of "Management + Motivation = 5.000 x 365", clearly indicating the importance of the daily participation in the new direction by all naval personnel. At the same occasion, the Chief of Naval Personnel explains his intentions for the introduction of proactive intrapreneurial kind of management instead of reactive, administrative personnel management. A video recording is made of the presentations and of the question time, in order to inform all those at sea or abroad, and also for educational purposes. Topmanagement is well aware that change cannot succeed unless there is a positive drive among the critical mass. The Chief of Naval Personnel honestly wants to increase openness, trust, risk-taking, autonomy, and respect for people. But he does not want to shake the organizational culture by imposing other values, or by disrupting some people's perception of privacy and freedom. On the other hand, changes do not occur unless there is some unfreezing of the status quo. The first challenge for the change agent is to find the proper balance, where the individuals' rights and well-being are weighed against improvements in the Navy's effectiveness.

2. <u>The Construction of the Human Resource Development Model</u>

Before starting the first yearly plan of action in January 1990, there is not much time left for a long analysis of all possible strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats. "Too long analysis often causes paralysis" is a well known adage.

The vast majority of all naval personnel believe that the quality of human performance is mainly the result of :

* Competence and skills, which are acquired through permanent education and training.
* Intrinsic motivation, which requires leaders who symbolize significant values, provide job enrichment, and assist individuals on their way to their natural place, or "locus naturalis" as Aristotle put it, where they experience joy and pride in their work.
* Congruence between individual expectations and the needs of the Navy.

It is obvious that this fusion of goals may transform followers into champions.

As congruence seems to produce the strongest leverage, the Navy's change agent decides to construct a model based on matching both individual and organizational needs.

The general components of the Human Resource Development Plan (HRDP) are presented in Figure 1.

COMPONENTS OF THE HRDP



Figure 1

B. HRM in 1990 : AN AMBITIOUS START

The purpose of the Navy's Human Resource Development Plan 1990 is to sensitize, to chip off the rust where needed, and to take some early actions in order to demonstrate the concern for the weakest link, the subordinate at the lowest level of the organization.

* Action 1 : PERFORMANCE INTERVIEWS

These are regular, non-scheduled, interviews between the direct superior and the subordinate in order to improve the quality of work through clear mutual problem solving commitments.
In the Navy, a performance interview happens at the request of the superior or of the subordinate.
The results of these interviews are expected to produce a more effective functioning of the subordinate and/or superior, the development of the subordinate's capacities, and new opportunities for a more conscious and meaningful experience of a work situation.
Lots of information and assistance must be given, such as :

- a non-limitative list of possible questions concerning the work situation, career, rewards, and feedback.
- a form for feedback to the Naval Staff.
- seven golden rules as a guideline for dealing with a subordinate's expectations, which are shown in Table 1.

SUBORDINATE EXPECTATIONS	
1. TELL ME WHAT TO DO	(JOB DESCRIPTION)
2. TELL ME HOW TO DO IT	(EDUCATION & TRAINING)
3. LET ME DO IT	(DELEGATION)
4. TELL ME HOW I AM DOING	(EVALUATION)
5. HELP ME TO PUT THE NEXT STEP	(POTENTIAL)
6. ADVISE ME ABOUT MY CAREER	(COUNSELING)
7. REWARD ME FOR IMPROVEMENTS	(REWARDS)

Table 1

In a special note, the Chief of Naval Staff stresses the role of the direct superior as a consultant for his subordinates, who displays an attitude of assertive communication and a genuine interest in the ideas and needs of each interviewed person. [2]
The explanation given on the purpose, organization, and procedure does not seem to be enough. Special education is needed and is provided in- and outside the Navy (in IPO-Management School Antwerp, and at Kluwer Education Systems Belgium).
As uncertainty still persists among the first-line officers and direct superiors concerning the aim, the communication techniques, and the possible subjects of the interviews, a final extended manual is distributed for the use in the units. [3]

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[2] Belgian Naval Staff, Veralgemening van het functioneringsgesprek, 03 April 1990, Note no. ZS1/Pers 412086 (Brussels), 1.

[3] Belgian Naval Staff, Handleiding voor functioneringsgesprekken, 10 October 1990, Note no. ZS1/P 415000 (Brussels), n.pag.

In the last paragraph, the Chief of Naval Staff reminds the responsible authorities that the performance interviews stand or fall with the leader's and subordinate's wanting and ability to get these interviews done. The interviews are merely a means, the people themselves are the real instruments for a successful contribution to human resource management. [4]

Critique

The introduction of performance interviews has the advantage of giving a clear signal from the Admiral to all leaders and their subordinates in the Navy. Not only superiors have the right to demand, also subordinates have an equal right to question and ask for more support and better use of their potential talents. The lowest people in the hierarchy may expect to be treated as unique adults, with valuable ideas. They know that their superior is listening carefully to them, and that he wants to improve the effectivity of their cooperation. The superior, on the other hand, knows that there is a win/win situation if he uses the tool of these interviews well. The purpose is to fix the problem, not to blame, and to agree on short-term individual objectives for improvement. The superior stays flexible, sensitive, patient, and calm. It is his responsibility that no one feels threatened or humiliated. The result of the win/win situation is a solution to the problem, one that all parties can accept and that will enhance good human relations and help increase productivity.
Table 2 cites the assumptions of the win/win strategy. [5]

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[4] Ibid.

[5] Barry L. Reece and Rhonda Brandt, Effective Human Relations in Organizations, 4th ed. (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1990), 357.

ASSUMPTIONS OF THE WIN/WIN STRATEGY

1. People want to work together.
2. People can work together to solve mutual problems.
3. People respect each other's right to participate in decisions that affect them.
4. People respect each other's integrity.
5. People respect each other's capabilities.
6. People, working in the same organization, share the common goals of the group.

Table 2

Given these assumptions and the opportunities to act on them, if sufficient information and needed material are available, conflicts can be resolved to meet the needs of all involved. Another advantage is that the informal performance interviews prepare the formal evaluation discussions.

A difficulty, at this early stage, is that the superior may have to put aside his pride, and listen to the arguments of the other person in a sincere dialogue. By striving to protect the self-esteem and self-respect of the other person, the superior may fear some loss of his own self-awareness and authority.

Another weakness may be the lack of recent information in the local units, especially on board of ships at sea or abroad.

A third disadvantage is the insufficient mental preparation of both superiors and subordinates. Especially those at the lowest end of the military spectrum, the enlisted men and the junior non-commissioned officers, certainly feel reluctant to confront their superiors with their personal frustrations.

For example, if a female quartermaster stands up and says to her Commanding Officer : "Sir, I feel your comments are often sexist and they do not

give me credit for my right to have equal input in our team discussions. They also affect negatively my performances. I request to have an interview with you on this subject." This is certainly an assertive way to handle a situation, but most people still do not have this kind of courage, or they simply fear some kind of retaliation disguised in some evaluation report.
A last disadvantage, and probably the most important one, is the insufficient education in communication techniques. This is in a lesser degree true for officers, but in a larger degree for the lower ranks. The transference and understanding of meaning is not obvious between two persons with different educational, and often social backgrounds. Even officers forget the feedback loop, or the check on how successful both sender and receiver have been in transferring their messages as intended. And often, barriers to effective communication, such as filtering, selective perception, emotions, and usage of a common language, are simply overlooked. So, the basic behaviors are related to effective active listening (see Table 3). [6]

BEHAVIORS RELATED TO ACTIVE LISTENING
1. Make eye contact
2. Exhibit affirmative head nods and appropriate facial expressions
3. Avoid distracting actions or gestures
4. Ask questions
5. Paraphrase
6. Avoid interrupting the speaker
7. Don't overtalk
8. Make smooth transitions between the roles of speaker and listener

Table 3

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[6] Stephen P. Robbins, Organizational Behavior, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs : Prentice-Hall, 1991), 329.

It is fair to mention that the change agent has not overlooked the importance of specific education and training at the time. However, budget is very tight, and the original idea is to train 10 percent of all superiors within a period of five years. It is also expected that every expert will train others in every unit.

* Action 2 : THE FIRST-LINE OFFICER AS HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGER.

In a detailed note to all naval authorities, including all officers in charge of a unit (the authority at the lowest level in the hierarchy), the Chief of Naval Staff places every first-line officer in the role of "first-line human resource manager". [7]
The Admiral explains the role of the first-line officer as one who shows the way to continuous improvement. He draws the ideal profile, being an officer who :

* distinguishes himself by his optimistic, positive attitude
* displays commitment, enthusiasm, and motivation
* is an example for all his subordinates
* welcomes change and knows how to adapt
* is a good communicator, with a great capacity as a listener
* is a creative finder of opportunities for his subordinates
* is capable of giving appropriate delegation
* has knowledge, experience, personality, and vision
* creates conditions in which motivation can develop and grow
* is both an effective leader and follower. [8]

In the same note, the characteristics of intrinsic motivation are listed, as will as a table with feedback rules. [9]
The Admiral again stresses his vision about the new naval personnel management when he writes : "Every person in the Navy is capable of learning new skills and being creative, and he can improve

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[7] Belgian Naval Staff, De 1ste Lijnchef als personeelsverantwoordelijke, 15 February 1990, Note no. ZS1 - 411049 (Brussels), 1.

[8] Ibid., 2.

[9] Ibid., Annexes B and C.

performances, if he is driven toward motivation and gets chances for self-development". He adds : "The Navy, as an open organization and a learning system, must emphasize more the combined approach to problems than the hierarchical differences at the functioning level. [10]
It has been made clear to all first-line officers that they are expected to stimulate active participation, two ways communication, and a fair reward system based on a continuous evaluation. In order to be recognized as a leader, the first-line officer has to be credible and acceptable to all followers (see more on Leadership in Chapter IV).

Critique

This action is not perceived as a new responsibility for the Commanding Officers of the ships. To recognize the importance of every member of the crew is characteristic for the traditional mentality on board.
At long distances from home, the captain is not only concerned with the execution of operational tasks, his concern is also directed to everyone of his crew. On board, good and hard moments are shared 24 hours a day, nobody is favoured by the seastate, and rank can not hide incompetence. Also, officers and subordinates alike are willing to take personal physical risks to help and rescue another. These practices create a favorable atmosphere to place every first-line officer in his role of coach and mentor who is responsive to the needs of each in his group or team.
Too often, Commanding Officers of naval establishments ashore take it for granted that the personnel officer is solving the human problems. Some first-line officers prefer to focus on the execution of tasks only, whatever it takes of their people. It is a fact that in a military organization, the successful execution of tasks is paramount, especially during real operations. But, most of the time, teams are being prepared for those tasks; people are at schools, in workshops, in logistics, in staffs, and so on.

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[10] Ibid., 2.

There are many opportunities to show a genuine concern for their professional and personal needs. Good leadership can not be built on concern for task alone
So, the positive side of this action is to sensitize those first-line officers who rule solely by obedience and authority in order to let human elements interfere to a minimum degree. Now, the Admiral himself draws their attention to the advantage of work accomplished by committed people who experience interdependence through a common goal. Management by fear, wherever it exists, has to be replaced by relationships of trust and mutual respect.
The possible disadvantage of this action is to cause some frustration among those first-line officers who already excel in these positive attitudes. However, they can also be satisfied about this confirmation of their concern for people.
Another disadvantage can lie in the fact that the result of this action will be very difficult to quantify in a short period of time.
Finally, most rewards must be authorized in advance by the superiors of the first-line officers. This has a discouraging effect on junior officers.

* Action 3 : THE INTRODUCTION OF HRM IN THE EDUCATION.

From new insight, a new mentality may emerge.
First, the Navy wants to invest in its own brains, not in external consultants.
Sufficient know-how has to be present before introducing human resource management in the Navy's educational system. Since 1988, this need for expertise has been anticipated by the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel.
In 1990, six officers form a first group of experts. By the end of 1992, it is planned that some 10 percent of all naval officers will have the required knowledge of HRM in order to spread the word in a competent way. Post-graduate programs are being followed at the IPO-Management

School at Antwerp. [11]
Inside the educational system of the Navy, 44 new course-periods are given to the four categories of non-commissioned officers (NCO's).
Midshipmen receive 16 new periods, and the candidate-Commanders also receive 8 new periods.
This total of 68 periods has to be presented separately in French and Dutch.
As from 1991, it is scheduled to increase the number of periods for the candidate-Commanders up to 40, again in the French and Dutch languages.
All these courses are taught by the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel, who is also the Admiral's adviser in this matter.
For the Chief of Naval Staff, continuous education and training is the principal task of every superior. It determines the quality of personnel and creates a long-term perspective for a successful career.

Critique

The great advantage of the integration of HRM in the educational system is that, on a yearly basis, all personnel categories can be reached in favorable conditions of time and place.
For the 200 participants at the HRM-courses, the advantage is written on their faces : they respond enthusiastically, they make good suggestions, and they wonder why some of their superiors are not present in order to hear how topmanagement expects them to behave. It also removes worries, creates trust in the future and faith in the new management of people.
The only disadvantage is that it is not easy at all to find another potential "champion" who is willing to invest time and energy in order to reach the expertise level required to teach and educate others. But, the Chief of Naval Personnel keeps things well in balance so that his deputy is kept well outside the danger of becoming burned-out.

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[11] IPO stands for "Institute for post-graduate studies".

* Action 4 : THE ORGANIZATION OF HRM-SEMINARS

The purpose of the HRM-seminars is :

* to bring light about the innovations and to show cohesion between the different actions;
* to indicate the direction towards an improved personnel management in which all subordinates and superiors are concerned, especially the immediate functional superior at the first level;
* to receive and to give feedback;
* to listen to new ideas and suggestions; and
* to ensure mutual understanding , and to adjust where needed.

The seminars are held eight times by the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel, every trimester in another naval Command.
Each seminar takes two hours, one for talking and one for listening.
The number of participants vary between 60 and 140. Officers and senior NCO's attend on a voluntary basis. Generally, the high ranking officers are present, showing their interest and giving the example. However, only in one of the three commands is the highest local authority present; the others send their deputy.
One special seminar is held for junior NCO's, enlisted men, and conscripts, in order to complete the information flow.
The speaker has to adapt his messages to the different audiences.
In fact, the subculture of the people in the operations differs from that of those in logistics, and from those in instruction.
In order to be effective, acceptance of the message by the group of participants must be reached. Fortunately, the speaker had served nine years on board, he spent a year in the logistic command, and he had been director of studies as well. So, acceptance has not been a major problem.
The attitude of participants is one of great interest. They want to welcome HRM, but they resent eventual additional administrative

workload. There is critique on the personnel management regarding unscheduled assignments on board. Some resistance is shown by some almost retired officers who do not want to change old habits, and covertly by some young officers who just left the Royal Military Academy, eager to perform tasks at sea.
There is a general demand to prepare junior NCO's better to their first jobs.
Some oral explanation is needed as to who may conduct a performance interview with a subordinate.
There is a widespread request for more training in basic communication.
More information is asked about the personnel reductions.
And, there is some concern about the preservation of the Navy's own culture.

Critique

There are no disadvantages involved, as long as the speaker does not create false expectations among the audiences.
Some participants take the opportunity to get rid of some personal frustrations, but this is quite normal and must not be avoided.
It is regretful though that the authorities, who are really in power, often seem to have more urgent priorities than the HRM-seminars.

* Action 5 : THE COMPOSITION OF A HRM-TEAM

In order to ensure the simultaneous implementation of the HRM-actions throughout the Navy, a Human Resource Management Team is composed.

The tasks are defined as such :

* Follow-up and feedback from the Commands and naval establishments, included all units.
* Lining-up and adjustment of actions, and setting priorities.
* To introduce and discuss new possibilities of

applications.
* To analyse the HRM-seminars.
* To receive and distribute further information. [12]

The president of the HRM-team is the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel.
The members are the personnel officers of all naval commands, and three staff-officers of the Personnel Section.
In 1990, the HRM-Team has five meetings. The results are positive, and are reported directly to the Admiral and to all naval Commands.

Critique

A disadvantage is that, in the beginning, the team members have no real knowledge of Human Resource Management. This is solved in the second semester of 1990 with a HRM-Course at IPO-Management School Antwerp.
Another disadvantage appears to be the fact that the participants have no power to push and pull HRM-actions where needed in local Commands As personnel officers, they may give advise to their Commanding Officers, but they do not make the decisions.
A positive aspect is that all members are professionally concerned with people. Consensus is easily obtained within the team. Language barriers do not exist.

* Action 6 : THE COMPOSITION OF A HRM-MANUAL

The quality of the management of the human factor is the most important contribution to the readiness of the Navy.
All leading personnel must continuously act as :

* **coach**, who trains, observes, encourages, assists, corrects, rewards, and informs his people;
* **motivator**, who generates abundant energy among his subordinates through transforming

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[12] Belgian Naval Staff, Oprichting van Human Resource Management Team, 22 February 1990, Note no. ZS1/Pers 411186 (Brussels), 1.

leadership;
* **team-builder**, who works together with a group of people at the achievement of a common goal, in a coherent and supportive way;
* **promotor** of potential talents, who detects individual strengths through listening and offering opportunities for self-disclosure and self-development.

In order to familiarize every officer and senior non-commissioned officer of the Navy with Human Resource Management, a manual is composed and sent to each of them personally, in his own language (Dutch or French).
In his introduction, Vice Admiral Jozef De Wilde uses the following wording :
"A cooperator is a tremendous rich, but at the same time very fragile resource.
He is a sense-seeker and a sense-giver with profound questions, a relation-directed human being with family- and friendship-ties, somebody who is driven by all kinds of needs and desires, in short : a unique individual with brains, a heart, and feelings.
This is why dealing with people requires reciprocal ethics, decency, and a sense of responsibility." [13]
The manual provides some practical answers on questions such as :
- is HRM really so new ?
- what influences my perception of my work ?
- what causes job satisfaction or dissatisfaction?

The manual also explains the HRM-steps leading to a better end-result, i.e., to know, can, want, dare, may, and take action. Finally, the relationship between commitment and results is discussed. In the conclusion, it is emphasized that HRM may generate a subtil process towards a new dynamism, in an open and learning system, where everyone can experience joy and pride. [14]

Critique

Although the manual is written in a vulgarizing way in order to obtain a clear and simple image of Human Resource Management, the intended readers

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[13] Belgian Naval Staff, Human Resource Management : een introductie bij elke leidinggevende van de Zeemacht, 28 June 1990, Note no. ZS1/P 413769 (Brussels), 2.

[14] Ibid., 16.

keep remarkably quiet after the distribution. No visible signs of resistance, no signs of jubilation either. What's happening ? Are eighteen pages too long to read ? Are people getting saturated ? Do they feel patronized ? Is the pace of the step-by-step approach too fast ? Field research among senior non-commissioned officers reveals that the manual contains unfamiliar terms, which cause reticence and reservation. Indeed, terms as effectiveness and efficiency may seem confusing. Participation may sound like losing the privilege of rank. Active listening has a threatening effect on strict execution of commands. And above all, the superiors are covertly unwilling to be again at the giving side, and the subordinates at the receiving end. They do not want to be the victims in a lose/win situation. On the contrary, especially senior NCO's and junior officers prefer to see the effort coming from the subordinates in the first place.
Although it is stated in the introduction of the manual that the renewal must not be noticed so much on paper but in the minds and behavior of each individual at all levels, the "translation" reflects a quite different story. Probably a glossary with definitions of all new terms could help to avoid misunderstanding.
I fear this is not enough. Knowledge results from education; reading a manual can not do the job. But education is a slow process, it takes several years (at least five) before the critical mass starts moving in the right direction, without the further assistance of tug-boats. And it is clear that new insights on leadership is needed through improved approaches (see more on leadership as an interrelated part of HRM in Chapter IV).

* Action 7 : SURVEY OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AMONG OFFICERS

The existing organizational culture in the Navy is thought to be receptive to change in general, and to Human Resource Management is particular. However, until 1990 no research has ever been

conducted in this specific area.
If it is true that only a wet baby welcomes "a change", it seems appropriate to stimulate naval personnel to indicate where they actually experience any unpleasant feeling; in other words, to disclose freely where they demand and welcome change. For, "Quid leges, sine moribus". Laws and rules are known to be meaningless without fitting morals and general behavior.
So, in order to know better the mainly unwritten own rules of conduct of all naval personnel, their perception of "good and bad manners" when working in the Navy, and what they really like or resent in their daily work, the Chief of Naval Staff decides to conduct of large scale survey research of the organizational culture. The plan in to proceed in three phases :

- phase 1 : the officers (in 1990)
- phase 2 : the non-commissioned officers (in 1991)
- phase 3 : the enlisted men (in 1992).

The Admiral's commitment is that after the analysis, the Navy will ensure widespread feedback to all naval personnel, and eventually take visible actions in personnel policy in order to improve motivation, competence, and job satisfaction.

This survey research of organizational culture among Belgian Naval personnel, conducted in 1990, 91, and 92, has been fully analyzed and evaluated, and is - because of its importance for this study - separately presented in Chapter III.

* Action 8 : CAREER INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE

The practice of spending a day on board of each of the commissioned naval ships, offering individual information and guidance about career development, is in fact in use since the 1980s as a means to succeed in the Navy's retention policy.
Indeed, long-term incentives and prospects are important if the Navy wants to retain the best qualified experts who can earn more money in

private companies without having to endure the obligations and restrictions of a military life. This yearly career information tour on board by a team of specialists from the Naval Staff responds to a tangible need of the officers, NCO's and enlisted men (EM) serving at sea, often outside the reach of the appropriate information sources. It is obvious that this appreciated initiative has to become integrated in the HRM-action plan.
The team is composed of four experts, headed by the Chief of Naval Personnel or his deputy. They spend a day on board of each frigate and logistical support vessel, and a day per group of smaller vessels, mainly minehunters and minesweepers.
Each personnel category is separately informed about the procedures, the kind of tests, the requirements, the dates, the numbers of available places, and so on. After this general part, all individual cases are scrutinized in an open discussion or in a seperate discussion, depending on the nature of the content and the client's demand. Here the information team also points at the various possibilities for assistance through distant learning (correspondence courses in languages and mathematics, available in the Instruction Command). [15]

Critique

At first sight, there are no disadvantages from the customers' point of view.
This service is exclusively brought to the officers and crews, in the right place (their own ship), at the right time (a long period before the start of the procedures and exams), and by the right people (in fact, by those who will handle their requests in the Naval Staff).
However, this service "on a silver plate" may cause passive attitudes and no interest in gathering career information by the people on board. They expect personal service, and consequently may disregard all the information presented in brochures sent on board, or available in the offices of the naval base, at a walking

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[15] Belgian Naval Instruction Command, Studiebegeleiding bij overgangen, 23 October 1990, Note no. DET 2509/13143 (Brugge), and, Voorbereiding van de taalproeven, 20 December 1988, Note no. DET 3578/14590 (Brugge), 1.

distance from the ships. In this way, when information is tapped from only one source, an individual may easily miss the boat (e.g., when he is not present at the time of the team's visit). It is clear that the ship's officers must insist on using all the sources, so that the career information team may eventually confirm the findings or make some last corrections.

Another disadvantage may be that, in shore establishments, local superiors are expected to take initiatives to inform their personnel. Some subordinates may complain about this, because all depends on the interest and knowledge of their officers who are not necessarily as well informed as the team from the Naval Staff. However, it is well known throughout the Navy that the Staff Section Personnel at the Naval Staff Brussels may be consulted any time by personnel of all ranks. And naval personnel are generally quite well informed about their own career possibilities.

* Action 9 : IMPROVEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL LONG-TERM PLANNING

In order to facilitate long-term personal planning, the Navy wants to inform everyone well in advance which periods for instruction can be expected in the 5 to 10 years to come. This is realized by the Instruction Command.

Social and family life can even be more disrupted by unscheduled assignments, especially on board of ships with a loaded operational program causing sudden long absences.
Job-rotation, of course, is a long-standing practice, and the periods at sea and ashore are as balanced as possible. Nevertheless, operational readiness and deployment have priority in all circumstances because the Navy's "raison d'être" can not be subject to individual social preferences.
The individual planning of assignments exists, but due to the great number of changes in the operational program, the instruction schedules,

the medical fitness required for sea duties, the pregnancies, and so on, the continuously adapted planning is not published. In normal procedure, individuals know at least six months in advance about their place and kind of work.
Now, as a contribution to the HRM-efforts, a complete list with all drafts and assignments of the naval technicians (NCO's-mechanics) for 1990 is distributed in a seven pages message (a naval telegram) to all units. [16]
This is not a long-term planning, but it is the first time that all drafts of a whole group of same specialists is published simultaneously.

Critique

The long-term planning of all forseeable courses required for a normal career development is relatively easy to do.
Still, it is a necessity to inform those who are so busy on board that the individual request to participate at a program needed for an eventual promotion can become forgotten. Also, a couple's family planning may be linked with a long period at school. School holidays also affect family life. There are no disadvanges for the individual in the publication of a long-term instruction planning. The only critique could come from those who must do the planning and inform people outside the educational system, because this involves a moral obligation to respect the planning as much as possible.

On the contrary, it is not at all easy to make and distribute a long-term planning for drafts and assignments. Indeed, variation occurs almost continuously from a lot of common and special causes. All the high ranking officers in command want the very best of personnel; nobody wants the five percent of "unreliable" personnel (i.e., less competent persons, those with health or other problems, those with a security problem, undisciplined persons, and so on). In a small Navy, personal preferences may intervene.
The test made by the message mentioned before has

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[16] Belgian Naval Message, Mutatieplanning O/OFF MEC (0431)-1990, 15 June 1990, MSG R151113Z JUN 90, from NAVCENREP.

been somewhat counterproductive. The NCO's concerned who were unhappy with their appointments had more time to argue and to use all the tricks in the book to avoid what was planned.
Is it best then to leave the system unchanged, and occasionally surprise somebody with a sudden priority ? Maybe, for it is quite defendable in the military profession to be mentally prepared to leave the family at a very short notice for a long period of absence when duty calls. Governmental decisions on participation of the Navy are never predictable, but when the nation says "go", the military must move effectively and bring back success.
The intention for long-term planning regarding drafts and assignments is to provide some simple predictions on which periods, in what place, in what function. E.g., quartermaster X could be told that his planning, based on the actual data, is :

* until December 1990 : at the Communication school (B2-course) in Brugge
* January-June 1991 : training at the Communication Center in ...
* Aug 1991-Dec 1992 : on board of a frigate, as Deputy Chief Radio Station
* Jan 1993-Dec 1995 : Instructor in the Communication school Brugge
* Jan 1995-Jul 1997 : on board of a CMT-minehunter, as Chief Radio Station
* Aug 1997-Apr 1998 : at the Instruction Center (B1-course) Brugge
* May 1998-Jun 2001 : in the Logistic Command Ostend as Deputy Chief of Transmission Center.

A reservation could be made for any unforeseeable operational priority, but also a commitement to respect the planning in all normal circumstances.

* <u>QUALITY CIRCLES</u>

This action is imposed on all Belgian Armed Forces, including the Navy, by the General Staff, but is not part of the global, integrated HRM-

approach by the Navy.
In 1990, a Quality Circle (QC) is put into practice in one pilot unit, the mechanical section of the Technical School in the Instruction Command, Brugge.
Slowly, this QC starts working as expected by the General Staff. Animators are learning their role through specific program at the Education Center of the General Staff.
So, the idea, the education, the guidance, and feedback come from outside the Navy. However, it is fair to say that the Education Center is working very hard at the introduction of participative leadership.
Nevertheless, this QC has only a very limited local effect. The NCO's, members of the QC are enthusiastic about it; but their direct superior and president of the QC is drafted on board and is replaced by somebody without previous experience in this area. This initiative is clearly not part of the Navy's Human Resource Development Plan; consequently, it is considered as a mere test case by the local naval Command.

Critique

According to Thomas Peters and Robert Waterman, authors of "In Search of Excellence", the quality circle is the current gimmick; it is a tool that can serve as a smokescreen while management continues to get away with not doing its job of real people involvement. [17]
There is no way that just one participative program in an isolated pilot unit will result in a fundamental and lasting change.
Also in another of his bestsellers, Tom Peters warns in "Thriving on Chaos" against just installing quality circles. He argues that a well-functioning circle program requires radical changes in traditional supervisorial attitudes and practices. [18]

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[17] Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman Jr., In Search of Excellence, (New York : Harper Collins, 1982), 241.

[18] Tom Peters, Thriving on Chaos (London : Pan Books, 1989), 300.

The pitfalls mentioned by Tom Peters are very familiar :

* misunderstanding of concepts and process by upper and middle management
* failure to provide information, support, and appropriate incentives
* failure to measure the impact of quality circles on waste, time, costs, accidents, defects, and so on
* absence of a long-term goal of institutionalizing the quality circle process. [19]

Quality circles are less natural in the Navy's work environment and culture than semi-autonomous teams, interrelated with leadership and a total quality approach. In 1990 though, the Belgian Navy is just starting a total quality management (TQM) experiment in the workshops of the Logistic Command. As focus is fully directed towards HRM, time does not seem appropriate to situate HRM within a TQM-project.

<u>October 1990 : some first impressions from internal customers</u>

After ten months of initial HRM-efforts, a limited survey research is conducted in the Instruction Command.
Some 120 respondents, instructors and staff personnel of all ranks, age and sex, give their first impression about where, and in what percentage improvement is perceived as a result of the new HRM-breeze.
The results of this local diagnosis are :

60% of the respondents have experienced improvement of PARTICIPATION
50% claim there is an improvement of the EDUCATION
40% feel better INFORMED
30% perceive a letter COMMUNICATION
20% feel an improvement of CAREER development
10% claim HRM has a positive influence on the CULTURE
0 % feel improvement in the ASSIGNMENT policy.

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[19] Ibid., 301

C. HRM in 1991 : BECOMING MORE VISIBLE

Action speaks louder than words.
The younger people do not join the Navy in the first place to develop a career as previous generations did. They are the products of a fast living consumer based society, and they want their short-term expectations to be realized as soon as possible.
From August 1990 til August 1991, the Belgian Navy participates actively in the Persian Gulf war. Four Belgian minehunters neutralize 280 Iraqi mines ! In other words, with only 8 percent of the allied mine-countermeasure (MCM) capability, the Belgians destroy 25 percent of all enemy mines present in this vast area.
Immediately, all allied Navies recognize and confirm that the Belgian Navy is the actual world-leader in this rather explosive market. In the same conflict, two Belgian frigates participate in the UN-embargo. They effected some 3.200 controls of merchant ships, and rescued 47 shipwrecked seamen.
During this period, 1.234 naval personnel -or more than one third of all professional personnel- participated actively in this operation. There were no casualties, and every individual involved experienced joy and pride of his meaningful contribution.
With the whole Navy busy with the actual realization of the mission, the purpose of the HRM-plan 1991 is to become more concrete, concentrating more on each individual.
The Chief of Naval Staff wants to reduce all theoretical guidance, to be less imposing (Top-down), and to stimulate more bottom-up involvement.
On 26 November 1990, the second annual HRM-conference is held for all leading personnel, presided by Vice Admiral De Wilde. Here, the Admiral speaks about the success in the Persian Gulf and makes the link with the excellence of leadership, competence, motivation, and participation of the whole Navy. The Admiral confirms his believe in the new personnel management which is focused at the common interest, not at personal profit or special favors. He reminds the

audience that individual participation will increase job satisfaction, but that criticism and resistance will bear no fruits.
The guest speaker is again the director of IPO-management School Antwerp, professor Luc Derijcke. His subject is about "The New Leadership Culture".
Finally, the Chief of Naval Personnel, Captain Wilfried Manhaeve, stresses the importance of better communication skills at the lowest hierarchical level. He also situates HRM within the Navy's culture, structure, and strategy.
At the beginning of 1991, the Chief of Naval Staff sends his Human Resource Development Plan 1991 to all the authorities of the Navy, including the Commanding Officers of the units at the first level. [20]
This plan also stresses the further continuation of the following actions started in 1990 : [21]

* Internal promotion (Action 8) : Social promotion (i.e., the passage from a lower to a higher personnel category) and passages within the same personnel category (i.e., the passages from temporary to full active service status) are to be stimulated as a means of rewarding and keeping the best qualified persons.
  In this context, the Navy helps to reduce drastically the possibilities of failure through individual support during the preparation.

* Seminars in the local Commands (Action 4) :
  Seminars must be continued each time whenever explanation is requested by the local personnel and management, or when a specific new directive or evolution needs more perspective and discussion, or as periodical feedback to ensure mutual understanding about direction and goals.

* Education in HRM (Action 3) :
  The introduction of HRM in the educational system must be continued and broadened, in the first place for the officers.
  The course Personnel Management for candidate-Commanders is completely rethought and redesigned, and covers 40 periods of HRM, leadership,

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[20] Belgian Naval Staff, HRM-ontwikkelings-plan 1991, 01 February 1991, Note no. ZS1/P 418058 (Brussels).

[21] Ibid.,2-3.

management of change, organizational culture, communication management, and organizational policy.
Also, the annual selection of officers for specialized postgraduate management programs is continued, be it slowly due to the low budget.

* Individual long-term planning (Action 9) :
It is decided that the individual long-term planning of assignments and drafts will be scrutinized after the participation of the Navy in the Gulf war.

The 1991 Human Resource Development Plan (HRDP) includes five new actions.

* Action 10 : IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNICATION SKILLS

The need for improvement of the communication capacities of direct superiors and instructors is already felt in 1990.
A first step is made in June 1990 when four groups of instructors and staff officers of the Naval Instruction Command receive a four days training in basic communication, provided by the Education Centre of the General Staff. [22]
A second step is made in February-March 1991 when the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel organizes three consecutive conferences with all second level Commanding Officers and their personnel officers. The central theme is internal communication.
A third step is made to enhance the efficiency of performance interviews. Training videotapes with appropriate documentation are bought and distributed among all end-users in March 1991.
A fourth step consists in the participation of two small groups of officers at an external training in "Effective performance interviews" (Kluwer training programs, Belgium).
A final step is made through the introduction of communication management and practice in the formal educational programs for officers and NCO's.

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[22] Belgian Naval Instruction Command, Vormingssessie in basiscommunicatie, 18 October 1990, Note no. DET 2422/12764 (Brugge).

Last but not least, communication is an integral part of new leadership (see Chapter IV).

Critique

Internal communication is the Achilles'tendon of the whole HRM-process. The eventual bottle-neck is mostly situated at the level of middle management. Resistance is not always caused by fear a losing authority and power. Lots of officers at the first and second levels, who are in the best place to practice internal communication, have never been properly educated and trained in active listening, feedback, assertiveness, brainstorming, nonverbal communication, and so on.
This resentment of getting personally involved in "new" internal communication techniques is often more based on their awareness of being unprepared. The first thing to do is not to convince those superiors to engage in dialogues and interviews anyway, but to remove their worries caused by the lack of knowledge and skills. Once they will feel competent, they will surely motivate themselves to take the lead.
It takes time and perseverance to achieve significant progress in this area. However, the Navy's culture stimulates free expression of ideas, and their is no support for management by fear.
Within a period of five years, the educational system combined with the continued external training sessions should provide visible results.

* Action 11 : EIGHT VISIBLE, CONCRETE MARKS

More tangible and faster results of the HRM-concept are requested at various levels. This is probably inspired by the apparent difficulty for lots of people to patiently cooperate at changes in general attitudes of superiors and subordinates. They want to see personal advantage first before believing in future common progress. But, "Vox populi, vox dei".

Out of 26 possibilities, the Chief of Naval Staff makes a choice of eight HRM-marks which are intended to underline and support the long-term HRM-actions. [23]
These more visible signs are certainly not to be considered as "management myopia"; concreteness can also be part of a global vision.
If well put into daily practice, these attitudes and facilities could become the hall-marks of the Navy's HRM.

(1) Office for free legal advice

The aim of this office is to procure free legal advice whenever needed to all naval personnel serving in the fleet.
The personnel of the naval base may also ask for assistance.
The office is installed near the ships in the main naval base at Zeebrugge. Two conscripts-lawyers are manning the office.
The legal advice may concern marriage, divorce, rent, mortgage, loans, heritage, insurance, court procedures, taxes, and so on.
The advice is meant to put people on the right track and to explain the law; not to interfere with the professional activities of barristers or notaries.

(2) "Open-door"- offices

This principle is applied on board of ships where cabins are normally open during transits in good weather conditions.
In order to see and be seen, to make the suppliers of services reachable and visible to the customers, and to facilitate natural communication, all offices in staffs and shore establishments are advised to keep doors open during working hours.
This further reduction of barriers can remove the occasional fear to cross the threshold of an office.

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[23] Belgian Naval Staff, Mogelijke concrete HRM-acties, 02 May 1991, Note no. ZS1/P 419954 (Brussels).

(3) "Management by wandering around" (MBWA)

Effective officers must lead from the place where the action is going on. If officers are hidden behind their piles of paper, if bureaucracy monopolizes the attention, they will get soon out of tune with reality.
Eye contact with those who execute the tasks, and listening to weak signals ("Big chiefs have big ears"), must become a daily attitude of all superiors at the second-level (such as Commanding Officers of naval bases).
Especially during periods of change and uncertainties, superiors must be within natural reach, while coaching, training, caring, listening, leading, and facilitating.
Second-level superiors are advised to spend at least one hour a day doing MBWA among their subordinates.

(4) Facilitate access to 2nd level C.O.'s

The access to the second-level Commanding Officer is rather formal, with a written request, scrutinized by a suspicious master-at-arms. This is only protecting the superior, not the subordinate. Any superior has to look after the common interest of his personnel. Old-fashioned procedures must be abolished if they serve the wrong purpose.
A simple demand from the direct superior or the subordinate himself (e.g., during MBWA, an oral question, a telephone call) must suffice.
And another barrier will vanish.

(5) Exit-interviews

Arrival-, performance-, and evaluation (or appraisal) interviews are existing throughout the Navy.
But, when somebody leaves his section, unit, ship, workshop, or office, we often observe the brief handshake and the traditional word of thanks. It only takes two or three minutes : the superior has other work to do, and the subordinate has to be on his way to

the next job. Yet, here lies an ideal opportunity to get unprejudiced feedback with fresh impressions about the work situation as it is really experienced.
This information can be surprising for the superior, because on departure, most reservations disappear, and the subordinate is likely to tell an uncoloured true story. Even if frustration can put an emphasis on the weaknesses of the system, it will allow the superior to take appropriate action. On the other hand, the subordinate will find it rewarding that the superior listened to him and appreciated his feedback or eventual advice on how to do better in the future.
So, all superiors are requested to use exit-interviews as an internal communication tool in order to profit from the final impressions and to show the leaving person appropriate gratitude and appreciation.

(6) "Get off your arse" (GOYA)

Frederick Herzberg explained how ineffective the "kick in the arse" or KITA is for the motivation of employees. [24]
In the Navy, we want to see superiors act in an intrapreneurial way. If they want to find new opportunities for the self-development of their subordinates, they can not do this from behind their desk. They have to get up, leave the office, and take action.
It is also considered to be a bad practice to call a subordinate at the superior's office, without giving any clue why.
This "normal" attitude of lots of superiors may cause unnecessar·stress, uncertainties, and anxiety. The subordinate expects something disagreable and feels unprepared.
A better practice for a direct superior is to visit subordinates in their work environment, where they can give the best service or information.
Whenever the situation does not allow such practice, superiors should inform subordinates in advance why they are sent for.

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[24] Frederick Herzberg, "One more time : How do you motivate employees ?", Harvard Business Review, January-February 1968, 35.

For these reasons, and in line with the concern for people, all superiors in the Navy are encouraged to apply the "get off your arse" or GOYA principle as much as possible.

(7) Positive Reinforcement

The Navy wants to bring improvement of the self-image and self-esteem of subordinates through better use of rewards, more positive strokes, genuine interest, and more congratulations than punishments.
The topleaders are encouraged to send a personal congratulation or "thank you" note to individuals who deserve this (e.g., at the occasion of an outstanding performance, an improvement of a specific process, an inspiring behavior).
The first- and second-line officers are requested to focus their attention at rewarding well executed tasks, instead of punishing poor performances without analysing the causes in order to remove them. The positive attention is more a matter of many small and visible rewards, shared by the teams, than of the exceptional unshared big reward for one "prima donna".

(8) Social integration

In the Belgian Navy, the French-speaking personnel forms a numerical minority. As the Navy is situated in the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium (except for the Naval Staff in Brussels where both languages are used), French-speaking colleagues and their families may experience some problems of integration, such as for finding a job for the wives, good schools for children, children's care, isolation from other relatives, learning the Dutch language, and so on. This initiative is an appeal to the Dutch-speaking personnel for facilitating the social integration of their French-speaking friends in the Navy, and for all colleagues and their families with social problems.

Critique

The best possible concrete and visible action, so much wanted by those who are waiting to see "it" (the HRM-miracle?) happen, is simply to make it happen by starting to practice HRM oneself. HRM is a lot of common sense, you just have to treat others like you want to be treated yourself. But, this common sense is unfortunately not a common practice. Disguised resisters are passively waiting like the doubting Thomas, because they do not believe in the meaningful message of HRM which is "we can all win by it". They probably have always been winning by making another one losing. These bottle-necks are not situated among the lower ranks. They fully cooperate with this improvement of management. The people crying for more and faster results are smart persons, often of higher ranks, who realize that it is just impossible to change human attitudes overnight and without their cooperation.
Fortunately, the majority of leading persons in the Navy are keen on following the fine example of their Chief of Naval Staff.

The office for legal advice appears to be an immediate success. It reduces lots of worries, especially of those who are often away at sea, and who are less capable than others to consult a lawyer at home.
The MBWA, GOYA, Exit-interviews, and Positive Reinforcement initiatives are good HRM-practices, which are already imbibed in the actions 2,3,6,8,9 and 10.
As for the Open-Door offices, the facilitated access to second level C.O.'s, and the social integration, they are appeals to the direct superiors to give the example by changing unfitting habits and by displaying real commitment to improve human relationships. If subordinates are the most valuable asset of the system, superiors must spend sufficient energy to provide job satisfaction, to remove worries, and to create

conditions for the development of their daily motivation and pride.

* Action 12 : SURVEY OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AMONG NCO'S

See detailed study of this survey in Chapter III.

* Action 13 : INTERNAL RECRUITMENT

As a result of the decision made by the Minister of Defence, the temporary personnel of the Belgian Armed Forces have to leave, or to succeed in selection tests in order to stay in the active (professional) personnel category.
In the Army, this decision causes lots of dramatic departures, because of failure in the tests and insufficient places to stay in another category.
In the Navy, temporary personnel was only recruited as a last resort, in small numbers just enough to satisfy the real needs.
As there are many well-trained people among this temporary category, the Navy wants to keep as many as possible.
Consequently, enough places are opened in the category of the active cadre. Secondly, all members of the temporary personnel are offered full assistance in their preparation of the selection tests.
As a result, the Navy is able to reward all those who did an efficient job on board, or in another function, by accepting the vast majority of the former temporary personnel on a permanent basis.
Those who have to leave are the very few non-productive or undisciplined persons. In total, more than 95 percent of this endangered personnel category can be kept through the means of a very active internal recruitment effort.

Critique

During the second year of HRM in the Belgian Navy, this successful internal recruitment of the most

defenceless personnel category is most certainly seen as a clear signal that topmanagement means business. If action speaks louder than words, than the echo of this action must be heard at all levels. Especially the lower ranks, where many temporary people come from, are very satisfied with this kind of personnel management.
It is indeed a success for them and their families, but also for the credibility of the Navy's goals, particularly those concerning personnel management.

* Action 14 : FOUR PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS

This action is not planned as such at the Naval Staff.
But, as HRM is developing steadily, problems in the process are being defined, analysed, and solved in order to continuously improve the process, following the advice given by Dr. W. Edwards Deming. [25]

Thus, four process improvements are carried out.

(1) Extension of the HRM-Team

With action 5, the HRM-Team is established, composed of personnel officers only.
As the Chief of Naval Staff wants the team to be effective and dynamic, it seems appropriate to extend the group with the six Commanding Officers of the naval establishments and of the flotillas. [26]
The reason for this adaption is that these authorities are responsible for the practical implementation of HRM in their own areas of command. Also, they are in the best position to suggest new actions based on further local needs and priorities. [27]
The president of the team remains the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel.

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[25] W. Edwards Deming, Out of the Crisis (Cambridge, MA : Massachusets Institute of Technology, 1986), 51.

[26] Belgian Naval Staff, Uitbreiding van het HRM-team, 20 February 1991, Note no. ZS1/P 418452 (Brussels), 1.

[27] Ibid.,2.

(2) Flexibility by empowering people, and new leadership.

Based on Tom Peters' views on empowering people and leadership, the Admiral translates these views to the reality of the Navy. [28]
The Chief of Naval Staff adds three categories (A,B,C) for the gradual application of the prescriptions as mentioned in "Thriving on Chaos". [29]
He also demands all naval authorities to check their HRM- and leadership performances using as criteria :

- effectivity ("do the right things")
- efficiency ("do the things right")
- flexibility ("do the right things in the future")
- creativity ("do the things right in the future")

This new direction of leadership will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV.

(3) A new tool for coaching

A model, callled "Achieve"-model, is recently in use in the Dutch Navy. This model is provided to support work-objectives and development-goals.
It may also help first-line superiors
- as a guideline in interviews
- as a means for coaching
- as a guidance when making an evaluation.

The "Achieve"-model is sent to all members of the HRM-Team as an new tool for their first-line people. [30]
This additional tool for leadership will also be discussed in Chapter IV.

(4) A new preference card for officers

In order to let the officers indicate their

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[28] Belgian Naval Staff, Toelichting inzake HRM-concept en aangepast leiderschap, 30 May 1991, Note no. ZS 420422 (Brussels), 1.

[29] Tom Peters, Thriving on chaos (London : Pan Books, 1989), 281-477.

[30] Belgian Naval Staff, Het ACHIEVE model, 28 June 1991, Note no. ZS1/P 421119 (Brussels), 1.

preferences, a new preference questionnaire is made available. [31]
By filling in the card, officers may determine their intentions for further studies, their desired specialization, and their availability or preference for foreign courses.
When filled in, the cards are handled in confidence, and are taken into serious consideration by the decision makers.

Critique

The extension of the HRM-Team is a good adaption, because those in power (the new members) are invited to propose and design new HRM-efforts. They can no more argue that actions are purely being imposed on them without being asked for their opinion.
Regrettably, killer-phrases are often heard, such as "We have no time for all that, operational tasks require all our energy", and "Simply give us a standard check-off list for the performance interviews". Apparently, senior Commanding Officers do not very well know how to handle this appeal to their flexibility and creativity in the detailed implementation of HRM. They are used to execute clear-cut orders, and they would prefer HRM to be presented in this familiar way.
Here again, education is needed first. The president of the HRM-Team intends to invite all new members at a fitting HRM-program in the IPO-Management School Antwerp. In the mean time, he explains the principles over and over again. It is remarkable though, that the C.O. in charge of the flottilas, who is truly very much involved with operations at sea, is giving spontaneous feedback on positive results and remaining problems on board.
As to the preference card for officers, this is more an updating of what existed before. But, a preference system should be made available to all personnel categories. Surely, every member of naval personnel can officially inform the authorities about personal demands.

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[31] Belgian Naval Staff, Nieuwe voorkeursteekkaart officieren, 4 July 1991, Note no. ZS1/Pers 421373 (Brussels), 1.

D. HRM in 1992 : BECOMING MORE MATURE

On 6 March 1992, the third annual HRM-conference is held for over 500 participants, again presided by Vice Admiral De Wilde, Chief of Naval Staff.
The Admiral, who is going to retire from the Navy at the end of the year 1992, adresses the audience in his typical charismatic style. He returns to the basics of HRM, to his vision, the Navy's culture, and the importance of the human capacities and quality.
The guest speaker, director-professor Luc Derijcke of IPO-Management School Antwerp (now becoming a well-known figure in the Navy), has chosen as subject : "The delegation of responsibilities and authority". He explains the importance of expectations, feedback, and appreciation of obtained results. He also tells how growth is experienced through a challenging delegation.
The Chief of Naval Personnel warns that the purpose of HRM is not to fulfill everyone's wishes. He repeats the importance of joy in the job, of being part of an efficient organization, and to feel recognition and respect. Captain Wilfried Manhaeve stresses that nobody is perfect, and that superiors must learn to accept that human errors may occur. He commits himself to work at some negative findings from the surveys about the organizational culture.

Before the publication of the HR Development Plan 1992, an intermediate HRM-action is launched.

* Action 15 : THE EVALUATION DISCUSSION

According to the existing rules, no evaluation discussion has to be made between the superior and the subordinate.
As such discussion should be a normal, procedure in the context of HRM and indeed of good leadership, the Admiral decides to introduce the evaluation discussion for all personnel categories. [32]
During every formal appraisal, the strong and weak aspects of performances, capacities and attitudes

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[32] Belgian Naval Staff, Het beoordelingsgesprek, 26 February 1992, Note no. ZS1/P 451303 (Brussels), 1.

must be discussed. The superior must help his subordinate to overcome weaknesses, to cooperate more efficiently with the group, and to develop all potential talents.
In the note, guidance and explanation are provided for the preparation and execution of the evaluation discussion.

Critique

It was assumed that such evaluation discussions were taking place spontaneously, as a natural behavior between superior and subordinate. This common sense proved once more to be no common practice.
As the performance interviews exist since 1990, it is a small step to make towards the evaluation discussion. There are some basic differences between both conversations.
The performance interviews are informal, at the request of the superior or the subordinate, without a hierarchical distance.
The evaluation discussions are formal, only at the initiative of the superior, within a hierarchical relationship. Here, past results are judged, without solving the problems or questioning the system.
The advantage of having both communication tools is that the subordinate can no more feel victimized when his superior makes a periodical evaluation in accordance with the previous performance interviews. They are both interrelated.

* * *

In April 1992, the Chief of Naval Staff sends his Human Resource Development Plan 1992 to all naval authorities. [33]
In this note, the Admiral states that HRM is a continuity which aims at the effective participation of all personnel in the realization of the Navy's "raison d'être" : to provide the optimal service to the nation in mine counter measures and anti-submarine warfare.

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[33] Belgian Naval Staff, HRM-ontwikkelingsplan 1992, 9 April 1992, Note no. ZSI/P 452365 (Brussels).

The Admiral stresses the need to invest in education and training, areas where the human factor is central, especially in a period of shortages and reductions.
For 1992, the Chief of Naval Staff wants to deepen all main actions of 1990 and 1991, i.e., actions 1,2,3,8,9,10,11, and 13.
He also adds to following new HRM-actions.

* Action 16 : DELEGATION TO SHIP'S CAPTAINS

The idea is to push delegation of authority and co-responsibility down the chain-of-command to the lowest possible level of command.
Receiving delegation includes receiving the means needed for the execution of the task. It also includes to agree with the intended delegation and to be prepared to accept responsibility of results, and of the way they are achieved.
The principles for giving delegation are explained to all authorities. The risks involved must stay acceptable, and the direct superior of the one that wants to delegate must also agree.
A communication and feedback system must be established. And it is remembered that to give delegation is not the one and only "best" style of leadership in all situations.
With a naval message sent to all operational levels, the Chief of Naval Staff authorizes to delegate all ship's Captains with the attributions of the second level superior (such as the Commanding Officer of a naval base) for all personnel matters. [34]
This delegation includes also that the Executive Officer (or second-in-command) may assume the Commanding Officer's first level prerogatives in the same personnel matters.
This double delegation brings more rights as to sanction and reward, but also more obligations in measures and procedures such as for accidents at sea. All administrative support is provided by the naval base.

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[34] Belgian Naval Message, Herstructurering ZM, 3 June 1992, MSG R031328Z JUN 92, from BELNAV.

Critique

More delegation was asked for by the majority of the officers in the survey on the organizational culture (see details in Chapter III).
So, the delegation message from the Naval Staff must have been welcomed on board. It also means that the officers' suggestions are taken seriously, and that HRM is no hollow cosmetic treatment.
But, there is a big difference in professional maturity between a Captain of a frigate (average age 45, rank of Commander senior grade) and a Captain of a minehunter (average age 35, rank of Lieutenant Commander). And the difference between the Executive Officers of both types of ships is even greater. The danger exists for abuse of power on board of smaller ships, because the senior officers of the Operational Command can only interfere when there is a complaint, or when they have been informed about some abuse. At sea, in foreign harbours, and even alongside in a Belgian naval base, a ship's crew depends completely on the direct superiors' sense of leadership and fairness in distributing sanctions and rewards.

* Action 17 : SURVEY OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AMONG ENLISTED MEN (EM)

See detailed study of this survey in Chapter III.

* Action 18 : REDUCTION OF WORRIES

From the analysis of the survey on the Navy's culture, the Naval Staff has become well aware of the fact that one of the most demotivating factors for all personnel are the sudden, unexpected drafts on board for urgent operational reasons, with a very short warning time (varying between 2 and 14 days in general). This may cause serious disruption in private and family lifes. Although this only happens in an emergency, people say to experience this ever present possibility as threatening and worrying.
Another burden is caused by the lack of information concerning the consequences of the restructuration plan for the Belgian Armed Forces, the plan Delcroix, named after the current Minister of Defence. This plan is a political decision, caused by the historical fundamental changes in Eastern Europe. The naval personnel is first informed, incompletely, by the media. The Navy's men and women know of the end of conscription as from 1994, the heavy budget cuts, and the reduction in manpower and ships. But they do not know any details about their own future. They hear through the grape-vine that feverish studies are made in the General Staff. But those studies are not finished within months; new inputs require new alternatives, and as long as there is no definite political decision, no detailed information may be given to the personnel. This is a very frustrating situation, both for the top level and the lower levels.
When worries are weighing too heavy, no intrinsic motivation can prosper. So, the reduction of those principal worries is the immediate aim of the following two initiatives taken by the Naval Staff.

(1) A databank for unplanned sea-duties

It is well know in the Navy that some people, of all ranks, are always eager to return at sea, no matter the short warning time, the kind of ship, task, duration, and so on. This is not so strange. Some people are living alone, as bachelors or divorced; others are married or living with a partner but can use some more money; others still are just feeling best on board whatever the side-effects.
The Chief of Naval Personnel has the idea to list in a special databank all naval personnel, volunteering to be first-in-line for any unscheduled draft on board for urgent missions at sea. This work is still in progress. Although not all urgent needs will be possible to be solved by the use of this databank - the one missing qualified radio-electrotechnician might just not be on the list - this system will most certainly reduce the fear for sudden disruptions in private life.

(2) An information conference about HRM and the "Plan Delcroix"

During the period September-November 1992, the whole military population and their families are waiting for the decision of the Belgian government concerning the announced new structure of the Armed Forces.
The Chief of Naval Staff decides to inform his personnel on what is planned inside the Navy, and simultaneously warn people for possible changes afterwards due to political decisions. So, on 10 December 1992, a fourth HRM-conference is held for some 600 officers, NCO's, and delegations of the enlisted men. In his opening speech, the Chief of Naval Personnel emphasizes his belief in better human relationships, in full commitment, and in the realization of the Navy's goals through adequate means and motivated people.

He repeats that superiors are expected to give their subordinates a feeling of trust and appreciation, and to offer a fair chance for self-development and for a personal contribution to the achievements of the Navy. Decentralization and participation are being pursued. This requires a superior who believes in what he does, who welcomes a dialogue, accepts ideas from others, recognizes the needs of his people, has a great sense of justice and responsibility, and who renounces self-interest and personal ambition. HRM means to give more than to receive personally, but it will bring harmony, joy, and pride of a job well done.

During the conference, the results of the survey research on the Navy's culture are presented. This research is fully explained in Chapter III.
Another objective of the conference is to inform naval personnel on the expected consequences of the plan Delcroix. The Chief of Naval Planning explains the future organization, the Navy's mission, the operational fleet, the infrastructure, and the available budget.
The Chief of Naval Personnel explains the personnel reduction for officers and NCO's, the increase of civilians, and the eventual gradual discharge until 1997. The personnel distribution on board, in naval establishments, in Allied and General Staffs is presented per personnel category. The end of the conscripts is confirmed, with the introductin of the recruitment of short-term military personnel. Also, the Minister's promise that nobody will be fired is clearly assured.

During the question time, the audience displays a remarkable sense of reality and a determination to survive as a small but effective Navy. They all love their Navy, everyone in his own way. Lots of questions are answered by the Admiral personally.

Between the audience and the top, their is no fission but fusion of objectives.

Critique

The initiative taken to reduce the number of unwelcomed urgent drafts on board is certainly better than stamping out fires whenever they occur.
But will the databank be sufficiently performant to heal the sickness within the system ? The Navy's general mission is to provide the Nation with effective naval means that can be brought into action at any time in order to protect and preserve national and allied interests at sea and overseas, unlimited in place and time.
In my opinion, the real operations at sea, such as the Navy's participation in the Persian Gulf, the current embargo in the Adriatic Sea, or the present naval support in Somalia, are based on a government decision which can not be planned or predicted. It is an inherent part of the military profession to participate in such events whenever called upon. So is also the greater physical risk during exercices and real actions.
People who resent these characteristics of a military job should consider an other profession.
On the other hand, naval personnel like to be pushed hard, but not to be pushed around. When for less significant tasks, people are warned two days in advance to embark on board for a long period at sea and abroad, often to fill in a sudden gap, it may be hard to maintain a high morale, and to tell the news to a young wife with one or two small children. However, as the analysis of the survey research in Chapter III will show, these disagreable experiences occur rather exceptionally. Also, being more aware of the negative impact, the authorities will attempt to reduce such drafts to a strict minimum.
The use of the databank will certainly bring

some respite, and this effort will indicate a genuine concern for improvement.

The fourth HRM-conference is remarkable in several ways. First, more interest is shown by the audience in the results of the three surveys on the organizational culture than in the consequences of the plan Delcroix. This is in fact understandable : most of the audience participated at the surveys; now they are interested in the results and what the Naval Staff did with it. The plan Delcroix is imposed on the Navy; basic decisions have been made by the government, on proposal of the Minister of Defence, and detailed in several alternatives made by the General Staff. People are aware that this information can only be one-way; the speakers from the Naval Staff are only explaining what they was told, not what they would have preferred.
Secondly, the Navy is the only Armed Force that - with lots of warnings and reservations - finds it more important to confront its personnel and to reduce uncertainties, than to wait for the publication of the official plan. This is a typical HRM-action, because it proves the profound respect for the right to know. People are not made to be kept in the dark for too long.
Finally, notwithstanding the bad news, this fourth HRM-conference is ending in a fusion of objectives. Higher and lower ranked persons are standing shoulder to shoulder in front of the coming turbulence.
And the Admiral, he brings the light of knowledge and the fire of enthusiasm. He leads from the front in an open and visible way. In his personal recommendations, the Admiral invites everyone to re-design and re-think, to question processes and structures, and to remove barriers in order to profit from synergy. If the small Belgian Navy wants to survive in the future, the fleet must remain effective. This will require doing things together in less time, with less costs, and in better ways.

E. HRM in 1993 : BECOMING BORN AGAIN

Since the end of 1992, the Belgian Navy has a new Chief of Naval Staff, the Rear Admiral Willy Herteleer.
The Admiral has informed the Chief of Naval Personnel that he wants to continue the policy of his predecessor.
Consequently, all HRM-actions of previous years are continued.
Awaiting specific new priorities, the following actions are being implemented.

* Action 19 : THE INTEGRATION OF HRM IN EXTENDED EDUCATION

As part of the revision of basic educations, all candidate non-commissioned officers (NCO's) in the Belgian Armed Forces will follow a more extended education cycle of four years, starting in 1994.
A special focus has to be put on basic military knowledge and general human education.
In the Navy, a new management program for candidate NCO's is prepared by the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel, and is passed to the Instruction Command. The educational aims are :

(1) Acquire **social skills** : through behavioral and transactional analysis, verbal and non-verbal behavior, conflict-handling, and basic communication.
(2) Acquire **communication skills** : through presentation and conversation techniques, models, assertivity, active listening, and didactical methods.
(3) Acquire **leadership skills** : through situational leadership, analysis of power, relationship superior/subordinate, leadership in crisis situations, teambuilding and - work, stress and burn-out, delegation, motivation, and case studies.
(4) Acquire **skills in problem-solving and decision-making** : through creative thinking, brainstorming, identifying and solving

problems, analysis of work environment, and using a specific model based on image, judgment, and decision-making.

(5) Acquire **skills in consulting and gathering** : through techniques in consulting and gathering ideas.

(6) Acquire **knowledge of structures and organizations** : through different configurations, and types of structures.

(7) Acquire **knowledge of processes** : through study of managerial, organizational, and strategic processes; and processes of authority, communication, information, and decision-making.

(8) Acquire **knowledge of personnel management** : through study of the Human Resource Development Plan, personnel management principles, role and tasks of the first-line superior, automation, and legal aspects.

(9) Acquire **knowledge of evaluation systems** : through the understanding of evaluation, procedure, and evaluation discussion.

(10) Acquire **knowledge of the Belgian Defence system** : through study of goals and structure of the Defence system.

(11) Acquire **knowledge of recent developments** : through study of present and predictable developments, such as the Plan Delcroix.

The project is being worked out in detail, and refined where appropriate.
Similar integration of Human Resource Management in the extended education of officers is presently being prepared and worked out at the Royal Superior Institute of Defence in Brussels.

Critique

A critique could be that this will need skilled instructors in the first place.
This is being taken care of. Some instructors are quite capable to teach this program; and they are enthusiastic about this improvement. Also, guest teachers may be invited from other Commands and Staff.

Another critique could be that the content is too demanding for candidate non-commissioned officers, being only some 18 years old. Of course, the content must be adaptable and lots of practical exercices will be included, often outside the classrooms.
The good news is that young NCO's will feel revalued, being able to actively participate in the management and leadership of groups and individuals. They will better understand their dual role as followers and leaders.

* Action 20 : ACTIVATION OF FRONT-LINE HRM-SERVICE

The plan Delcroix and the consequences of the vast revision of all personnel matters at the General Staff have created more questions than answers. The official information session, to be presented by the Personnel Section of the General Staff, is announced to take place on 16 March 1993. In the mean team, the Chief of Naval Personnel wants to take action to be very visible on board of the ships in this time of rumors and speculation. As most first-line superiors can not give the right answers on their crew's questions, the Chief of Naval Personnel and a team of experts want to activate a HRM-service for those very important customers who are on board of naval ships. Before meeting the officers and crews, written questions may be asked by the ships in order to prepare the answers in the best possible way. The need for direct information is overwhelming :

* The minehunter **MYOSOTIS** sends 14 questions on the planning of drafts, the policy, the social promotions, the sea duties, the financial compensations, and the participation of the ship's first-line officers in drafts of their subordinates. [35]
* The minehunter **ASTER** transmits 15 questions on future career possibilities, urgent leaves, allowances, impact of preference cards in assignments, new ranks, policy on drafts and assignments, and new categories of enlisted men. [36]

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[35] Belgian Naval Command Operations, M922 - Myosotis, Lijst met onderwerpen i.v.m. HRM beleid, 28 January 1993, Note no. 64 (Zeebrugge), 1-2.

[36] Belgian Naval Message, HRM-personeelsbeleid, 27 January 1993, MSG R271535Z JAN 93, from ASTER.

* The minehunter **BELLIS** beats the record by sending **36 questions** on a wide range of personnel matters, such as warning time for drafts on board, use of preference system, career development, internal recruitment, social/family problems, allowances, life insurance, multiskilling matters, social problems, solicitation system, feedback on personal requests, evaluation systems, and automatic promotions. [37]
* The frigate **WESTDIEP** transmits **25 questions** on the long-term planning of drafts, social promotions, allowances, assignments, relationship between function and rank, participation in personnel decisions, age limit for sea duty, rotation of periods ashore/on board, and new ranks. [38]

On 4 February 1993, the Chief of Naval Personnel and his team spend a complete day in the naval base Zeebrugge answering the questions, listening, and counseling.

Critique

The great number of questions illustrates the need for direct information from the best possible source, which is the Naval Staff in these specific circumstances. But it also shows that the direct superiors, the ship's officers, are not really making a special effort to gather the informations themselves for their crew. Indeed, questions on salary, career, social promotions, and so on, can be easily answered by the personnel officer of the naval base or of the Operational Command.
This confirms earlier observations of some complacency among officers on board whereas their responsibility as human resource managers is concerned.
The GOYA-principle could probably be more applied on ships as well.
On the other hand, Commanding Officers and the divisional officers on board put so much effort in the execution of tasks that this hard necessity often overrules the "softer" side of human

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[37] Belgian Naval Message, HRM-Gestion du personnel, 31 January 1993, MSG R311905Z JAN 93, from BELLIS.

[38] Belgian Naval Message, HRM-personeelsbeleid, 27 January 1993, MSG R271717Z JAN 93, from WESTDIEP.

concern. Efficient officers however do still find time and opportunity to seek an acceptable harmony between task and people. When operations require all the attention, human aspects can probably wait. But they can not wait for ever. Otherwise, demotivation will increasingly affect the quality of performances.

* Action 21 : MORE INFORMATION ON PROFOUND CHANGES

(1) In January 1993, the Belgian Council of Ministers approves the new structure of the Armed Forces, presented in the Plan Delcroix. [39]
The main changes are :
* Budget frozen at 99 billion Belgian francs until 1997.
* Suppression of conscription in 1994.
* New structures. For the Navy, a reduced fleet of 3 frigates, 7 minehunters, 4 minesweepers, 2 command & supply vessels, and some small support units.
* Maximum 40.000 military personnel. The Navy gets only 6,25 percent of this total, or 2.500.
* New regulations :
  - improved administrative regulations
  - better salaries (at the start).
* Measures to discharge personnel (in total 700 officers and 6.000 NCO's).
* Sales of military infrastructure and material.

(2) Other significant changes are being worked out at the General Staff.
These major changes are :
* New regulations for candidate military personnel (4 years education).
* New regulations for careers (including new ranks, new evaluation system, accelerated promotions, more social promotions).
* Regulations for short-term military personnel (until the age of 25).
* Revision of salaries.
* Extended education for officers.

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[39] Belgian Ministry of National Defence, Le Plan Delcroix, 29 January 1993, Press Communiqué (Brussels).

On 16 March 1993, an information session is organized for the Navy by the Chief of Military Personnel, Major-General Ververcken, and his team of the General Staff. This session is attented by some 300 naval officers, NCO's, and a delegation of the enlisted men. The Chief of Naval Staff is also present. Lots of questions are asked by all personnel categories. Naval authorities defend the specificity of the Navy; and since the new regulations are valid for all military personnel, emphasis is put mainly on the needs and culture of the Army. The Admiral stresses the need for flexibility, so that regulations can be adapted to the demands of the Navy. He also commits himself to keep the personnel informed concerning important decisions, and makes a rendezvous at the end of 1993 for a new information session.
At the same conference, the Chief of Naval Planning gives the audience an updating of the consequences of the plan Delcroix for the Navy.

THE METAMORPHOSIS

In March 1993, after some preparation by the Chief of Navy Affairs, Office of Defense Cooperation, at the United States Embassy Brussels, the green light is given by the Office of the Under Secretary of the U.S. Navy for the participation of a few Belgian flag and senior officers at the Senior Leaders Seminar in Washington, DC from 30 March - 02 April 1993.
The Belgian Chief of Naval Staff agrees to send two senior officers : his prospective Deputy Chief of Staff and his Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel. A Belgian Army Major-General and a Colonel also participate with great interest.

This Senior Leaders Seminar is organized by the Total Quality Leadership Office of the Department of the U.S. Navy The course presents the Department of the Navy (DON) approach to Total Quality Leadership (TQL).
This approach is based on the philosophy and principles of Dr. W. Edwards Deming, whose 14

points for management and system of profound knowledge are explained in the course. [40]
The course covers : the role of quality in the Department of the Navy (DON) and its impact on the economy; a definition of TQL and related concepts; approaches to improving quality; the role of the customer; tools for planning and process improvement; organizing for process improvement; strategic planning; and TQL implementation planning to support a strategic approach to improvement.

In 1989, the DON recognized that some fundamental changes had to be made in order to maintain the level of readiness in a downsizing environment. As an organization, the DON decided to adapt a management system that focused on quality, largely based on the teachings of W. Edwards Deming. The DON learned from their experiences at naval aviation depots and other industrial sites that emphasis on quality improves productivity and reduces costs. This approach is called **Total Quality Leadership**, or TQL.

When the most interesting Senior Leaders Seminar is over, the Belgian Chief of Naval Staff is briefed by his two participants.
During the discussion, the Admiral reveals his reticence towards the sole further development of HRM in the Navy. He dislikes the idea that people may feel like a commodity when being managed as a human resource. It can also have some manipulative connotation.
It becomes soon clear what the Admiral prefers when he says : "**I believe in this TQL approach**".
So, the Belgian Chief of Naval Staff wants to adopt the same TQL-system as is applied in the United States Navy.
Since TQL is a - **leader** lead
- **team** driven
- fact based
- **customer** oriented
- quality focused

system of management to achieve the strategic imperative, one could say that "working with people" will play a determinant role in this all

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[40] W. Edwards Deming, Out of the Crisis (Cambridge, MA : Massachusets Institute of Technology, 1986), 23-96.

embracing quality approach. In this way, HRM has paved the way and will be reborn as an integral part of a two new parents, Total Quality and Leadership.

In Chapter IV, Total Quality Leadership is discussed in more detail. The possible beginning of TQL in the Belgian Navy is analyzed in a first approach. The future developments of strategic management in the Belgian Navy may well bear the marks of TQL.

F. RETENTION : RESEARCH IN 1990 AND 1991

During the years 1990 and 199, retention is a most worrying personnel issue. The Navy experiences problems to keep the best qualified NCO's and enlisted men because civilian companies are offering more money, more stability in family life, and regular working hours.
Recruitment can not sufficiently compensate the departures, because recruitment can not satisfy the normal shortages. For NCO's, the yearly deficit ranges between 10 and 30 (period 1988-1991).
This is the reason why research has been made on retention in 1990 and 1991 in order to know how to convince people to stay in the Navy.
Here follows a summary of the findings and recommended solutions.

1. A Field Research about Retention (1990)

In September 1990, two naval reserve officers, Lieutenant Jacques De Decker (in civilian life a successful barrister from Gent) and Lieutenant Paul Van Maele (a president-general-manager of large bakery business in Brugge), spend two weeks in the Navy for making the practical test as candidate-Commander in the reserve. [41]
The author of this dissertation , then president of the jury, charges them with the mission to analyse the Navy's retention problems and to present coherent actions for a better retention policy.
The method used is based on field research, through

* personal interviews with officers, NCO's, and students
* discussions with former officers and NCO's
* interviews with officers and NCO's who left the Navy before the normal age of retirement
* discussions with representatives of military syndicates
* interviews with officers in staff-functions.

During two weeks, more than 200 persons have been interviewed or personally contacted.

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[41] LTZ(D)Res Jacques De Decker and LTZ(D)Res Paul Van Maele, "Neen, dank U wel, Mijnheer, ik verkies nog steeds de Zeemacht !", TS, Paper for examination of candidate-Commander in the Reserve, Brugge, 28 September 1990.

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS

a. Work environment

Findings

- Some feel unable to execute properly their tasks because of absence of means (tools), unadapted work-space, work-rhythm without enough periods of rest, and no social coherence between work-rest-leave.
- Management has to determine the means in accordance with the tasks; often limitation of means cause limited results of performances.
- Ships need a more appropriate period of rest after a long mission at sea; during the rest period, the logistic support ashore may take over ship's maintenance.

Recommended Solutions

* Equipment and material : efficient, sufficient, and available where the action takes place.
* Visible and tangible support from shore establishments (logistics, maintenance, personnel for guard duties, and so on) for ships after long periods at sea.
* Rewards or incentives for correct use and maintenance of material.
* Simplification of the administration (less quantity of papers, less complexity of rules and procedures).
* Allow informal work breaks in order to improve human relations and the building-up of new energy.
* Avoid frustration; let people know in advance what the limitations (in budget, personnel, material) are and how this will affect the mission.
* Do more follow-up of group actions, give and ask feedback; do not accuse others or the system, take action to solve problems yourself.

b. Recruitment

Findings

- Information during recruitment is incomplete and misleading.
- Some candidate NCO's feel being forced into a specialty needed by the Navy, but not wanted by them; this causes demotivation from the start.
- Recruitment of NCO's is done once a year; why not recruit continuously ?

Recommended solutions

* Give complete and exact information from the first contact, with information of career possibilities and social promotion.
* Info-sessions before, during, and after the naval education, including an individual career planning.
* Recruitment based on the candidates' preferences whenever possible.
* Install continuous recruitment for lower ranks (NCO's and enlisted men); plan useful occupation before stepping into the annual school system.
* Ensure permanent guidance of candidates; assign appriopriate mentors.
* Reciprocal obligations and rights of the candidate and the Navy must be fully and clearly stated in the initial contract. A test period of 6 or 12 months must preceed the definitive acceptance, based on a participative evaluation system.

c. Career and Promotion

Findings

- The horizontal career, with promotions based mainly on seniority, is demotivating.
- There are not enough places for internal promotion from one personnel category (say NCO) to a higher category (i.e., officers).

- A well functioning evaluation system, related to the promotion system, is not available or failing. There are no evaluation discussions, nor effective procedures for appeal.
- Technical specialists want more recognition and special rewards such as : a specialty allowance, more chances for social promotion, and distinctive insignia.

Recommended Solutions

* An accelerated career development for the best qualified and experienced NCO's.
* Annually, a well structured evaluation report, with an evaluation discussion.
* Recognition of the category "technical specialist".
* Compensation in seniority for performances in dangerous circumstances.
* Rewards for exceptional personal efforts, such as : knowledge of languages, and special skills.
* Enhance chances for social promotions through better information and stimulating actions in the units.

d. Human Relationships

Findings

- HRM is experienced at the basis as being very positive.
- Performance interviews function as barometers, not yet as a means to solve problems. Superiors do no follow-up afterwards. These interviews are generally reactive, not preactive, and insufficiently interactive.
- There are no rewards for merits.
- The military function stays too much in the margin of society. More society integration, visible support of the community, demystification of the military institution are wanted contributions.

Recommended Solutions

* Continuation of HRM at all levels (in personal and family meetings, during breaks, in the mentalities).
* Show more concern for the family : be flexible in granting leave and periods of holidays.
* Improve performance interviews : generalize, systemize, and do follow-up.
* Reveal appreciation for excellent performances publically.
* Demystify the military function through cooperation in schools, among youth, in all levels of the society.
* Provide a network of social and family support during long missions at sea.
* The management of the Navy could eventually negociate interesting conditions for mortgages when buying a house.
* Install a "Comity for Merits" for the attribution of financial and other rewards.

e. Remuneration

Findings

- Salary is not linked with competence, skills, knowledge, or an evaluation result. They are no fringe benefits, such as meal checks, group insurances, and so on.
- The financial need is greatest when people are younger, not when they are almost retired.
- Military students receive a monthly salary, without any financial counceling. Young military students feel "rich" at 16 or 17 years of age. But once they start their career as a junior NCO, they suddenly feel "poor" due to the small difference in pay.
- Salaries at the start are perceived to be in disproportion with the required high professional qualifications.
- Allowances for week-end and night-duties are not realistic. People resent to do for example an extra 15 hours a week at a net

payment of approximately two dollars per hour.

Recommended Solutions

* Relate salary to work. Reward better work with a faster career.
* Revise salary scales; install better spreading (increase payment at the beginning); look for fiscal attractivity.
* Install more allowances for special diploma's, drafts, dangerous work, and so on.
* Revise the payment of students under 18.
* Revise allowances for military charges, such as guard duties.
* Negociate with the Ministry of Finance less fiscal pressure on allowances earned in dangerous situations, during special missions ordered by the government.

f. Drafts and assignments

Findings

The present negative effects of drafts and assignments are the result of :
- insufficient specialists available for functions on board
- unexpected priorities for the executions of urgent operational tasks at sea ordered by the goverment
- frequent permutations between ships
- impossibility to plan drafts at long-term
- the great number of persons who are unavailable for sea-duties.
- imposed periods at sea in each rank for a normal career development.

Recommended Solutions

* More effective recruitment, even using internal recruitment in other Armed Forces, especially among the troops returning from Germany.

* Better planning of drafts at short- and middle long-term.
* Fair spreading of individual drafts.
* Let people stay longer on board if they prefer just that.
* Reduce length of legally imposed periods on board for career development (propose changes to the legal texts).
* Fair spreading of periods on board and ashore.
* Link a special allowance to every draft.
* Plan personnel consequences when establishing the operational use of the ships; keep balance between concern for tasks and people.

g. Education

Findings

- A majority is looking for more extended professional education for the preparation of functions in the future.
- Naval personnel perceives and accepts a difference between technical specialists and non-technicians (among NCO's).
- Change from operational to shore functions, due to age or medical problems, is asked to remain possible; some even request an extension of reconversion opportunities.
- At the end of a career, people demand to be prepared for their return to full civilian life.

Recommended Solutions

* Keep basic military education meaningful and motivating; add HRM from the start. Display good leadership.
* Provide continuous professional development; organize additional education for specialists.

* Distinguish technical specialists from non-technicians. Link a financial difference to it.
* Offer a possibility of professional reclassification.
* Facilitate professional demands at the end of a productive career (e.g., no more sudden drafts during the last three years; assignments near the place of residence).

2. A Survey Research about Retention among Technicians (1991)

In December 1991, Lieutenant Commander Hubert Stassen delivered a paper to his instructor (the author of this dissertation) containing a survey research about how to increase motivation and improve retention among technicians in the Belgian Navy. [42]
Of all the people who leave the Navy in an early stage, about half are NCO's of the technical branch.
The method used is based on survey research, with a self-administered questionnaire sent to 497 technical officers and NCO's.
Some 160 respondents, or 32 percent of the population, filled in and returned the questionnaire.
The questionnaire is composed of 36 questions (24 closed, and 12 open), and is anonymous (see detailed representation of the questionnaire in Appendix A).

a. FINDINGS

(1) Job satisfaction

Only 7 percent is not at all satisfied, and another 7 percent is mostly not satisfied with their present work (cf. question 19).
But all the other respondents are relatively well satisfied.
The greatest percentage is obtained by

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[42] 1LZ(T) Hubert Stassen, "Op welke manier kan men bij de technici de motivatie verhogen en de retentie verbeteren ?" Paper for examination candidate Commander, Brugge, December 1991.

those who declare to be mostly satisfied with their job (39%). Even 17% pretend to be totally satisfied.
The conclusion is that two thirds of the technicians experience sufficient job satisfaction.

(2) Delegation

Most respondents (48%) find they must participate in the determination of tasks and ways of execution, and many (37%) are convinced of the value of teamwork in reaching optimal productivity with a minimum of means. Rigid "management by objectives" (MBO) is only supported by 24 percent.
So, if the Navy wants to improve retention, superiors must be more open to the consultation of their subordinates, and allowing more participation.
It is remarkable that only 8 percent of the respondents find that tasks and processes must be rigidly defined by superiors (cf. question 29).

(3) Remuneration

The answers at questions 18 and 17 provide the following findings on remuneration.
A relatively high 64 percent of the respondents claim to be insufficiently payed. Only 34 percent of the respondents on board agree that the total pay on board is sufficient, notwithstanding the importance of sea-allowances.
Some answers are probably inspired by a typical Belgian attitude which is always to ask for a lot more in order to get what you really hope for. But, it may not be neglected that the basic salary is considered to be insufficient by the majority of young technicians.

(4) Education
(cf. questions 9 and 13)

The technical education received in the Navy is seen by 53 percent as a complement to the previous education in civilian schools.
Still, 20 percent find their specialty education not to be in line with their former education.
A rather high 41 percent find their specific education too shallow with regard to the demands of the tasks.
Since three on four respondents recognize the importance of continuous education, and only 22 percent say to have received a "tailored" education (cf. question 12), the Navy is not investing enough effort in short, modular technical programs.
A surprising fact is that some 70 percent of all respondents are willing to pay themselves additional technical studies outside the Navy, if they receive credit-hours to do this (cf. question 13).
The finding that almost 60 percent find the received education not to be adapted to their actual tasks is meaningful; before being drafted to a new function the level of competence should be verified. A warming-up period is presently lacking.

(5) Available means for the execution of tasks
(cf. question 32)

Some 50 percent of all respondents experience a lack of appropriate means. Means include equipment, material, and also delivery times.
Whereas 24 percent of the technicians in the Logistic Command find their means rather insufficient, this is doubled (52%) in the answers from the technicians on board. So, most of the technical means are present in the workshops ashore, but not within direct reach of the technicians serving at sea.

(6) Information
(cf. question 33)

A total of 81 percent pretend to be sufficiently well informed in order to be able to execute tasks. This is a very good result.
But some 8 percent of the respondents say to receive lots of information which is not relevant. This means a waste of efforts and costs. Effective information is the basis for intrinsic motivation. Superiors are not channeling enough the information flow, and there is a need for filtering at the receiving end.

(7) HRM-efforts in the Navy
(cf. question 36)

The majority of the respondents (38%) find that the present HRM-efforts in the Navy contain good ideas, but they are not put into practice.
Almost 10 percent say the HRM-ideas are good, but it will take time to see the results. Another 14 percent claim that HRM is not needed when the superior (meaning his leadership) is good. And still 21 percent has no idea, which could indicate a bottle-neck at middle management or local Command level.
These results seem to support the promulgation of HRM, but to expose the great number of resisters and those who make no real effort to change "old habits". Those leaders who resist HRM may claim that the Navy is driven by traditional values. Here, "traditional" is used in the sense that superiors continue to believe that what worked in the past is bound to work in the future, regardless of change whatsoever.
In a rapidly changing environment, adherence to traditional values may quickly bring an organization to the brink

of disaster.
Superiors at middle management on local Command level may resist the implementation of HRM for several reasons. First, when superiors must learn new skills of communication, accept more delegation, or take on new challenges, they may just feel inadequate to the task ahead. Resistance will arise from a lack of self-confidence and a lack of ability. Second, if a superior sees HRM as a loss of personal power, authority or status, he may feel his worth being diminished or threatened.
Third, there is fear of the unknown. Some local superiors resent active listening and participative methods. They do not explain to their subordinates how HRM may result in a win-win situation.
Fourth, resistance may be directed at those who introduce change. In order to see HRM widely accepted, local superiors must display a high degree of openness and trust. Otherwise, even greater distrust will develop if change is forced upon everyone.
And finally, if local superiors are not included in the process of HRM from the start, or if they exclude themselves from it, they often cannot see beyond their own convictions. They do not understand the change in terms of goals and needs of the Navy. Local superiors must push aside their pride and accept some help to understand how HRM may improve the whole personnel management, and thus, the whole Navy.

(8) Leadership of superiors
(cf. question 25)

The general tendency is that satisfaction about leadership of superiors decreases with the increase in hierarchical distance between subordinate and superior (negative correlation).

A relatively high 55 percent of the respondents are pleased or very pleased with the leadership of their first-line superior.
Only 8 percent say to be not at all satisfied with this.
For the second-line superior, still 45 percent are pleased or very pleased, and 9 percent of the respondents are displeased.
As to the leadership at the third or fourth line of Command, 38 percent is pleased with it, and 18 percent say to be displeased.
This is not surprising, leadership has to be visible and direct; it happens daily between the direct superior and the subordinates within the same team or group. When a higher superior intervenes in a unit of team, it is not often perceived as leadership but as patronizing, imposing, and meddling. Also the higher superior is perceived as a bearer of bad news, such as "less budget", or "no personnel". In addition, he is known as the authority who is always demanding special efforts without giving special rewards in return.

(9) Other findings

(a) Choice of a military job
(cf. question 6)
Having a secure and steady job is for 63 percent the reason for choosing a military job; 24 percent are attracted by the career.

(b) Choice of the Navy
(cf. question 7)
For 43 percent of the respondents, adventure is the principal attraction to join the Navy; 19 percent choose the Navy because it means working near the place of residence; and another 16 percent prefer the good spirit in the Navy.

The uniform only counts for 3 percent of the choices.
By "adventure", people mean navigating, life at sea, the contact with other Navies, and to discover a part of the world.

(c) Would you choose the Navy again ?
(cf. question 8)
Some 60 percent respond positively. But a surprising 30 percent would probably not make the same choice again; this percentage corresponds with the amount of respondents who are not really satisfied with their present work (cf. question 19).
This same percentage is found in the answers about winning a lottery : 31 percent would leave the Navy if they would win a prize of over 20 million Belgian francs (cf. question 24).
More significant though is the finding that 4 and 16 percent would leave the Navy even after winning respectively 2 and 5 million francs.

(d) Team spirit
(cf. question 34)
The feeling of being a winner is certainly present within the teams : 14 percent claim to perform a lot better than the others, and 24 percent pretend simply to be better.
The majority (41%) say to be equally performing as comparable teams. And only 5 percent find their own performances worse than those of others.

(e) Improvements
(cf. question 35)
A highly remarkable 86 percent agree that changes are needed in order to improve the Navy. The desire to change indicates that the technicians like to participate in the search for

improvement.
Other results are :
66% say to have clearly formulated tasks
69% is very committed to their missions
50% find work to be stimulating permanent learning
54% stay motivated, also if drafted
76% say the Navy gains with continuous education
72% receive and help newcomers enthusiastically
50% find everyone competent in their service
65% say new ideas are welcome in their service
51% will make the best of politically imposed changes

(b) RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS

Short-term solutions

(1) Create more participation, also when defining objectives. Delegate to the lowest possible level.

(2) Involve the end-users in determining the required knowledge for technical functions (can be realized through the existing councils of specialties).

(3) Focus more attention on education. Let candidates make a report on the utility of their technical education after the first year in function. Superiors must give more direct feedback to the schools.

(4) Install credit-hours for additional education outside the Navy (in civilian technical institutes).

(5) Provide sufficient but relevant information. Use more oral means of communication.

(6) Teach practical leadership techniques to direct superiors. Make use of the "Education Center" (of the General Staff).

(7) Put more effort in recruitment. Extend the Navy's delegation during June/July in the Recruitment Center (CRS). Improve the external recruitment campaign of the Navy.

(8) Install flexible workhours.

(9) Procedures must be more customer oriented. Let the customer evaluate the quality of the products, especially their fitness for use.

(10) Establish multi-skilled teams.

(11) Listen to suggestions made by subordinates. Explain if propositions can not be accepted.

(12) Respect preferences for a specific work or function; this will enhance motivation and the effectivity of performances.

(13) Provide sufficient means for a successful execution of tasks.

Long-term solutions

(1) Ensure transfer of knowledge and experience to successors.

(2) Install a culture of rewards, create a "management of trust"; abolish a culture of power, based on a "management of fear". Provide financial and other incentives.

(3) Install a separate salary for technicians, and a specialty allowance.

(4) Review the maintenance policy. Set up standard packets for maintenance.

(5) Educate all superiors in communication management and - techniques.

(6) Create recruitment possibilities throughout the year. Eventually, provide a test period before making the choice of specialty.

CHAPTER III

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IN THE BELGIAN NAVY
(cf. Actions 7, 12, and 17 in Chapter II)

In any organization, there are the ropes to skip and the ropes to know.

R. Ritti and G. Funkhouser

In this chapter, the organizational culture existing among the officers, non-commissioned officers (NCO), and enlisted men (EM) is scrutinized in depth.
As the HRM-ship is sailing on the sea of culture, her captain must know where threats exist (shallow waters, strong tidal currents, and so on), and where new opportunities lie ahead (favorable winds and currents, deep waters, shortest way, and so on).
Because of the importance to know exactly the Navy's culture, the findings of this extensive research are analyzed and evaluated in detail.

A. INTRODUCTION

1. What is Organizational Culture ?

Organizational culture refers to a system of shared meaning held by members that distinguishes their organization from others.[1] On closer analysis, there appear to be ten value-characteristics which, when put together, form the core of an organizations's culture.[2]

Individual initiative

Risk tolerance

Direction

Integration

Management support

Control

Identity

Reward system

Conflict tolerance

Communication patterns.

By appraising on organization's perception of these characteristics, a composite picture of its culture may be formed.
Since the Belgian Navy is an organization where core values are intensely held and widely shared by a large majority, there is a strong culture present.[3] A strong culture demonstrates agreement on meaning, and builds commitment, cohesiveness, and loyalty.
Culture performs important functions within an organization, such as : a boundery-defining role, a sense of identity, commitment, social stability, and a sense-making mechanism. It guides the attitudes of people, and defines the implicit rules of the game.
Culture is mainly transmitted in the form of stories,

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1 E.H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco : Jossey-Bass, 1985), 168.

2 G.G. Gordon and W.M. Cummins, Managing Management Climate (Lexington : Lexington Books, 1979), n.pag.

3 J. Wiener, "Forms of Value Systems : A Focus on Organizational Effectiveness and Cultural Change and Maintenance", According of Management Review, October 1988, p.536.

rituals, material symbols, and language.

Cultures are extremely difficult to change when new directions are imposed; but cultures are alive and changing, especially when there is a crisis that calls into question the relevance of the current culture. Also, new top leadership may provide an alternative set of values. These conditions are present in the Belgian Armed Forces since 1990, and are growing with the consecutive personnel reduction plans and budget cuts.

2. The start of the survey research

With the implementation of the Human Resource Development Plan in the Belgian Navy, it seemed appropriate to conduct a large scale survey research on the existing organizational culture among the officers (in 1990), the non-commissioned officers or NCO's (in 1991), and the enlisted men (in 1992).

In 1990, the Belgian Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral J. De Wilde, agreed to start this survey research. As Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel, I became responsible for the development of the concept and the organization of the survey, in collaboration with the chair of sociology of the Royal Military Academy, Brussels.

The survey research was selected as the mode of observation. It allows a descriptive study of a large population, and the use of self-administered questionnaires permits anonymity, privacy (allowing free responses on sensitive issues), economy, and speed. Other advantages are : the high amount of collectable data, representative explanatory analyses, many questions can be asked on a given topic, and standardized questionnaires allow reliable measurements over the three year period.
In the questionnaires, we wanted to focus on commitment, competence, and consistency, as principal components of organizational culture.[4]
After analysis of the results of each survey, a full feed-back would be given to all participants, lessons would be learned, and policy would eventually be adapted or changed.

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[4] C.R. Hickman and M.A. Silva, Creating Excellence : Managing corporate culture, strategy and change in the new age (New York : New American Library, 1984), n.pag.

B. SURVEY RESEARCH OF THE OFFICERS (1990)

1. Population and Questionnaire

The population was composed of 277 officers, all being in function in the Navy in Belgium or on board of naval vessels. In total 207 officers participated on a free, anonymous, and confidential basis; so 75% of all the addressed officers responded.
Each officer received a personal questionnaire, in his own language (Dutch or French), accompanied by an introduction letter of the Admiral explaining the objective and requesting full collaboration.
The questionnaire itself contained 15 questions (13 closed and 2 open) and 65 variables. (see Appendix B).

2. Results

Results emerged from the analysis made by the chair of sociology, headed by professor Dr. Philippe Manigart, of the Royal Military Academy.[5]
Results on new ways for more motivation and higher competence were collected from the analysis of the open questions, made by the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel.[6]

a. Attitude towards life in general

Job-satisfaction is a very important dimension of happiness in life.

Job-satisfaction can not be isolated from a more global context : satisfaction towards life in general.

Question 2 :
Satisfaction of your life at this moment.

No or poor satisfaction	13%
Moderate satisfaction	18%
Good or great satisfaction	68%

Table 4

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5 Philippe Manigart, "Enquête concernant la culture organisationelle au sein de la Force Navale", Technical Report, October 1990, Royal Military Academy, Brussels.

6 Belgian Naval Staff, Resultaten enquête over de organisatiecultuur in de ZM, 16 Nov 1990, Note No.ZS 416591 (Brussels), Annex B.

The degree of life-satisfaction increases with rank and age (80% for superior officers, 66% for Lieutenant-Commander and below).
Also technical officers score lower (53%) than the other officers (73%).
The highest score (76%) is made by those in function on board.

Question 3 :
Expected life-satisfaction within 5 years.

No or poor satisfaction	17%
Moderate satisfaction	25%
Good or great satisfaction	58%

Table 5

Here again, expectations are more optimistic with rank and age (e.g. less than 30 years old : only 36% is optimistic about the future; over 50 years old : 96% is optimistic about the next 5 years).
In general however, this pessimistic attitude is clear but difficult to explain. The new geo-political situation (the fall of the Berlin wall and the radical changes in Eastern Europe) raised many fundamental questions among the military, such as : who is our potential enemy now, the role of NATO, the nuclear overcapacity, who must stop the numerous local civil wars ?

b. <u>The Navy as generator of satisfaction</u>

Question 1 :
Satisfaction about the functioning of the Navy.

No or poor satisfaction	19%
Moderate satisfaction	45%
Good or great satisfaction	36%

Table 6

The lowest score (25%) is obtained by the junior officers, aged less than 30 years, and by the technical officers (28%).

The highest (63%) is noted from the upper age group, i.e. the officers more than 50 years old. Officers on board reach slightly above the average (38%).

Remarkably, the vast majority (93%) of the officers consider that they respond very well to the expectations of the Navy (Question 8).

c. <u>Satisfaction towards the present function</u>
(Question 4).

On the whole, satisfaction is good or great for 78% of the respondents.
Again, the satisfaction-level increases with the age, rank, and being on board. Technical officers reach the lowest score, with a still good 63%.

d. Satisfaction towards different aspects of work

Question 5 :
Do you agree with the following statements ?

I love my work (the kind of job)	90% agree
I work in a pleasant place	83%
I have an interesting work	90%
I earn good money	49%
The team spirit is good	86%
Work-hours fit well	78%
Capacities are recognized by superiors	84%
Good relations with colleagues	95%
Good understanding with superiors	93%
My capacities are well used	73%
I help realizing tasks	76%
I identify and solve problems	68%
I can influence decisions	76%
I am pleased with my superior's actions	83%
I am generally informed in advance which may allow influencing important decisions	55%

Table 7

Extremely high scores are obtained in all aspects of human relations.
Lowest scores have salary (the only item just below 50%), and information about important work decisions (55%).
This last item may be explained by the fact that participation of all officers in a decision-making process is not appropriate when the issues are important and require selective competence and experience.

e. Factors of motivation and demotivation

Question 6 : In what degree are the following factors demotivating ?

% Anwers "very demotivating"	
Salary and allowances	20%
Guards and night duties	12%
Irregular service hours	4%
Absence from home	5%
Planned draft on board	5%
Unplanned draft on board	48%
Draft ashore	16%
Not receiving sea-allowances (alongside)	18%
Lack of career informations	28%
Lack of recognition of performances	30%
Insufficient delegation of responsibilities	28%
Insufficient self-development	35%
Too heavy workload	7%
Too much paper-work	38%
Not enough means (personnel/material/budget)	60%
The promotion systems (too slow)	37%

Table 8

The big demotivator is clearly the lack of means (60%), such as personnel, equipment, and finance. Other important demotivators are :

- unscheduled draft for sea duty (48%)
- too much administrative work (38%)
- the promotion system (37%)
- not enough chances for self-development (35%).

There are also some slight differences in the answers from Dutch and French-speaking officers. The latter group finds absences from home, unscheduled draft on board, not receiving sea-allowances when being alongside, lack of career information and of recognition, more demotivating than the Dutch-speaking officers who form the majority (71%).

Surprisingly, planned draft on board (5%), irregular hours (4%) and absences from home (5%) emerge as almost neglectable demotivating factors.

Question 7 :
Do you agree with the following statements concerning motivation ?

Missions are well formulated	74%	agree
Tasks are clearly formulated	75%	
Tasks can be situated within the objectives of the Navy	87%	
Most collaborators support their tasks	83%	
I am totally committed to the mission	95%	
My work helps education & training	68%	
I help developing potentials of collaborators	87%	
My work-motivation stays the same, even if work or place change	60%	
Permanent education & training lead to better results on board	94%	
Permanent education & training lead to better results ashore	86%	
Communication of results on education & training to all participants	62%	
On the job, focus is put on motivation and competence of each	70%	
In my group, commitment is great	85%	
In my group, competence level is high	72%	
In my group, commitment of newcomers is high	78%	
In my group, competence of newcomers is high	58%	
In my group, new ideas and changes are accepted and explained	73%	

Table 9

Concerning the motivators, respondents gave many homogeneous answers. This confirms the unanimity of judgment on motivation in the Navy.
The lowest score (58%) on the motivating effect caused by the competence of newcomers in the group can be explained by the lack of skills and experience which may be normal for school-leavers, but which is not appreciated by the group for obvious reasons (it weakens the quality of the team, transfer of competence takes time and patient coaching, it increases the risk of human errors).

f. Strongest motivating factors

Open question 15 :
What do you suggest in order to improve motivation among your collaborators ?

	10 STRONGEST MOTIVATING FACTORS	
1	To feel RECOGNITION	63%
2	To receive SELF-RESPONSIBILITY	55%
3	To experience SELF-REALIZATION	44%
4	To be involved in DECISIONS	43%
5	The maximum USE of CAPACITIES	40%
6	To experience SELF-DEVELOPMENT	30%
7	PARTICIPATIVE management	30%
8	To solve PROBLEMS	30%
9	To REALIZE PERSONAL OBJECTIVES	29%
10	Effective INTERNAL COMMUNICATION	25%

Table 10

These answers provided by the officers coincide remarkably well with the motivators, or growth factors resulting in job enrichment, as described by Frederick Herzberg : achievement, recognition, the work itself, responsibility, and advancement or growth.[7]

Officers want to be recognized as winners. Indeed, in the military profession, the only alternative is being a loser which is totally unacceptable when one has to defend and protect the common interest and the value system of millions of people. If an officer is willing to risk his life for the community, he feels entitled to some recognition by his superiors, but not in the least by the members of his own society.
To receive more self-responsibility is related with competence and mutual trust. The principle of subsidiarity could be more applied by the hierarchy.
Officers want to fulfil their own expectations about their profession. They like to understand the "why" of decisions, and prefer to be involved in the decision-making process. They accept being pushed hard, but not being pushed around. Self-development is a permanent challenge. The leading of teams require excellent internal communication, problem solving interviews, and the participation of every member of the group.
Respondents also find it motivating to realize personal objectives, which are congruent with the goals of the Navy.
Therefore, a good system for the registration of preferences or interests, and regular performance interviews, are needed in order to know the individual aspirations.

Other indications on how to improve motivation got a lesser score but should not be neglected.

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[7] Frederik Herzberg, "One more time : How do you motivate employees ?", Harvard Business Review, January-February 1968,39.

11	Good human relations/showing appreciation	22%
12	Be interested in social/family problems of others	19%
13	Team building/feed-back/exchange experience	19%
14	Show the example (own motivation, enthusiasm, good humour)	18%
15	Reward system based on merits/ results	9%
16	Setting priorities/objectives together	8%
17	Improve workconditions/balance workload/include relaxation	7%
18	Install quality circles	6%
19	Be available/well informed	6%
20	Evaluate continuously, and follow-up	5%

Table 11

The rather surprising discovery is that "more money" is not suggested in this top-20, as a way to improve motivation.
In answering this open question, respondents apparently looked for intrinsic motivators in the first place. Still, 20% of the officers regarded salary and allowances as "very demotivating" when answering the closed question 6 (see Table 8).

g. Strongest competence-improving factors

Open question 14 :
What do you suggest to increase the competence of your collaborators ?

	TEN STRONGEST COMPETENCE IMPROVING FACTORS	
1	Permanent EDUCATION and TRAINING	48%
2	MOTIVATING workconditions	42%
3	Reduce/rationalize drafts	18%
4	Career based on competence	16%
5	Better pay	12%
6	Better recruitement and selection	7%
7	Transfer of knowledge and experience	6%
8	Sanction incompetence	5%
9	No trainees in functions on board	4%
10	More time at sea/no routine work	3%

Table 12

A first observation is that the scores are a lot lower than those attributed to the strongest motivating factors, as shown in table 10.
Here only two exceed the 20% level, whereas all ten motivating factors obtained scores higher than 20%.
The topscore confirms the necessity to invest heavily in the continuous education and training of all personnel.
Detailed analysis of the answers reveal how respondents want to achieve this objective.
They recommend :

- updating of education programs, focused on the practice at sea.
- more but shorter punctual programs (e.g. on new equipment)
- improve the quality of the instructors
- generalize knowledge of computers
- more exchange with civilian companies (increase expertise)
- develop education of management

- allow education in civilian schools
- no decrease of quality norms
- to be an instructor oneself
- exchange programs with U.S., U.K., Dutch, French, and German Navies
- to specialize according to ships types
- to increase multiskilling (e.g. cross-training on board).

The second highest factor shows clearly the overall importance of motivation for each collaborator. The motivating factors have already been mentioned before. Some new approaches emerged in this competence context :
- be exigent on quality of work
- be clear (e.g. in task descriptions)
- decentralize as much as possible
- learn from mistakes (accept small human errors)
- do research and development
- improve infrastructure and office equipment.

Respondents further demand an individual planning of drafts, and a progress in merit as a condition for promotion.
They also want better pay for technicians, and allowances for unhealthy or dangerous work.
Recruitment and selection should be better transferred from seniors to juniors.
A small percentage claim for sanctions against absenteeism or incompetence (e.g. career stop, or dismissal).

3. Conclusions

The principal conclusion of this survey research on the existing organizational culture among the officers of the Belgian Navy is that, generally, they are rather satisfied with their life and with their work. Of all the factors used in the questionnaire, only a very few are really demotivating them.
More detailed analysis shows however that results are influenced by a number of variables, such as ranks (below or above Lieutenant-Commander), the officers corps (technical, services, or deck), age, and the

language (Dutch or French). The most satisfied appear to be the superior officers (Commanders and above), the officers belonging to the Corps of services (personnel, supply, and finance officers, including some in the naval infantry), the age-group between 45 and 55 years, and the Dutch speaking officers. This last deduction from the answers is not surprising : the naval bases are all situated in the coastal province where most officers work and live, and where Dutch is spoken.

As could be expected, salary and insufficient means are two factors considered to be the least positive. These two elements depend directly on political decisions concerning defense and escape largely from the control of naval authorities. Nevertheless, the reorganization of the Navy's means (personnel, fleet, budget, infrastructure, schools, and logistics) should allow to realize the mission as successful as possible.

Other less positive aspects are the late information about important work decisions, the insufficient participation in the identification and solution of problems, the unscheduled drafts for sea-duty, the administrative work, and the promotion system.
For these aspects the Navy's Human Resource Development Plan will look for answers for step-by-step improvement.

Finally, the survey demonstrated the existence of a distinct organizational culture within the Belgian Navy. The great majority of the officers declare indeed that tasks and missions are clearly defined, that people know them well and identify themselves with them, and that the personnel on the whole is motivated. What during the period before 1990 was supposed to exist (based on intuition and observation of performances and behavior), has been confirmed in this survey research with lots of interesting detailed information.

The Chief of Staff was anxious to know how the other personnel categories, the Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO's) and the Enlisted Men would feel about organizational culture. As Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel, I was asked by the Admiral to continue the survey research for NCO's in 1991, and for Enlisted Men in 1992.

C. SURVEY RESEARCH OF THE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS (1991)

1. Population and Questionnaire

The population was composed of 1176 non-commissioned officers (NCO's), all in function in the Navy in Belgian establishments or on board of naval vessels. In total 737 NCO's participated on a free, anonymous and confidential basis; or 63% of all the addressed NCO's responded.
The same method was applied as for the officers in 1990. Each NCO received a personal questionnaire, in his own language (Dutch or French), accompanied by an introduction letter of the Admiral explaining the meaning and requesting everyone's participation.
The questionnaire itself contained 19 questions (all closed ones), and 88 variables.
The questionnaire used for the officers the year before was slightly adapted and updated with new questions regarding drafts, operations in the Persian Gulf, and ways to increase motivation and improve competence. Still, a comparison between the organizational culture of officers and NCO's would be possible.
Details on the questionnaire NCO's : see Appendix C.

2. Results

The analysis of the answers was again made by the chair of sociology, at the Royal Military Academy, under the personal guidance of professor Dr. Philippe Manigart.[8]

a. Attitude towards life in general

Question 2 :
Satisfaction of your life at this moment.

No or poor satisfaction	14%
Moderate satisfaction	26%
Good or great satisfaction	60%

Table 13

[8] Philippe Manigart, "Culture organisationnelle au sein de la Force Navale : les resultats de la deuxième vague de l'enquête (les sous-officiers)", Technical report SS16, November 1991, Royal Military Academy, Brussels.

The NCO's seem to be slightly less satisfied with their life (60%) than the officers (68% in 1990). This is no surprise, because we previously found out that life-satisfaction tends to decrease with a lower rank (cf. the results of the officers' survey in 1990).
The satisfaction of the most senior till the most junior NCO's ranges from 73% to 51%. These results are confirmed by the same tendency in the qualification levels, and the age groups : those over 50 years old with the highest rank and qualification are generally quite satisfied with their life; only half of those under 30 years with the lowest rank and qualification are satisfied in the same amount.

Question 3 :
Expected life-satisfaction within 5 years.

No or poor satisfaction	15%
Moderate satisfaction	26%
Good or great satisfaction	59%

Table 14

Here, we observe no difference between the officers and the NCO's.

French speaking NCO's are less optimistic about their near future than their Flemish colleagues (with a difference of 11%).
However, the female NCO's are more optimistic than their male colleagues (68% against 58%); but only 42 women (or 6% of the total) participated which makes the difference not statistically significant.

b. The Navy as generator of satisfaction

Question 1 :
Satisfaction about the functioning of the Navy.

No or poor satisfaction	25%
Moderate satisfaction	40%
Good or great satisfaction	36%

Table 15

The highest amount a satisfaction reached by officers and NCO's is equal (both 36%).
A higher percentage of NCO's (25%) is not satisfied when compared with the officers (19%).
If these percentages appear rather low, they are superior to the level of satisfaction of the NCO's in the whole Belgian Armed Forces. Indeed, during a survey research in 1989, only 21% of the NCO's declared to be well or very well satisfied with the functioning of the Belgian Armed Forces.[9]
Here, detailed analysis shows that the lowest score is obtained by the most junior NCO's (only 30% are really satisfied), and by the technical branches (26% of the electronic specialists say to be satisfied).
The most senior NCO's are best satisfied (54%), and especially those in the administration branch (up to 60%).
Unscheduled drafts for sea-duty decrease satisfaction with at least 7%; falling from 41% to only 28% for those who experienced four or more drafts on board with less than 3 days warning time.
Naturally, those NCO's who love their work are twice as much satisfied than the rest (49% against 25%).

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[9] "Enquête sur la satisfaction au travail des militaires belges", Technical Report SS03, 1990, Royal Military Academy, Brussels.

I love my work (the kind of job)	86%	agree
I work in a pleasant place	76%	
I have an interesting work	82%	
I earn good money	30%	
The team-spirit is good	87%	
Work hours fit well	75%	
Capacities are recognized by superiors	80%	
Good relations with colleagues	97%	
Good understanding with superiors	89%	
My capacities are well used	70%	
My team helps realizing tasks	76%	
I help to identify and solve problems	69%	
I can influence decisions	70%	
I am pleased with my superior's actions	75%	
Generally I am informed in advance which may allow influencing important decisions	45%	
My direct superior :		
- takes my ideas/suggestions serious	78%	
- stimulates my motivation	62%	
- uses performance interviews	50%	
- supports me with advice and action	61%	

Table 17

Again, we see a confirmation of the extremely high scores for human relations obtained in the officers' survey. The NCO's are quasi unanimous about their good relations with their colleagues. Lowest scores have salary (70% think it is not good enough), information about important work decisions (55% think their information comes too late to allow some input from their own), and performance interviews (only half the NCO's think their superior makes good use of these interviews). However, performance interviews just started in 1990 on a general basis, and lots of NCO's still had to be trained in this techniques on the moment of the survey. On the other hand, if 50% of the NCO's agreed that their superior made good use of these interviews, just one

year after the start of this initiative, this percentage could also be interpreted as a successful result. As for the participation of NCO's in important decision-making processes, this is most appropriate when superiors need an expert advise on a punctual matter. Still, almost half of the respondents say to be informed well in advance so that they could influence their superior's decisions.

Generally, NCO's are rather satisfied with the main aspects of their work. On the other hand, leadership and support of the direct superior should be improved, possibly through better internal communication.

A last surprisingly positive evolution is observed in work-satisfaction : 86% declare "to love their job" in 1991, when only 68% of the same population expressed this same important feeling in the 1989 survey on job-satisfaction in the Belgian Armed Forces.

e. Factors of motivation and demotivation

Question 6 :
In what degree are the following factors demotivating ?

	% Answers "very demotivating"
Salary and allowances	38%
Guards and night duties	23%
Irregular service hours	13%
Absence from home	19%
Planned draft on board	18%
Unplanned draft on board	51%
Draft ashore	27%
Not receiving sea-allowances (alongside)	35%
Lack of career informations	27%
Lack of recognition of performances	37%
Insufficient delegation of responsibilities	23%
Insufficient self-development	37%
Too heavy workload	10%
Too much paper-work	22%
Not enough means (personnel/material/budget)	59%
The promotion system (too slow)	55%

Table 18

A first observation is that, with the exception of the administrative work which seems to demotivate the officers more than the NCO's (38% against 22%), all other items are judged to be more demotivating by the NCO's than by the officers.
A second fact is that some items are perceived as quite demotivating by the NCO's, which were not particularly demotivating for the officers. This is so for salary, guards, service hours, absences from home, planned drafts on board, drafts ashore, and absence of sea-allowances being alongside. Money and family seem to have a greater impact on the motivation of NCO's, reaching twice the effect they had on officers. This is not a surprise, NCO's do have a rather modest basic salary during the first ten years of their career, and they spend generally more time at sea than the officers (an average of 15 years against 10 years for the officers).

For all the other items, officers and NCO's share the same opinions. This is very much so for the biggest demotivator, the lack of means, reaching respectively 60% and 59% on the "very demotivating"-scale of officers and NCO's.
Other important demotivators are, in decreasing order of importance :

- the promotion system (55%, against 37% for the officers)
- unscheduled draft on board (51%, vs. 48% for Offrs.)
- salary and allowances (38%, vs. only 19% for Offrs.)
- lack of recognition of performances (37%, vs. 31% for Offrs.)
- insufficient self-development (37%, vs. 36% for Offrs.)

The lowest score as demotivator is obtained by the workload, which is considered being too heavy by only 10% of the respondents.

Again, French-speaking NCO's seem to have more complaints than their Dutch-speaking colleagues. This confirms the same tendency in the officers' survey, and it is repeated in the analysis of the other questions.
So, this difference should be attributed to the basically different cultures and mentalities between those two dominant ethnic groups of Belgians. In the Belgian Navy, it should be noted that French-speaking NCO's know fairly well both languages, and the English procedure is commonly practiced during operations.

Question 9 :
Do you agree with the following statements concerning motivation ?

Missions are well formulated	67%	agree
Tasks are clearly formulated	70%	
Tasks can be situated within objectives of the Navy	83%	
Most collaborators support their tasks	75%	
I am totally committed to the mission	80%	
My work helps education & training	70%	
I help developing potentials of collaborators	87%	
My work-motivation stays the same, even if work or place change	60%	
Permanent education & training lead to better results on board	91%	
Permanent education & training lead to better results ashore	74%	
Communication of results on education and training to all participants	45%	
On the job, focus is put on motivation and competence of each	43%	
In my group, commitment is great	75%	
In my group, competence level is high	73%	
In my group, commitment of newcomers is high	66%	
In my group, competence of newcomers is high	58%	
In my group, new ideas and changes are accepted and explained	58%	

Table 19

Once more, we observe a large consensus among NCO's and officers about what motivates them. Four items though make an exception :
- focus put an individual motivation and competence (43% vs. 70% for the Offrs.)
- communication of results on education & Trg (45% vs. 62% for the Offrs.)
- consideration of new ideas and changes (58% vs. 73% for the Offrs.)
- commitment of newcomers is high (66% vs. 78% for the Offrs.).

Although receiving a very high score, the item about total personal commitment to the Navy's mission did not reach to highest peak with the NCO's as it did with the officers (80% vs. 95% for the Offrs.).
The highest agreement among the NCO's existed on the improvement of results on board through permanent education and training (91%, vs. 94% for the Offrs.).
From a general view, NCO's are quite well motivated, but on a slightly lower level than the officers.

f. Drafts

Question 7 :
During your career, how many times were you drafted for urgent/unscheduled reasons (warning time : 3 days or less) ?

On board :	
Never	31%
Between 1 and 3 times	44%
More than 3 times	25%
Average no. of times	2.92
Ashore :	
Never	56%
Between 1 and 3 times	37%
More than 3 times	7%
Average no. of times	1.33

Table 20

It appears that unscheduled drafts on board are more frequent than those ashore. About 2/3 of the NCO's experienced three urgent drafts on board during their whole career, and 2/5 experienced one similar draft ashore. Since government decisions concerning naval participation in the Persian Gulf, the Adriatic Sea, in Zaire, Somalia, or elsewhere, can not be scheduled in advance, such drafts will remain unpleasant for half of the NCO's, but this inconvenience is related to the specificity of the military profession.

Question 8 :
Do you agree on the following statements concerning the organization of drafts in the Navy ?

- For my drafts, my own preferences were sufficiently taken into account	60% agree
- The period of my previous function was too short to acquire experience	36%
- I must move too often due to drafts	10%
- Drafts cause practical and financial inconveniences	68%
- If I get an inconvenient draft, I shall leave the Navy	41%

Table 21

In 1991, 41% of the NCO's declared their intention to leave the Navy whenever a draft seemed totally inconvenient to them.
Reality proofs however that no more than 5% leave the Navy for this specific reason. Some also return after a period of 3,6,9 months or one year because they probably discovered new inconveniences in the profit sector, such as unemployment.
The well known fact that drafts cause practical and financial problems was confirmed by 68%.

On the other hand, a majority (60%) of the respondents also confirms that the preference-registration system works, and only a minority (10%) complaints about moving too often due to drafts.

g. Strongest motivating factors

Question 10 :
What do you choose in order to improve motivation among your collaborators ?

10 STRONGEST MOTIVATING FACTORS	1st	2nd	3rd choice
1. Giving SELF-RESPONSIBILITY	23%	16%	8%
2. Giving the EXAMPLE myself	17%	10%	12%
3. Working really as a TEAM	12%	11%	9%
4. Having good human RELATIONS	10%	8%	13%
5. CONGRATULATIONS for results	6%	7%	6%
6. Let them TEST and PROVE THEMSELVES	6%	7%	5%
7. Showing RESPECT	4%	6%	6%
8. Explaining REASONS of DECISIONS	4%	4%	5%
9. Using their full CAPACITIES	3%	6%	5%
10. Involving them in the OBJECTIVES	3%	6%	5%

Table 22

There seems to be a large consensus among the respondents concerning the four most motivating factors, which are in decreasing order of importance :

- giving self-responsibility, based on trust and delegation;
- showing the own example, displaying motivation, enthusiasm, and humour;
- working really as a team;
- having good human relations.

Expressed in another way, these factors were ranked high on the officers'list as well, with the exception of showing the example wich occupied only the 14th place (see Table 11).
NCO's are working more closely with their teams than officers, and they must inspire their people in the first place because they are visible all the time, working daily at the same tasks with their collaborators. NCO's know that followers only follow credible leaders, who appeal by their example.

h. Strongest competence-improving factors

Question 11 :
What do you choose in order to improve the competence of your collaborators ?

SIX STRONGEST COMPETENTE-IMPROVING FACTORS			
	1st	2nd	3rd choice
1. Creating a MOTIVATING WORK ATMOSPHERE	27%	17%	18%
2. Sharing my KNOWLEDGE and EXPERIENCE	26%	21%	8%
3. Contributing to permanent EDUCATION & TRAINING	10%	7%	8%
4. Demanding better QUALITY and RESULTS	8%	8%	11%
5. Linking PROMOTION with PERFORMANCES	8%	6%	4%
6. Accepting ERRORS when taking initiatives	6%	15%	18%

Table 23

The most important factors appear to be a motivating workenvironment (ranked no. 2 by the officers), transfer of competence and skills (ranked no. 7 by the officers), and permanent education and training (ranked first by the officers).
It is remarkable that NCO's perceive making errors when taking lots of initiatives as a good competence-improving tool, whereas the officers prefer to sanction any incompetence (see Table 12). Again, NCO's know better the human reality, where daily errors simply occur despite all Total Quality Management where "zero errors" is a long-term objective. The "no-error"-concept and the "right to make errors" seem to be in contradiction, but NCO's are practical people : they prefer to make good use of errors made by hard working team-members, they analyse mistakes, discuss them within the group, adapt processes, make proposals to their superiors, and consequently raise the competence-level of the team. Ultimately, less errors will occur and the quality of work will improve.

i. <u>The operations in the Persian Gulf</u>

Question 13 :
Have you participated in the operations in the Persian Gulf ?

In 1987/88			
- Directly		15%	
- Indirectly		29%	
	Total		44%
In 1990/91			
- Directly		30%	
- Indirectly		38%	
	Total		68%

Table 24

Globally, 68% of the NCO's confirm to have participated, directly (on board, or on the spot) or indirectly (logistical support), at least in one of both operations.

To those who participated, another question was asked.

Question 14 :
What did this experience represent for you ?

- A purely financial matter	76%
- A precious professional enrichment	58%
- A unique personal experience	91%
- A too long absence	44%
- A reason to stay in the Navy	50%
- A reason to leave the Navy	10%

Table 25

Clearly, NCO's have seen their participation in the Persian Gulf above all as a unique personal experience, with an appreciated financial attraction. This last point is normal when one considers the low basic salary of NCO's younger than 35 years, who are most represented on board. Also, the professional enrichment is considered to be very valuable by 58% of the respondents.

3. Conclusions

The principal lesson from this survey research on the organizational culture among the non-commissioned officers of the Belgian Navy is that, generally, they are rather satisfied with their life and work. Only a very few factors used in the questionnaire are really demotivating them.

Deeper analysis shows that results are being influenced by a number of variables, such as the language of the participants.
Indeed, French-speaking NCO's appear to be systematically less satisfied than their Dutch-speaking colleagues, whatever the work-dimension. The facts are well known : naval bases are situated near the sea where Dutch is spoken; recruitment and retention of French-speaking NCO's are less successful; wifes and family of these NCO's prefer to stay in the East of Belgium causing practical and financial problems sooner or later.
Other variables are the levels of qualification, the specialty-group, and the age-group. The most satisfied NCO's are those with the highest rank, belonging to the administration specialty-group, and in the age-group between 45 and 55 years.

Generally, NCO's are slightly less satisfied than the officers. This becomes clear after comparison between the results of both surveys. However, NCO's seem more critical, but at the same time, also more practical than the officers when it comes to suggest strong motivators (e.g. role of their own example), or to choose competence stimulators (e.g. accepting errors when taking lots of initiatives).

As emerged already in the survey among the officers, low salary and insufficient means are considered by NCO's as the least positive. The other less positive aspects confirm the findings of the officers' survey. Direct superiors should become better coaches by practicing more internal communication, stimulating motivation and showing more concern for their people through better individual support. Also, superiors could show more visible signs of respect for those who continuously lead teams and execute tasks at the front lines, i.e. there where our clients expect to see results.

Now that the existence of a coherent naval culture was confirmed by the results of both officers and non-commissioned officers, the Chief of Staff asked to undertake the third wave of the survey research with the enlisted men, in 1992.

D. SURVEY RESEARCH OF THE ENLISTED MEN (1992)

1. Population and Questionnaire

The population was composed of 924 enlisted men (EM), all in function in Belgian naval establishments or on board of naval vessels. In total 382 enlisted men participated on a free, anonymous, and confidential basis. So, only 41% of all the addressed enlisted men responded, whereas we noted 63% for the NCO's, and 75% for the officers. The sample of 382 respondents is still representative, since for most of such researches by posted questionnaire the response level exceeds rarely 40%.[10]

The sample gives the same proportion of Dutch-speaking (72%) and French-speaking (28%) participants, as present in the total population of the enlisted men.

Sex- and age-groups are represented in tables 26 and 27.

Sex	POPULATION		SAMPLE	
	no.	%	no.	%
M	952	87%	305	81%
F	140	13%	74	19%
Total	1092	100%	379	100%

Table 26

[10] Philippe Manigart, "La culture organisationnelle au sein de la Force Navale : les résultats de la troisième vague de l'enquête", Technical Report SS18, September 1992, Royal Military Academy, Brussels.

Age	POPULATION		SAMPLE	
	no.	%	no.	%
< 31	416	38%	174	46%
31-49	636	58%	188	50%
> 50	40	4%	13	4%
Total	1092	100%	375	100%

Table 27

Globally, we observe an over-representation of female participants, and of those in the age-group under 31 years. These deviations are not significative for the further analysis.

The same method was applied as for the officers and the NCO's in 1990 and 1991.
The questionnaire was exactly the same as the one used for the NCO's the year before. This should allow a final comparison between the answers on organizational culture of each personnel category : officers, NCO's, and enlisted men.

2. Results

The analysis of the answers was once more made by the chair of sociology, at the Royal Military Academy, directed by professor Dr. Philippe Manigart.[11]

In providing the tables with results, we shall display comparing findings from the previous surveys.

[11] Ibid.

a. Attitude towards life in general

Question 2 :
Satisfaction of your life at this moment.

	EM(1992)	NCO(1991)	OFF(1990)
No or poor satisfaction	6%	14%	13%
Moderate satisfaction	23%	26%	18%
Good or great satisfaction	70%	60%	68%

Table 28

The big surprise of table 28 is that the enlisted men (EM) are more satisfied with their present life than the officers and the NCO's. On the whole, 93% of the EM are at least moderately satisfied, against 86% for the NCO's and the officers. This result is totally unexpected. In any organization, the satisfaction level is generally correlated with the level in the hierarchy : the higher in the hierarchy, the higher the satisfaction level, and vice versa. This general tendency had also been observed, in 1989, during the research on job-satisfaction of the military in Belgium.[12]
This present observation is not an isolated result, or a kind of aberration. The analysis of the other sections confirm the fact that the EM are equally or even more satisfied than the other categories. How can this be explained ?
A first hypothesis consists in the interpretation of the low number of respondents.
Here, one could argue that only the most motivated EM have participated, and those are normally more satisfied than the rest. This can not be proven. The present workconditions, with a lack of means, are rather unfavorable for this hypothesis. Since it is impossible to measure the satisfaction level

[12] Philippe Manigart, "Enquête sur la satisfaction au travail des militaires belges", Technical Report SS03, 1990, Royal Military Academy, Brussels.

of those EM who did not cooperate (59% of the population), this hypothesis can not be tested.
A second hypothesis consists in admitting the actual difference to be correct. In this case, the reason could be the functioning of the Navy itself, or the interval between the three surveys. As to the first possibility, we could suppose that EM in the Navy have always been more satisfied than the others because drafts are less frequent in this category, their place of work is more stable, they receive more autonomy in their job, they find their work more interesting, they are more appreciated by their superiors, they have not to worry about promotions (which are very limited and based on seniority), etc. This is contradicted by the results of the survey research on job-satisfaction of the Belgian military, in 1989. Then, only 47% of the EM in the Navy answered to have "good or great satisfaction", against 48% for the NCO's, and 60% for the officers.

Satisfaction level seems, partially at least, linked with the number of unscheduled drafts. For the EM, the averages for such urgent drafts on board is only 1,84 and 0,84 ashore, which are quite lower than for the other categories.
As for the interval between the surveys, one could suppose that between 1991 and 1992, the satisfaction of all naval personnel had increased. This seems unprobable, since NCO's would be supposed to have made a jump of 10% between 1991 and 1992 without any reason.
External changes happened in this period, such as personnel reduction and budget cuts. Obviously this can not explain a better satisfaction.

A last hypothesis could be more acceptable. It consists of accepting the effects of the Navy's Human Resource Development Plan as the reason for greater satisfaction. The implementation started in 1990, so the officers could reflect some small progress (+8%), the NCO's advanced more in 1991 (+12% since 1989), and the EM confirmed the trend in 1992 (+23% since 1989).

Detailed analysis shows that Dutch-speaking EM are more satisfied than their French-speaking colleagues (75% vs. 57%), women are a lot more satisfied than men (81% vs. 61%), and satisfaction increases with age (from 67% for those under 31 years vs. 73% for those between 31 and 49 years).

Question 3 :
Expected life-satisfaction within 5 years.

	EM(1992)	NCO(1991)	OFF(1990)
No or poor satisfaction	11%	15%	17%
Moderate satisfaction	27%	26%	25%
Good or great satisfaction	62%	59%	58%
Numbers	367	684	202

Table 29

Here we observe that EM are less optimistic for the near future than for their present life. At the moment of the survey, the new restructuration plan for the Belgian Armed Forces was already announced by the government. The end of the conscripts (from 1994) would downgrade the enlisted men to the bottom of all personnel categories.

For the rest, no significant difference was noticed between the three categories.

b. The Navy as generator of satisfaction

Question 1 :
Satisfaction about the functioning of the Navy.

	EM(1992)	NCO(1991)	OFF(1990)
No or poor satisfaction	14%	25%	19%
Moderate satisfaction	39%	40%	45%
Good or great satisfaction	47%	36%	36%
Numbers	380	700	206

Table 30

Once again, the enlisted men appear to be the most satisfied, with a clear difference of 11% against the other categories.
In the 1989 survey on job-satisfaction in the Belgian Armed Forces, the satisfaction level of the EM of the Navy reached only 21%. Because the sample was very limited (with only 121 participants of the Navy, all categories included), the percentage difference is considered to be not statistically significant.[13]
Detailed analysis confirms previous findings concerning the language, and age.
Alike the officers and the NCO's, the enlisted men are almost unanimous (95%) in their conviction that they respond very well to the expectations of the Navy (Question 12).

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[13] Philippe Manigart, 'Enquête sur la satisfaction au travail des militaires belges", Technical Report SS03, 1990, Royal Military Academy, Brussels.

c. Satisfaction towards the present function

Question 4 :
Degree of satisfaction about your present function.

	EM(1992)	NCO(1991)	OFF(1990)
No or poor satisfaction	9%	14%	7%
Moderate satisfaction	17%	18%	15%
Good or great satisfaction	75%	68%	78%
Numbers	381	701	207

Table 31

On the whole, the EM are very satisfied about their present function, just like the officers, and even more than the NCO's.
Detailed analysis shows that divers and EM of the deck-specialties make the highest scores (81%), and technicians the lowest (62%).
Also, EM occupying their function since more than five years are more satisfied (77%), than those in function less than six months (46%).

d. Satisfaction towards different aspects of work

Question 5 :
Do you agree with the following statements ?

	EM(1992)	NCO(1991)	OFF(1990)
I love my work (kind of job)	90%	86%	90%
I work in a pleasant place	84%	76%	83%
I have an interesting work	84%	82%	88%
I earn good money	35%	30%	50%
The team-spirit is good	85%	87%	86%
Work hours fit well	85%	75%	78%
Capacities are recognized by superiors	79%	80%	87%
Good relations with colleagues	96%	97%	95%
Good understanding with superiors	91%	89%	93%
My capacities are well used	77%	70%	73%
My team helps realizing tasks	74%	76%	77%
I help to identify and solve problems	73%	69%	65%
I can influence decisions	79%	70%	74%
I am pleased with my superior's actions	77%	75%	81%
Generally I am informed in advance which may allow influencing important decisions	55%	45%	53%
My direct superior :			
- takes my ideas/suggestions serious	72%	78%	-
- stimulates my motivation	65%	62%	-
- uses performance interviews	58%	50%	-
- supports me with advice and action	67%	61%	-

Table 32

On the whole, satisfaction about the work or the kind of job is very high in all personnel categories of the Navy, and notably higher than in the other Belgian armed forces.[14]

A second observation is that, with the exception for the salary (only 35% of the EM are satisfied with it), use of performance interviews (58%), and the fact of being informed in advance allowing some influences on important decisions (55%), all other percentages are well over 60% of satisfaction. This confirms the tendency we already saw in the surveys of 1991 and 1990.

A third observation is that, as in 1991 and 1990, all aspects concerning human relations receive particular high satisfaction scores. Thus, 96% of all respondents during the three surveys agree that relations with colleagues are good.
In general, of the 20 items, 8 receive at least 80% (average for all personnel categories), and 13 get over 70% of satisfaction.
However, the survey confirms that direct superiors should show more concern for their people by stimulating better their motivation, giving more advice and support, and by making more effective use of performance interviews.
Detailed analysis confirms that French-speaking EM are somewhat less satisfied than their Dutch-speaking colleagues (84% vs. 92%), but also that women are more satisfied than men (96% vs. 89%).
The satisfaction changes according to the age-group:
- over 50 years : 100% of the respondents are well or greatly satisfied;
- between 49 and 31 years : 96%;
- less than 31 years : 86%.

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[14] In the survey research on job-satisfaction of the Belgian military in 1989, the average for all forces and ranks reached 69%. For the enlisted men, the score was 67% (vs. 90% for the EM of the Navy, in 1992).

e. Factors of motivation and demotivation

Question 6 :
In what degree are the following factors demotivating ?

VERY DEMOTIVATING FACTORS	EM(1992)	NCO(1991)	OFF(1990)
Salary and allowances	32%	38%	19%
Guards and night duties	23%	23%	13%
Irregular service hours	15%	13%	4%
Absence from home	20%	19%	5%
Planned draft on board	31%	18%	6%
Unplanned draft on board	55%	51%	48%
Draft ashore	26%	27%	15%
Not receiving sea-allowances (alongside)	21%	35%	16%
Lack of career informations	31%	27%	26%
Lack of recognition of performances	32%	37%	31%
Insufficient delegation of responsibilities	16%	23%	28%
Insufficient self-development	32%	37%	36%
Too heavy workload	8%	10%	7%
Too much paper-work	16%	22%	38%
Not enough means (personnel/material/budget)	51%	59%	60%
The promotion system (too slow)	53%	55%	37%

Table 33

Globally, the enlisted men follow the same ranking of the most demotivating factors as the other categories.
The three most demotivating aspects for all naval personnel are : the shortage of means (or a discrepancy exists between the available means and the execution of tasks), the number of unscheduled drafts on board, and the present promotion system (too slow, too much automatism, not enough impact of merits and individual potential).
A minority of enlisted men finds the following factors very demotivating :

- too heavy workload (8%, and less than 10% for all naval personnel);
- too much administrative work (16%, but increasingly demotivating for the other categories, reaching 38% for the officers);
- insufficient delegation of responsibilities and authority (16%, but again in an increasing degree for the other categories).

Detailed analysis shows that also among the EM, French-speaking respondents appear to be more demotivated by the factors from table 33 than their Dutch-speaking colleagues (average difference of 6%).

Question 9 :
Do you agree with the following statements concerning motivation ?

MOTIVATING FACTORS	EM(1992)	NCO(1991)	OFF(1990)
Missions and tasks are well and clearly formulated	80%	68%	72%
Tasks can be situated within the objectives of the Navy	85%	83%	87%
Most collaborators support their tasks	74%	75%	83%
I am totally committed to my missions	84%	80%	95%
My work helps education & training	63%	70%	67%
I help developing potentials of collaborators	82%	87%	87%
My work-motivation stays the same, even if work or place change	59%	60%	59%
Permanent education & training lead to better results on board	86%	91%	94%
Permanent education & training lead to better results ashore	79%	74%	85%
Communication of results on education & training to all participants	42%	45%	62%
On the job, focus is put on motivation and competence of each	42%	43%	70%
In my group, commitment is great	73%	75%	85%
In my group, competence level is high	67%	73%	72%
In my group, commitment of newcomers is high	60%	66%	78%
In my group, competence of newcomers is high	53%	58%	58%
In my group, new ideas and changes are accepted and explained	58%	58%	73%

Table 34

The results show a large consensus among all naval personnel on the relative importance of the mentioned motivating factors. Satisfaction scores are mostly high.

Alike the NCO's, the EM have two scores below 50% : the feedback of results obtained on education and training to all participants (42%), and the attention focused on motivation and competence of each (42%). It must be noticed that officers attached a quite higher degree of importance to these motivators, i.e. respectively 62% and 70%. Probably, because these factors are part of leadership, which is traditionally more a concern for the highest in rank and position.
In general, the enlisted men confirm the tendency that emerged during the analysis of the answers provided by the NCO's in 1991. However, it is remarkable that even in the lowest personnel category, people are highly committed to the values and the mission of the Navy.

f. Drafts

Question 7 :
During your career, how many times were you drafted for urgent/unscheduled reasons (warning time : 3 days or less) ?

Unplanned draft	EM(1992)	NCO(1991)
On board :		
Never	41%	31%
Between 1 and 3 times	43%	44%
More than 3 times	16%	25%
Average no. of times	1.74	2.92
Ashore :		
Never	59%	56%
Between 1 and 3 times	35%	37%
More than 3 times	6%	7%
Average no. of times	0.84	1.33

Table 35

This results confirm that unscheduled drafts on board are more frequent than those ashore, but the enlisted men have a much lower average than the non-commissioned officers (1.74 times urgently drafted on board vs. 2.92 for the NCO's, and only 0.84 times ashore vs. 1.33 for the NCO's).

There are some differences to be noticed from the detailed analysis, as shown in table 36.

Unplanned draft EM (1992)	Language		Specialty		
	D	F	Deck	Technicians	Services
On board :					
Never	43%	35%	30%	40%	56%
Between 1 & 3x	41%	49%	48%	46%	36%
More than 3x	15%	17%	22%	13%	8%
Average no. of x	1.63	2.06	2.28	1.37	1.14
Ashore :					
Never	31%	54%	60%	61%	66%
Between 1 & 3x	34%	39%	39%	35%	25%
More than 3x	5%	7%	2%	5%	9%
Average no of x	0.72	1.13	0.64	0.73	0.84

Table 36

Among the EM, it appears that the French-speaking ones are more often drafted on very short notice than their Dutch-speaking colleagues (in average 2.06 times vs. 1.63 times on board, and 1.13 times vs. 0.72 times ashore). This may partly explain why the French-speaking EM are less satisfied than Dutch-speaking colleagues. Also, their small numbers (28% vs. 72%) increase the possibility of being drafted to fill a gap more often than the more

numerous Dutch-speaking EM.
We may observe that the possibility of unplanned draft on board is, quite naturally, a lot higher for the Deck-group (2.28 times average) than for the Service-group (average of only 1.14 times).

Question 8 :
Do you agree with the following statements concerning the organization of drafts in the Navy ?

Statement	EM(1992)	NCO(1991)
- For my drafts, my own preferences were insufficiently taken into account	63% agree	40% agree
- The period of my previous fonction was too short to acquire experience	29%	36%
- I must move too often due to drafts	14%	10%
- Drafts cause practical and financial inconveniences	63%	68%
- If I get an inconvenient draft I shall leave the Navy	45%	41%

Table 37

In 1992, 45% of the EM declared to prefer to quit the Navy than to accept an inconvenient draft. This seems more as an intention if there would be a suitable job available at that moment. The degree of inconvenience will also differ individually, and it is very exceptional that an EM actually leaves the Navy for this sole reason.
The expectation that drafts cause some temporary disturbances in life was confirmed by 63% of the EM.

A high amount of complaints about insufficient attention for their personal preferences was noticed among the EM (63%). This is possibly due to the fact that a growing number of people seem to think that a preference system only works well when all wishes can be satisfied in all circumstances. Operational necessities however overrule personal choices; and during the period 1990-1991, shortly before the survey, the participation in the Persian Gulf was just one of those priorities.

g. Strongest motivating factors

Question 10 :
What do you choose in order to improve motivation among your collaborators ?

	10 STRONGEST MOTIVATING FACTORS (EM)		
W A Y	1st	2nd	3rd choice
1. Giving SELF-RESPONSIBILITY	15%	8%	5%
2. Showing RESPECT	11%	11%	9%
3. Matching REWARDS with MERITS	11%	7%	16%
4. CONGRATULATIONS for results	10%	6%	8%
5. Having good human RELATIONS	9%	11%	9%
6. Working really as a TEAM	8%	7%	10%
7. Giving the EXAMPLE myself	7%	8%	8%
8. Let them TEST and PROVE themselves	7%	6%	4%
9. Asking their ADVICE in solving problems	5%	11%	6%
10. Showing interest for their PERSONAL problems	4%	8%	8%

Table 38

The EM chose the same best motivator as did the NCO's, i.e. giving self-responsibility, based on mutual trust and delegation of authority.
Other strong motivators are in decreasing order of importance :
- showing respect;
- matching rewards with merits;
- congratulations for good results; and
- having good human relations.

On the whole, the items chosen by the EM obtain lower percentages than from the NCO's (see table 22).
Also, the answers given by the EM show that they are more concerned with the way superiors treat their subordinates (see ways no. 2, 3, and 4 in table 38).

h. Strongest competence-improving factors

Question 11 :
What do you choose in order to improve the competence of your collaborators ?

SIX STRONGEST COMPETENCE-IMPROVING FACTORS (EM)			
W A Y	1st	2nd	3rd choice
1. Creating a MOTIVATING WORK ATMOSPHERE	25%	22%	21%
2. Linking PROMOTION with PERFORMANCES	22%	7%	8%
3. Sharing my KNOWLEDGE and EXPERIENCE	14%	15%	11%
4. Accepting ERRORS when taking initiatives	11%	16%	15%
5. Encouraging social PROMOTION (to NCO)	8%	13%	12%
6. Contributing to permanent EDUCATION & TRAINING	7%	3%	5%

Table 39

Again, the EM chose the same strongest factor for improving competence as did the NCO's, i.e. creating a motivating work atmosphere (in total 68% vs. 62% for the NCO's).
Since the EM have a limited promotion system, based mainly on seniority, they would prefer to see good performances as a basic condition for an eventual promotion.
Alike the NCO's, the EM who are often doing a lot of manual work would like their superiors to accept errors when a person is taking many initiatives in the execution of his (or her) job.

i. <u>The operations in the Persian Gulf</u>

Question 13 :
Have you participated in the operations in the Persian Gulf ?

Gulf participation	EM (1992)	NCO (1991)
In 1987-88		
- Directly	17%	15%
- Indirectly	35%	29%
- Total	52%	44%
In 1990-91		
- Directly	27%	30%
- Indirectly	40%	38%
- Total	67%	68%

Table 40

There are no significant differences between the participation of the EM and the NCO's during each of the operations in the Persian Gulf.

To those who participated, another question was asked.

Question 14 :
What did this experience represent for you ?

Possible meaning	EM(1992)	NCO(1991)
- A purely financial matter	51%	76%
- A precious professional enrichment	86%	58%
- A unique personal experience	90%	91%
- A too long absence	36%	44%
- A reason to stay in the Navy	70%	50%
- A reason to leave the Navy	10%	10%

Table 41

The reactions of the EM were very positive, and a lot less materialistic than those from the NCO's. The almost unanimous impression is one of a unique personal and professional experience, and an excellent reason to stay in the Navy. Money came only on the fourth place (and in second place for the NCO's). Before this survey, nobody could actually expect that professional enrichment would play a more important role for the enlisted men than pure financial enrichment. These results prove that Frederick Herzberg's thesis is correct, still in 1992, and even for a low payed population (only 35% of the EM agree to earn good money - see table 32).[15]

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[15] Frederick Herzberg, "One more time : How do you motivate employees ?", Harvard Business Review, January-February 1968, 39.

3. Conclusions

The principal conclusion from this survey research on the organizational culture among the enlisted men of the Belgian Navy is that they are quite satisfied with their life in general and with their work itself.
Detailed analysis has shown that results are influenced by a number of variables, such as the language of the respondents, the age-group, the specialty-group, and the sex-group. Highest levels of satisfaction, commitment, competence, and congruent behavior (of personal needs with the Navy's mission and goals) are reached by Dutch-speaking enlisted men, aged between 31 and 49 years, of the specialty-group "Services" (mainly administration, supply, and naval infantry), and of the female sex.
Lowest levels of satisfaction are obtained by French-speaking enlisted men (18% less), aged under 31 years (6% less than those between 31 and 49 years), of the technical specialty-group (19% less than the others) and of the male sexe (20% less than females).
The most remarkable result of this survey is that the enlisted men of the Belgian Navy seem to have broken an empirical rule of sociology which positively correlates the degree of satisfaction and motivation with the level in the hierarchy of the organization. Here, we found out that the population at the bottom of the Navy shows more life-satisfaction than the higher categories; they have more hope for the future, are more pleased with the functioning of the Navy, and participate at real operations more for the unique experience and expertise than for pure financial advantages.

E. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IN THE BELGIAN NAVY

* All personnel categories are sufficiently **satisfied** with their life in general, but are increasingly uncertain about the next five years.

* Satisfaction about the **functioning of the Navy** is considered to be moderate up to very good by over 80% of the officers and the enlisted men. Non-commissioned officers score some 7% lower.

* Satisfaction about their **present function** is good or very good for over 75% of the officers and the enlisted men. Again, non-commissioned officers score 7% lower.

* On the whole, satisfaction towards the **work itself**, or the kind of job, reaches very high levels (90% for officers and enlisted men, and 86% for non-commissioned officers).

* **Direct superiors**, mainly officers under 30 years, are expected to show more concern for their people by stimulating better their motivation, giving more advice and support, and making better use of direct communication systems (such as the performance interviews). In this area, the scores are situated between 65% and 50% of satisfaction.

* Among all personnel categories, good **relations** and **understanding** obtain exceptional high scores, situated between 89% and 97%.

* The survey confirmed what was widely suspected about salary and allowances as an important demotivating factor. But topmanagement did not suspect that the **promotion system** (which is the same for the whole Belgian Armed Forces, and escapes from the control of the Navy itself), and **insufficient means** would be perceived as very demotivating factors by more than half of all personnel.
  And the same high percentage of all respondents pointed at the **unscheduled drafts on board** as another very demotivating factor, notwithstanding the relatively low average of 2 or 3 unplanned drafts on board during the

career of each respondent.

* Although insufficient **delegation** is considered as a rather moderate demotivator, the overall majority of all naval personnel chooses **self-responsibility** as the best motivator, when it is based on mutual trust and delegation of authority.

* Naval personnel is highly committed to the **values**, the **mission** and the **objectives** of the Navy. The survey shows no significant differences between the three personnel categories.

* Sometimes an apparent **contradiction** is found. The enlisted men have the lowest number of unscheduled drafts on board. Yet, this same personnel category complaints the most that their own preferences on places and functions are insufficiently taken into account, and that half of them would leave the service whenever they would receive an inconvenient draft. Possibly, enlisted men are more sensible to great disturbances in their high satisfaction about life in general.

* As for the strongest motivators being suggested by the respondents, the three categories have their own priorities, except for self-responsibility.

  Officers prefer to be **recognized** and to experience self-realization. This reflects a personal ambition for distinction.

  Non-commissioned officers prefer giving the **example** themselves and to work as a coherent team with their collaborators. This reflects a coaching ambition, a concern for people and task.

  Enlisted men prefer **respect**, congratulations, and rewards based on results. This reflects a need for correct, warm and honest treatment by all direct and indirect superiors.

* All naval personnel agrees that **competence** can be improved in a motivating work atmosphere, working permanently on education and training, and linking promotion with quality performances.

* Whereas officers prefer to sanction incompetence, the rest of the naval personnel is quite willing to accept errors from those who are working hard and taking lots of initiatives. Errors are part of human nature, and are excellent instruments for learning and improvement.

* Participation at real operations, such as the one in the Persian Gulf, is perceived as a unique personal experience and a precious professional enrichment. The favorable financial compensations are very much appreciated as well, especially by the non-commissioned officers.

* Finally, this survey research proved the existence of a strong, coherent organizational culture in the Belgian Navy. Elements of this culture could now be analysed, measured, and compared among the three personnel categories.
This culture is very much alive and changing continuously with the changing environment, such as the government policy on defence, and with the internal evolution, such as new development in human resource management, leadership, and total quality.

CHAPTER IV

LEADERSHIP IN THE BELGIAN NAVY
(cf. Actions 2, 10, 11, 14, 16, and 19 in Chapter II)

These are the hard times in which a genius would wish to live. Great necessities call forth great leaders.

Abigail Adams
1790, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson

In this chapter, the focus is first put at Total Quality Leadership (TQL) in the United States Navy. Since TQL has become the new credo of the Chief of Naval Staff of the Belgian Navy, it seems appropriate to study what TQL means and how this new strategic approach can be beneficial to the Belgian Navy. Then, the existing concepts about leadership in the Belgian Navy are analysed.

Unprecedented research concerning important leadership issues, such as the leadership perception among junior naval officers and mine disposal specialists, may reveal new aspirations. From these findings, new orientations can emerge which may inspire the top leaders of the Navy. For this inquiry, we did not wish to know the opinions of the senior officers. We focused on those who work near the internal and external customers : the young officers and the top specialists, who are the manufacturers of our unique products. And this population knows very well what followers expect from their leaders.

A. TOTAL QUALITY LEADERSHIP IN THE U.S. NAVY

1. T Q L : A NEW COURSE

In the biggest Navy in the world, the U.S. Navy, a new important item was put on the agenda of the Commander-in-Chief : Total Quality Leadership (TQL).

Let's have a closer look at this American Naval approach of Leadership for the year 2000.

a. Statement of the Secretary of the U.S. Navy

H. Lawrence Garrett III, Secretary of the Navy, believes that TQL is a systematic approach that will enable the Department of the Navy (DON) to meet the challenge of declining resources and continue to provide the strong defense essential to the American nation.[1]

In a statement, the Secretary of the U.S. Navy explains his commitment to improve quality by expanding the Total Quality Management effort (TQM, based on the principles of W. Edwards DEMING, which requires top-down leadership focusing on quality, user needs and requirements, improvements and innovations of strategically important processes through fact-based decision making and management of team participation) to the operational forces.

As a result of the unique role of leadership in military operational commands, and the fact that military personnel generally disfavor the word "management", "Total Quality Leadership" was accepted as the title for the new concept.

TQM and TQL are consistent approaches to quality with the same foundation. The "management" in TQM refers to systems for managing work (e.g., acquisition), and systems for managing people (e.g., personnel). Eventually, changes in both systems will be needed for significant quality improvements to be realized. "Management" in a quality organization does not mean just taking care of day-to-day business. Leaders are responsible for improving systems so they will meet current and emerging requirements. Leading change will become the core of their new tasks in the future.

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[1] H. Lawrence Garrett, III, DON Executive Steering Group Guidance on TQL, white paper, 1990, 4.

Leadership is paramount as "quality is made in the board room, not on the factory floor" (Deming, 1988), or as paraphrased by Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) "quality is made in the wardroom, not at the deckplate."[2]
Quality is leadership driven.

The Secretary of the Navy explained : "While TQL principles and related methods are applicable to all systems, we recognize that operational requirements aboard ship, and combat command environments involve systems that are different from shore support activities. The application of TQL in the fleet must address these differences.
Nevertheless, process improvements can be made through the use of analytical methods and tools. The major emphasis in operational environments will be made on leaders learning to change the way they work with subordinates, gather information, make decisions, and improve the quality of operational performance."[3]

So, TQL is an approach to leading and managing that is guided by a total view of how all systems of work and people blend together to meet mission requirements, and ultimately perform the service for the country. TQL is a bottom-line approach to assess and improve continually the processes by which an organization conducts its business. Lowered operating costs, increased satisfaction on the part of the customer or end user, increased productivity, and improved operational readiness will result as quality improves.

To the Secretary of the Navy, his Department is at a crossroads in its history. It can continue on its present course and try to do more with less, using traditional approaches, or it can chart a new course. The U.S. Navy has chosen a new course. That course is improved quality in support of the sailor and marine. By improving quality, the Secretary and the Admiralty are confident to meet the demands of this decade of change and those of the next century.[4]

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[2] Ibid.,2

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.,4

b. Departement of the Navy (DON) [5]

1) Vision Statement

The fully integrated Navy-Marine Corps team remains the world's premier force to carry out the national will in increasingly hostile globale maritime environment. It deploys a high quality, multi-purpose, flexible force designed to meet a variety of the most likely contingencies.

In order to respond to the volatile and unpredictable nature of the world-wide threat, our forces must provide deterrence through presence and an ability to project power quickly.

The combined force is sustained in this mission by a support establishment which has dramatically decreased the time necessary to field new weapons systems, alter training cycles, accomplish overhauls, etc.

These and other supporting services, including medical care, are of a uniformly high quality because our leadership accepts responsibility for continuously improving all the systems and processes which govern our support establishment.

The support establishment consists of :

Leaders prepared to exercise their responsibilities with quality as the principal focus.

Properly maintained necessary shore and support facilities.

Acknowledged experts in the technologies key to maritime operations.

Acquisition and maintenance strategies which will strengthen the public/private relationships to produce quality products and services faster and at competitive prices.

Well-trained professionals dedicated to excellence with confidence and pride in their Navy and Marine Corps.

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[5] U.S. Department of the Navy. Vision, Guiding Principles, Strategic Goals, and Strategic Plan for TQL, 1992, 6.

2) Guiding Principles

The purpose of the DON support establishment is to provide our Sailors and Marines with the ability to go anywhere, anytime, to successfully defend the nation's interests and survive.

In achieving this purpose, the following principles will guide our decisions and actions :

We will accomplish the mission.

We recognize the central fact that our Sailors and Marines are the best prepared and that our units have the highest rates of operational readiness in our history. They are at the heart of our ability to perform the mission. We must maintain that quality.

We are all responsible for accomplishing the mission. That is our first loyalty. We must strive to find new ways to cooperate within the DON which look beyond a single service warfare community or traditional role and responsibility. Pride, professionalism and a sense of community are extremely important but we must ensure that they are not rigid barriers to our interoperability. The valuable process of competing for resources and roles must not be carried to divisive and destructive extremes.

We accept responsibility for taking control of and improving all the systems and processes through which we support Sailors and Marines. We can ensure that the weapons, ammunition, training, transport, health care, housing and all other goods and services which constitute that support are of predictable high quality and available on time and in sufficient quantity for any task they may be called upon to perform.

We must use innovation to meet current and future requirements and challenge ourselves to develop creative methods, including new technologies, to enhance our support to our operating forces.

We are committed to honesty and integrity, recognizing that the public trust and defense of the nation requires the highest standards of moral conduct. By integrity we mean that we will make decisions which are in the best interests of the Navy, the Marine Corps and the nation without regard

to personal consequences.

We have adopted the term "Total Quality Leadership (TQL)" as the general term under which we will pursue total quality efforts. However, we understand that it is the concepts and content of those efforts that is important - not what they are called.

3) strategic goals

Signed by the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, a joint document was published on February 10, 1992, with the Strategic Goals of the U.S. Navy. Here follows the integral text.

We, the leaders in the Department of the Navy, will optimize the effectiveness of the Navy-Marine Corps team by leading our people and managing our systems as an integrated force within a quality-focused organization. We will work to influence our future by translating our vision, mission, and guiding principles into goals, strategies, and actions so that resources and improvements are aligned with the same intent.

We believe that everyone has a legitimate contribution to make in accomplishing these goals; Navy and Marine Corps; military and civilian; operational and support. In starting this translation, we have developed a vision and identified five major strategic goals for the Department of the Navy. These strategic goals are : Integration; Human Resources, Education, and Training; Acquisition; Innovation and Technology; and Facilities. We believe that continuous improvements in these areas are mandatory if the Department of the Navy is to meet the challenges that confront us.

The Department of the Navy will :

Integration

operate a fully integrated Navy-Marine Corps team that will provide maximum operational capability, capitalizing on the synergism of our operating forces and our support establishment.

Specifically, the DON will :

- develop broad strategies and tactical doctrines that maximize naval service combat effectiveness within the framework of joint and combined operations of the National Military Strategy.
- create and maintain a consolidated naval acquisition, maintenance, and logistics infrastructure that is efficient and responsive to the building, support, and sustainability needs of our naval service forces.
- integrate the focus and efforts of staffs and management organizations to facilitate interaction; and educate our personnel, both military and civilian, in multiple disciplines that affect naval service capabilities and applications.

Human Resources, Education, and Training

- continuously improve the quality of our military and civilian work force through fact-based, innovative systemic changes affecting recruitment, training, and quality for life.

Specifically, the DON will :

- identify and remove the barriers to equal opportunity for all our people.
- improve the military recruiting system through better requirements determination, resource allocation, and day-to-day operations.
- improve determination of military training requirements, feedback systems, delivery of training to meet fleet requirements and foster student success; properly fund training and eliminate redundancies in the system.
- improve the civilian recruiting and hiring system through better requirements determination and resource allocation and by assessing national versus local recruiting responsibilities and needs.
- improve civilian training by improving requirements determination, training delivery, and by adjusting resources to match requirements.
- enhance the working environment to improve the performance of quality military and civilian personnel.

Acquisition

- continuously improve the acquisition process to achieve timely design, development, test, manufacture, and support of maritime weapon systems for our Navy-Marine Corps team.

Specifically, the DON will :

- reduce the time from concept definition to fleet introduction.
- stress reduced operating and support costs in all aspects of system design; field fully supported systems with emphasis on interoperability and operational availability.
- foster contractor/government working relationships, emphasizing teamwork built on trust, sound business practices, and the highest standards of ethical behavior. Ensure that an industrial capability for unique naval requirements is maintained.

Innovation and Technology

- continuously improve the process of identifying and introducing new technologies. Ensure our recognition as a world leader in key maritime technologies. Create a climate that fosters innovation and invention.

Specifically, the DON will :

- improve the process of selecting and evaluating technology opportunities; focus DON investment on those technologies that form the foundation of future Navy-Marine Corps system developments; introduce cost-effective technologies into our system as they become available.

- improve the interaction with our sister services, academia, industry and our allies to support the DON technology investment.

Facilities

- operate an adaptable and responsive shore facilities establishment that is properly sized and properly supported to allow continuous improvement in the quality of service to the operating forces; that consists of well-maintained and attractive facilities, resulting in improved living and working conditions and increased productivity at

all its installations; and that consistently performs in an environmentally responsible manner and contributes to the quality of life in the communities of which it is a part.

Specifically, the DON will :

- define and implement "quality standards" for facilities that support mission requirements, family and bachelor housing, family support functions, and morale, welfare and recreational activities.
- provide the resources to achieve the defined quality standards over time and maintain the support establishment at these levels; in addition to traditional military construction, consider innovative financing and management arrangements (e.g., cost-sharing, public-private venture, leasing).
- integrate environmental awareness into all DON planning, management, and operations to comply with all applicable environmental laws and to protect the natural resources found on Navy and Marine Corps installations. Minimize waste, conserve energy, and adopt pollution prevention measures to avoid adverse impacts on the environment.

Our vision and associated strategic goals require a significant transformation throughout the naval services. By pursuing our vision, we believe we will enhance our ability to determine our future. Achieving these strategic goals will be neither quick nor easy; however, we believe that our people are capable of meeting the challenges confronting the Navy-Marine Corps team. We recognize that all members of the team have valuable contributions to make to our strategic efforts. As leaders, we will strive to provide the direction and support required for this transformation.

4) Strategic Plan

The document with the strategic goals says, in effect, that the entire organization will focus on quality as it plots its course for the future. It also means that the leadership accepts responsibility and accountability for changing the things that need changing and for finding more efficient ways to do business. Emphasis is on a fully integrated Navy-Marine Corps team.

The strategic goals represent one of three documents that are the foundation for the DON strategic plan. The other two documents are : a vision statement and a set of guiding principles. Strategic goals essentially describe the results to be realized in working toward the vision of the organization.

The vision statement, guiding principles, and strategic goals were drafted by the DON Executive Steering Group (ESG), formed by Secretary Garrett in 1989 to lead and guide the transformation to Total Quality Leadership (TQL), the approach to be used to implement total quality efforts within the Department. The group is made of 28 top leaders within the Department, including the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. Under Secretary of the Navy Dan Howard chairs that group.

All three documents make reference to the support establishment. Mr Howard explains what is meant today by that term. "Our concept of the support establishment has changed. The Department of the Navy does not fight wars, the Commanders in Chief fight wars, so in that sense the entire Department is a support establishment. That means that our customer ultimately is the individual Sailor and Marine. The guiding principles document begins with the statement that 'the purpose of the DON support establishment is to provide our Sailors and Marines with the ability to go anywhere, anytime, to defend the nation's interest successfully and survive.'"

To reach the strategic goals, "strategies" and "actions" need to be determined. Toward that end, the ESG is forming working groups made up of senior military and civilian leaders who will define them. As their work progresses, more guidance will be provided to the Department at large.

c. Leadership, Total Quality, and TQL

In order to avoid confusion, let us compare the definitions provided by the U.S. Navy.[6]

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[6] U.S. Navy. TQL Glossary, 1992, 18.

- Leadership : is the art of influencing people to progress towards the accomplishment of a specific goal.

- Total Quality : An extension of the quality concept to include improvement of all of the quality characteristics that influence customer-perceived quality. This includes sources of variation from incoming supplies, all of the significant processes within an organization, and all those that can influence customer satisfaction, needs or expectations when the product (or service) has left the organization. Systematic improvement of all of these sources of variation is referred to as total quality management.

- Total Quality Leadership (TQL) : Total Quality Leadership is the application of quantitative methods and the knowledge of people, to assess and improve materials and services supplied to the organization; all significant processes within the organization; and meeting the needs of the end user, now and in the future.

  The main elements of Quality Leadership are :

  * Education and Training
  * Constancy of purpose, and long-term commitment
  * Focus on process
  * Quantitative methods
  * Continuous improvement
  * Supplier partnership
  * Customer focus
  * Leadership
  * Total personnel involvement, and teamwork.

2. Dr. DEMING's VIEWS

a. The System of Profound Knowledge

The System of Profound Knowledge is in four parts, all related to each other :

A. Appreciation for a system
B. Theory of variation
C. Theory of knowledge
D. Psychology

One need not be eminent in any part of profound knowledge in order to understand it as a system, and to apply it.[7] The 14 points for management in industry, education, and government follow naturally as application of the system of profound knowledge, for transformation from the prevailing style of Western management to one of optimization.

The various segments of the system of profound knowledge can not be separated. They interact with each other. Thus, knowledge of psychology is incomplete without knowledge of variation. If psychologists understood variation, as learned in the experiment on the Red Beads, they could no longer participate in continual refinements of instruments for rating people.

A manager, in the role of leader of people, must have some knowledge of variation and of psychology.

Management of a system is action based on prediction. Rational prediction requires systematic learning and comparison of predictions of short-term and long-term results from possible alternative courses of action.

Theory of variation can play a vital part in optimization of a system. Statistical theory is helpful for understanding differences between people and for understanding the interactions between people and the systems that they work in.

Assistance to systematic learning is a specialty of the statistician. Statisticians that understand a system and optimization thereof, along with some theory of knowledge and something about psychology, could apply their specialized knowledge of variation toward continual improvement of methods for better prediction, and hence for better management. They could help people to retain their intrinsic motivation to learn.

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[7] W. Edwards Deming, Foundation for Management of Quality in the Western World, paper; Institute of Management Sciences, Osaka, Japan, 27 July 1989, revised 1 February 1991.

Statistical theory, used cautiously, with the theory of knowledge, can be useful in the interpretation of the results of tests and experiments, to understand cause and effect relationships. The interpretation of the results of tests and experiments is for future use : prediction.

On 20 December 1991, Dr. W. Edwards Deming spoke before an unprecedented gathering of over 600 Navy, Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard flag officers and Senior Service members. Here follow some of his recommandations about leadership and Managing People :

- One is born with intrinsic motivation, self-esteem, dignity, cooperation, curiosity, and joy in learning. These attributes are gradually crushed by the "Forces of Destruction" : grades in school, merit system, judging people, competition, incentive pay, quotas for production, and suboptimization.
  These forces cause humiliation, fear, self-defence, rivalry. They lead anyone to play to win, not for fun. Extrinsic motivation replaces intrinsic motivation, joy, and innovation. People are jewels which must be supported; never humiliated. And there is no shortage of good people.

- Unless we understand our customers, we cannot do our job. Helping our customers creates joy. People are entitled to joy in their work.

- A man's job is to govern the future. Everyone is putting forth his best efforts, but one must first understand what his job is, and why, and who depends on him.

- You can only get innovation by working with freedom, it can not be planned.

- Job descriptions must be rewritten. The flow diagram tells anybody what his job is.

- Transformation is required to move out of the present state. Metamorphosis, not patchwork on the present system.
  We must restore the individual, and do so in the complexity of interaction with the rest of the world. Transformation will release the power of human resource contained in intrinsic motivation. The result will be greater innovation, better service, applied science and technology, expansion of the market, and greater reward for everyone.

- Our job is to work on the system, to change the system,

understand it, and try to understand how to change it. The performance of people depends on the system they work on, and are a part of. When you recognize good performance, give a pat on the back, not money.

- Short term thinking gets us nowhere. We must have long term plans.

- People grow and gain confidence by the recognition of their own weakness and short comings. He who does not know his limitations is to beware of.

b. The Basis for Transformation

The basis for transformation is summarized in Dr.DEMING's fourteen "Obligations of Management".[8]

(1) Create and publish to all employees a statement of the aims and purposes of the organization. The management must demonstrate constantly their commitment to this statement.

(2) Learn the new philosophy. Top management, and everybody.

(3) Understand the purpose of inspection, for improvement of processes and reduction of cost.

(4) End the practice of awarding business on the basis of price tag alone.

(5) Improve constantly and forever the system of production and service.

(6) Institute training (for skills).

(7) Teach and institute leadership.

(8) Drive out fear. Create trust. Create a climate for innovation.

(9) Optimize toward the aims and purposes of the organization the efforts of teams, groups, and staff areas too.

(10) Eliminate exhortations for the work force.

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[8] U.S. Navy, Office of CNO, A Day With Dr.Deming, report; Washington D.C., 20 December 1991, 23.

(11a) Eliminate numerical quotas for production. Instead, learn and institute methods for improvement.

(11b) Eliminate MBO (management by objective). Instead learn the capabilities of the processes and how to improve them.

(12) Remove barriers that rob people of pride of workmanship.

(13) Encourage education and self-improvement for everyone.

(14) Take action to accomplish the transformation.

3. NEW LEADERSHIP [9]

a. Main issues of new leadership

* Leaders create the quality culture
  - leadership can not be delegated
  - employees follow the boss's lead
  - things that get rewarded get done

* Good leaders invest in quality
  - requires long term focus

* Good leaders drive out fear to promote innovation

* Leadership requires constancy of purpose

* Strategic planning
  - vision
  - mission
  - goals
  - strategies

* Consistent quality emphasis
  - actions
  - rewards
  - resources

b. Important aspects of leadership

* **Customer focus**
  - define products
  - define external customers
  - define operational definitions of quality
  - encourage internal/external customer focus by employees

* **Process focus**
  - improving the process is management's responsibility
  - leaders must understand a process before they can improve it
  - good leaders focus on process, not outcome
  - the best quality is prevention based

* **Quantitative Methods**
  - common vs special cause variation
  - leaders use quantitative methods to determine :
    - how are we doing ?
    - where can we improve ?
    - the effect of system change

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[9] U.S. Navy, Office of CNO, Excerptions from unpublished text of briefing on TQL during visit of the Chief of Naval Staff Belgium to the CNO; Washington D.C., June 1991.

* **Supplier Partnership**
  - the output of a process is affected by the quality of the input from the supplier
  - long term relationships :
    - end the practice of awarding business solely on the basis of price
    - reduce the number of suppliers
  - good leaders open lines of communication with their suppliers to operationally define quality

* **Total Employee Involvement**
  - leaders create an environment that :
    - encourages participation
    - establish cross-functional teams with link to top management
      - include customers and suppliers
      - solicit and act on input from employees for fact based decision making
      - consensus in not required, but is achievable in most cases
    - good leaders create relationships that optimize the whole system

* **Continuous Improvement**
  - develop a plan
    - educate
    - implement
  - establish a structure for process improvements
  - emphasize quality
    - keep it up
    - don't stop
    - do it again
  - shewhart's cycle (plan-do-check-act)

* **Sources of Power**
  - position
  - knowledge
  - personality

c. <u>Some attributes of a leader</u>

* Understands the meaning of a system and how the work of the group is to support these aims
* Cooperates with all stages in a process toward system optimization
* Understands differences in people; tries to create joy in work
* Is coach and counsel, not a judge
* Develops knowledge and personality as sources of power
* Determines who is in need of special help
* Creates trust; creates freedom and innovation

* Does not expect perfection
* Listens and learns without passing judgement
* Understands benefits of cooperation and losses from competition
* His permanent challenge is to have the answer on these questions : - Who is customer ?
  - What is my/your product ?
  - What is quality ?
  - How do I control the future ?

d. Education and Training

The general approach is that leaders must educate themselves on quality focused management before they can lead the way.
They must therefore understand the urgency, the concepts, and the tools of total quality management and leadership.
Leaders must invest in the education and training of their people.
Thus, they must provide :
- management and leadership training (on a just-in-time basis)
- technical training to do their jobs.

The U.S. Navy's TQL education and training policy can be summarized as follows [10] :

The focus of the DON's TQL training program is to provide education and training for senior leaders and key members of their organizations who will fill roles of TQL coordinators and/or quality advisors. The courses will assist each command's TQL leader and TQL coordinator in developing implementation plans and will prepare quality advisors to coach and provide just-in-time training to teams working on process improvement. Each TQL course for command TQL coordinators and quality advisors is designed to provide in-depth background and understanding of various aspects of TQL through lecture/discussion, case studies, exercises, readings, homework assignments and other materials. Attendees at the DON TQL training sites will be provided all course materials (student guide, instructor guide, hardcopy of viewgraphs, books, etc) at no cost to DON organizations.
The DON ESG guidance follows : TQL implementation and training proceed top-down through the DON. Prior to sending command personnel to TQL training, the organizational leader must attend the SLS (Senior Leaders Seminar). Command leaders should send their TQL coordinators and quality advisors to the DON TQL training sites in preparation for establishing their own TQL implementation strategy, and in-house training capability to assist teams in their process improvement efforts.

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[10] Joyce Ward, Total Quality Leadership Source Guide, U.S. Department of the Navy, TQLO Publication No 92-01 (Arlington : Total Quality Leadership Office, June 1992), 11.

4. An INQUIRY on TQL

a. Questions from Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel (Belgian Navy)

Since the Belgian Navy is implementing a global Human Resource Management development plan, including a new approach on leadership, and has started a Total Quality Program in the technical support group, it is obviously interesting to know something more about TQL.

On 23 October 1992, the following eighteen questions on TQL were transmitted from the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel (Belgian Navy), Brussels, to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (U.S. Navy), Washington DC.

TQL in the U.S. Navy

(1) How is education in TQL implemented :

(Q1) - Top down : starting from what level (Flag officers, Senior Officers, C.O.'s) and until what rank or function ?

(Q2) - Bottom up : starting from what level (non-commissioned officers, junior officers), and until what rank or function ?

(Q3) - Both ways simultaneously ?

(Q4) - First top down, and later bottom up ? What time delay ?

(Q5) - In the naval schools and academies, as an integrated part of the core programs for midshipmen, and lower ranks as well ?

(Q6) - Are the instructors themselves prepared to the teaching of TQL, and how is this achieved ?

(Q7) - Only in the United States, or also abroad and at sea ?

(2) Leading a group of armed people, under enemy fire, towards victory, is not quite the same as managing employees, under competition, towards more profits or bigger market shares.

(Q8) - Have traditional concepts, as mentioned in "Fundamentals of Naval Leadership" (U.S. Naval Academy) become obsolete ?

(Q9) - Why this apparent change of course, using civilian managerial practices and focusing on quality in order to remain successful with less resources ? (Civilian companies invest a lot in quality in order to outperform competitors, often spending more money in research, and offering higher wages to attract the best qualified people).

(3) The "DON ESG Guidance on TQL" mentions that quality cannot be <u>delegated</u>, and that TQL focuses on the enhanced responsibilities of "Command".

(Q10) - Isn't "delegated" used here in a context of "transferred", instead of involving the lowest possible level with more authority and co-responsibility in a context of "asking and challenging"?

(Q11) - If situation and people permit, isn't delegation advisable as good leadership ? (Cf. Hersey and Blanchard, T. Peters, and other authors).

(Q12) - Isn't quality a concern of everybody ? (remembering "If you want me to care, let me share").

(Q13) - Transforming leadership aims at leader-followers symbiosis, characterized by credibility and excitement. Isn't this more appropriate for naval personnel than aiming at quality only by those in charge ?

(4) I read in "Out of the Crisis" by Edwards Deming that "people can face almost any problem, except the problems of people".

(Q14) - Wouldn't it be better to focus on "problem-solving", by first removing the worries (caused by unclear task descriptions, poor feedback, lack of means, complex rules and administration, inadequate information, etc.) and then by stimulating self-motivation by offering new challenges such as improvement of quality, appreciating their contribution, giving them own responsibilities, showing interest in their

work, providing variation and new means, rewarding for merits, etc.) ?

(5) In "The Leadership Challenge" by J. Kouzes and B. Posner, it is recommended that leaders challenge the process, inspire a shared vision, enable others to act, model the way, and encourage the heart. But leadership is not only about leaders, it is also about followers. In the long run, the followers will determine whether a person is recognized as a leader.

(Q15) - Has TQL examined what followers expect of their leaders ? What where the results ?

(6) The essence of leadership is about wanting. Managers get other people to do, leaders get other people to want to do.

(Q16) - Do naval officers want to lead others towards total quality ? (was this their initial reason to join the Navy ? or was it imposed ?)

(Q17) - Will TQL generate enough credibility in the hearts of others, so that they will want to follow their leader and even exceed themselves ?

(Q18) - Do naval personnel want quality leadership ? (is there a need or demand ?)

b. Answers from CNO Office (U.S. Navy)

With the valuable help of the Chief of the Office of Defence Cooperation, U.S. Embassy Brussels, the following answers were received on 19 November 1992 from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy.

(1) How is education in TQL implemented ?

In order to answer the question one must first understand that TQL/TQM/TQ is different from what has been taught in most universities and colleges concerning management. For that matter; it is different from the way many managers actually manage. The following quote from Kaoru Ishikawa provides the best base for understanding the US Navy philosophy about TQL education :

"Quality control begins with education and ends with education." "To promote QC with

participation by all, QC education must be given to all employees, from the President to assembly line workers." "QC is a thought revolution in management, therefore the thought processes of all employees must be changed. To accomplish this, education must be repeated over and over again." (Ishikawa, Kaoru, What Is Total Quality Control ? The Japanese Way, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1985).

All personnel require education to adopt the TQ management style. In order to facilitate the education of the entire work force, top management must demonstrate their commitment by acquiring the necessary education first. Once top management has demonstrated their commitment by attending and either continuing to attend additional training or actually teaching the material, the middle and lower levels can be educated. The first level of training being presented to Navy personnel is an introduction/fundamentals course on TQL. For more in-depth training in the various technical aspects of TQL, the US Navy has adopted a just-in-time training effort which provides the in-depth education/training just before the student will need to use it.

Initial instruction for all training is provided by specially trained personnel who are given an intensive 3 month education to qualify them as instructors. The sixty instructors currently trained by the Navy are stationed on the east and west coasts (thirty east coasts) and provide both on-site and mobile training teams for their respective coasts. Personnel stationed overseas can either attend the courses on-site in the US or arrange for a mobile team to go overseas. Fleet personnel are currently attending central site locations.

Efforts are currently underway to incorporate the concepts of TQL into all naval schools, the Naval Academy and into enlisted courses. This education is for all levels and while the Navy has decided to start with senior management, the education will be provided to all.

(2) Leading a group of armed people, under enemy fire, towards victory is not quite the same as managing employees, under competition, towards more profits or bigger market shares.

I would suggest that the major function of the military during a peace time environment is getting ready for war. The entire emphasis of TQ is knowing where your organization is going and using the principles and techniques provided under TQ to improve the everyday processes. By changing the management style, the US Navy believes that the organization will be better prepared to perform its future missions because it has a better understanding and control of its processes. Obtaining this understanding and control of its internal processes will reduce costs by reducing variation and at the same time allow for more rapid reaction to a changing world environment.

(3) The "DON ESG Guidance on TQL" mentions that quality cannot be delegated, and that TQL focuses on the enhanced responsibilities of "command".

The statement that quality cannot be delegated focuses on Dr. Deming's thought that management is responsible for quality. Management owns the processes in which workers perform their duties. If management focuses on results only (output) and does not focus on continuous process improvement, then the people in the organization will not have permission to continuously improve processes. Only management can provide that focus, if management "delegates" the quality focus to lower levels and continues to manage the way they always have (based on results), then there would be no quality improvement within the organization. Nothing would change. The enhancement in responsibilities is derived by management making decisions based on the capabilities of the processes within their organizatioin and improving those same processes. This is achieved through focusing the organization on understanding its processes, measuring the processes, improving the processes, understanding the customer requirements, acquiring knowledge about the processes, understanding variation (...etc).

Management in any organization "owns" the processes. To change a process requires that management understand the process well enough (through measurement) to improve it. Some processes or parts of processes can be changed by the workers, it is however, management's responsibility to ensure that the aims of the organization are identified and articulated at all levels. Without managements continued participation in the improvement effort, who will decide that the effort to improve one

process will not be detrimental to the entire organization. Management must provide the systems thinking required for the entire organization to work toward accomplishing the identified aims.

(4) I read in "Out of the Crisis" by Edwards Deming that "people can face almost any problem, except the problems of people".

How do you start the changing of an organizations focus ? Some corporations (i.e. Ford) started by focusing on people and the work environment. Others started with problem solving only (i.e. Xerox). Either starting place will work. The choice on where to start is up to the organizational leadership involved in the change. As long as management understands the concepts that Deming teaches and apply those concepts, where you start does not really matter. Again management must lead the way. If management believes that the change is important and demonstrates their willingness to change the remainder of the organization will follow.

(5) In "The Leadership Challenge" by J. Kouzes and B. Posner, it is recommended that leaders challenge the process, inspire a shared vision, enable others to act, model the way, and encourage the heart. But leadership is not only about leaders, it is also about <u>followers</u>. In the long run, the followers will determine whether a person is recognized as a leader.

People want to please the boss. It seems to be a fact of human nature. If leaders define a system of management (TQL) that stresses customer focus, team work, process improvement and systems thinking; that is what the followers will do. This system of management must include as a minimum the following elements :

a. Everyone understands the aim of the system within which they work.
b. Customer of process outputs define the quality, not the leadership of the process or the workers in the process.
c. People are rewarded for their contributions to maximize the aim of the system, not for their individual aims.

d. Everyone in the organization is educated and trained in the aim of the system and how they contribute to achieving that aim.

(6) The essence of leadership is about wanting. Managers get other people to do, leaders get other people to want to do.

These questions are best answered by quoting the US Navy Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. F.B. Kelso :

> "3. Some of you have made judgements about TQL with or without factual information about it. Some of you think TQL is just good leadership or common sense, but it's far more. It is a comprehensive system that focuses on the "process" rather than the "end result". TQL requires a total commitment to fulfill the needs of the "customer". It is a team approach, where leaders serve as coaches rather than judges. It injects quality into every step of a process, and stresses continuous improvement. TQL uses hard data and facts rather than gut feelings or instinct to identify problems. Every member of the team from the most junior seaman to the most senior admiral helps to find solutions to problems. TQL is not a quick fix. It is a long-term method to help us improve an already superb organization. In the short term, it will mean more work for all of us as we undergo formal training, outline processes, identify problems, gather data and find solutions. But in the long haul, TQL promises to make our jobs and our lives better. Through TQL we will improve efficiency, reduce accidents, eliminate sometimes repetitive or unproductive tasks, rely less on inspections, enhance our quality of life through better use of scarce resources and better time management". ALNAV message from CNO May 1991.

5. THE BEGINNING OF TQL IN THE BELGIAN NAVY

What follows is a possible future scenario for the Belgian Navy, based on the "Starter Kit for Basic Process Improvement" of the United States Navy, published in December 1992 by the TQL Office DON, and sponsored by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank B. Kelso, II.
One of the drawbacks of implementing anything Navy-wide is the amount of tissue and knowledge necessary to deploy education and training to all hands.
Attacking problems and making improvements within every command can not wait. Prior to a unit's formal education in Total Quality Leadership, means must be provided to start making improvements.
Every Commanding Officer should realize that he has a critical role as the enabler who gives the teams the resources to start, the supporter of the team efforts, and the evaluator of their findings and ideas for improvement.

a. Provide basic information about TQL

All naval personnel should know first what TQL means. TQL is an approach based on a set of leadership and management practices and statistical measures that, when combined, can improve product/service quality and reduce cost, while focusing on the needs of the customer.

Before getting really started, the Belgian Chief of Naval Staff should define and publish his strategic plan, which consists of the Navy's vision, guiding principles, and strategic goals.
The entire Navy must be on the same track for the future, focusing on quality. Strategic goals essentially describe the results to be realized in working towards the vision of the Admiral. But this also includes that especially the local leadership must feel highly motivated to accept full responsibility and accountability for changing the things that need changing and for finding more efficient ways to do business.
As the lessons should be learned after three years of HRM, the Commanding Officers (CO's) of the three naval Commands (Operations, Logistics, and Instruction), and the members of their TQL Executive Steering Committees, should be themselves TQL fanatics. They should discover before starting how beneficial TQL will be for their ships, naval bases, technical support, supply, and educational system.
HRM is focusing on the management of people; TQL emphasizes leadership in achieving high quality and productivity of work and people throughout the Navy.

TQL is a way to enrich and support the chain-of-command, not to bypass naval authority.

Some of the critical concepts of TQL include :
a. Quality is defined by the customers' requirements.
b. Leaders of an organization are responsible for quality.
c. Increased quality comes from systematic analysis and improvement of work processes.
d. Quality improvement is a continuous effort and is conducted throughout the organization.

Under the TQL approach, leaders and managers are expected to achieve quality improvements through the use of process improvement. TQL emphasizes teamwork, particularly across divisions and departments. Two-way communication is necessary to identify areas for process improvement and to reduce fear of change.

Another way to look at it is **TQL is a systematic way to ensure that everyone within a command is doing the right things, and in the right way !**
TQL builds upon many sound leadership and analysis methods that may be used before. It would be unusual to find a person who was not familiar with, or had not practiced, some element of TQL during his career. But individual elements are not enough. The real power of TQL comes from combining these elements, and that only occurs with full implementation.

Before we go on, let's take a few moments to describe again what TQL is and also what it is not. TQL is a way of leading an organization. It is the "how" rather than the "what". It is not something that you "do", but it is the "way" in which you do it. You use TQL principles and methods to accomplish your tasks. It is not a "program" that fades in and out, but rather a very sucessful approach for leading and managing that, once implemented, becomes a routine way of doing business to the men and women of the Navy.

TOTAL QUALITY LEADERSHIP	
IS	IS NOT
A way to strengthen the chain-of-command	A way to bypass the chain-of-command
A systematic way to improve products and services	A new program
A proven method	A passing fad
A structured approach to identifying and solving problems	"Fighting fires"
Long-term focus	Short-term focus
Conveyed by leadership actions	Conveyed by slogans
Supported by statistical process control	Driven by inspection
Practiced by everyone	Delegated to subordinates
Customer-focused	Internally focused
Team-oriented	Individual-oriented
Constancy of purpose	Continually changing direction
Process-focused	Results-focused
Fact-based	Opinion based
Continuous improvement	The status quo
Striving for excellence	Just meeting requirements
Driven by top leadership	Delegated
System-oriented	Management by objective
An American system	A Japanese invention

But, why practice TQL ?

The significant geopolitical changes that have occurred in the world in the last several years have resulted in greater pressures to reduce the Navy's budget and personnel, but without consonant changes in the Navy's mission. As budget become scarce and force drawdowns continue, commands will increasingly face the challenge of carrying out their missions with fewer resources. Commanding Officers will be tempted to respond to these challenges by simply telling their people they have to do "do more with less". The COs who succumb to this temptation are really telling their people they need to work harder. But aren't most people already working hard ?

Simply telling your people to work harder will not solve the command's problems. You may see what you think are improvements, but all too often they are short term, because you have only adressed the symptoms of the problem and not the root cause(s). In fact, in many cases the apparent "fix" only serves to aggravate the root causes in the long term. And the real costs to your command (that may be hidden in the short term) may be increased frustration and dissatisfaction among your people.

TQL provides a method for solving command's problems, improving its processes, and intrinsically motivating people. TQL gives the command a systematic way of critically examining the processes used to accomplish its mission. It provides the power and methods to make continual quality improvements to those processes.

In the Navy-wide context, TQL provides a method of improving the quality of systems in preparation for armed conflict. **It is clearly not a substitute for battlefield tactical leadership**, but TQL will improve planning, training, logistical support, and day-to-day operations. Coincidentally, improving Navy processes will also serve to improve the quality of life of the Navy's people.

Now, how do you get started ?

In the past, the management of quality was usually done through some after-the-fact method. Reviews, inspections, or audits were used to make sure that defective or bad products or unsatisfactory services were not delivered to the "customer". TQL just provides

a more effective means to accomplish that end.

In the Navy, a customer is anyone (both within or outside of your command) who receives products or services (process outputs), which may include materials, supplies, or information.

A process is defined here as a set of causes and conditions that repeatedly come together to transform inputs into output. The inputs may include people, methods, material, equipment, environment, and information. There can be several stages to the process, or each stage could be viewed as a process. The output is a product or service.

some PROCESS EXAMPLES are :
Ordering/Supplying materials Recruitment Refueling at sea Weapons loadout Replenishment Special request Laundry on board Check-in/Check-out Planning board for training Messing and berthing Acquisition of qualifications Getting underway Message distribution

The Navy's approach to practicing TQL should be a strategic, top-down approach. Commands should develop full implementation plans which detail education and structure, and develop plans that integrate quality leadership with the promulgated command's mission, vision, goals, and objectives.

When we speak of process improvement methods, we usually start with a problem. Our goal is not just to eliminate the problem for today, but forever. To do this we must take a broader and more forward-thinking perspective, one that tries to understand the underlying reasons for the problem and finds ways to eliminate those reasons altogether.

This approach has several advantages. First it focuses on permanent solutions by focusing on processes. Second, it usually results in cost savings and eliminates waste. Third, it allows more effective use of people.

b. Twelve steps for process improvement

In Figure 2, a flow chart is shown of the steps required for process improvement.

The flow chart has two sections. The left section leads you through process simplification. The process simplification steps of the improvement cycle will encourage you to eliminate actions that add no value to the workings of the process. As you complete the process simplification part of the improvement method you should have a better understanding of the process and, in all likelihood, have already seen some gains in efficiency. Major changes in the process may occur as a result of going through the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle, which is displayed on the right side of the flow chart. Root causes of problems are uncovered, a plan for improvement is put together, and the plan is used to test if improvements can be made. The results of the test are looked at, analyzed, and action taken to change or not to change the process.

NAVY PROCESS IMPROVEMENT FLOW CHART



Figure 2

STEP 1

SELECT A PROJECT

Selecting the right project will set the stage for the rest of your improvement effort. Working through the project selection worksheet will result in the selection of a project important to the organization. You should pick something that can be influenced internally by the members and leaders in the organization. Ideally, the team working on the project can implement changes.

Do not have more than one group working on the same project, because you will create a race and encourage conflict and competition. You want people to work together, not compete.

Start out small. Once you are comfortable with improving simple processes, more complex processes can be studied. Start with a project or process that occurs often enough that you can observe and document it. If you pick a situation that happens only once a year, you will never be sure if a change made it better or worse.

Teams tend to lose interest if they can't see progress. For a start, pick something that will permit at least one cycle of the improvement process within 90 days.

TOOLS : Brainstorming Multivoting

(Most of the tools, mentioned in each step, are described in "The Memory Jogger Plus +™" by Michael Brassard).

STEP 1. PROJECT SELECTION WORKSHEET

State the problem :

Check all of the items that apply to your project.

--1. The project can be defined. (Be careful not to pick something too big. The project should be able to be completed in 90 days).

--2. The solution of the problem is important to the command.

--3. There is a good chance for success.

--4. The problem area is well known and has a lot of visibility in the command.

--5. A lot of people would appreciate it if the process were improved.

--6. No one else is currently working this project in any way.

--7. The problem occurs frequently. (That is, there is quick turnaround time).

--8. Required changes can be put into effect with little or no outside help.

--9. This is truly a project, not a solution to a problem. (Solutions will come later).

NOTE : If you have selected an appropriate project, you should be able to check all items listed above. If you can't, you may want to pick a different project.

STEP 2

ORGANIZE THE TEAM

A critical step in the team approach to process improvement is the formation of the team. The following information is provided to assist in completing the team worksheet and organizing your team.

Team Leader.
The team leader is appointed by the commanding officer, department head, or whoever may be forming the team. The team leader is responsible for administrative support of the team, ensures that appropriate records are maintained, and becomes the contact point for the team with the remainder of the organization. This is an important and responsible assignment.

Team Members.
Team members are selected by the team leader and the individual forming the team. They may be of various ranks/rates and ratings and may cross departmental lines, depending on the nature of the project. Points to consider when selecting team members include :

- Do they work in the process under study ?

- Are they affected by the process under study ?

Generally, team members are closely involved with the process being studied. Do not let the team get too large : five people is normally sufficient; seven is the maximum.

Team Boundaries.
It is important that the team understands the boundaries they must operate within. The appointing official and team leader should clarify the following :

- When does the project begin and what are the time limits ?
- What decision-making authority does the team have ?

- What resources (money, material, training, other people) are available to help with this project ?

- How will status, results, recommendations, etc., be provided to the chain-of-command ?

- What other information applies ?

Improvement Team Meetings.
Tools for conducting improvement team meetings are listed below.

TOOLS :	Meeting Ground Rules	Agenda
	Process Improvement	Process Improvement
	Team Meeting Rules	Team Meeting Record

STEP 2 . TEAM WORKSHEET

Appointing Official :

Team Leader :

Team Members	Dept/Division	Watch/Sect.	Phone
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			

Team Boundaries

Begin Date :

End Date :

Decision Making Authority :

Resources :

Methods of Reporting

Other Information :

STEP 3

DEFINE THE PROJECT

A clear definition of the project is essential for a successful improvement effort. If the project is vague, i.e., "I don't like the way the ship looks," no one will know how to begin. Be specific, i.e., "There is trash in the passageways."

If there is any history on the project, such as previous attempts at a solution, it should be documented. The most important part of project definition is to be specific on what is expected. "Reduce trash in passageways"; "Reduce cost of operations"; "Reduce time in getting underway."

Completing the project definition worksheet will result in a clear project definition that includes a project statement, desired improvement, and project boundaries. If necessary, discuss your definition with the chain-of-command in order to get agreement and support.

EXAMPLE :

PROBLEM STATEMENT	PROJECT DEFINITION
There is trash in the passageway.	Improve the appearance of passageways throughout the ship with no added manpower.
Mess lines are too long.	Reduce the wait in the mess line from the time of arrival until seated.

TOOLS :	Brainstorming
	Multivoting

STEP 3 . PROJECT DEFINITION WORKSHEET

State the Problem (bring forward from Step 1)

1. Why are we working on this problem (e.g., wastes money or time, is a safety hazard)?

2. How do we know a problem exists ? Do we have any data ?

3. Do we know of any other attempts to solve this problem ? If so, why did they fail ?

4. Who can approve solutions to the problem (team, team leader, CO, someone outside the command) ?

5. Can we complete this project in 90 days ? How ?

6. Will others outside our group understand what we mean by the problem ?

NOTE : After answering these six questions, you may wish to restate the problem or go back for further clarification.

In the following steps, convert your problem statement to a project statement.

7. Define the kind of improvement desired (e.g., less time, fewer people, improved safety).

8. What benefit (advantage) will be gained by solving this problem ? Quantify, if possible.

9. Define the boundaries of the project (i.e., When does it begin ? When does it end ?)

10. Define the project, including a project statement, desired improvement, and project boundaries.

STEP 4

STUDY THE CURRENT SITUATION

Before you can improve a process, you must understand how it currently works. To do that, the most useful tool available is the flow chart, a picture of all the steps in process. Developing the chart may require following the work flow through the process many times, indicating where actions are taken, where decisions are made, where products or services are provided, where reviews or inspections are done, or where approvals are required. Be careful : many flow charts are based on what people think is happening, what they would like to see happen, or what some instruction or manual says. We want an "as is" flow chart that shows how the process is actually working.

The flow chart should not show how instructions or procedures define the process. It should show how the process really works. Talk to people at all levels of the command to determine how things are done.

An additional way to evaluate the current situation is to look at existing data. If data don't exist, you may have to take the time to gather some.

Finally, you should determine if your organization has worked previously on this problem, or attempted to fix it before. If you have, or another organization has, what where the results ? Can you use that information ?

The point of this step is to understand your existing process before you attempt to change it. Changing the process before you understand how it really works may cause many more problems than already exist.

TOOLS :	Flow Chart
	Check Sheet
	Pareto Chart
	Run Chart

STEP 4 . CURRENT SITUATION WORKSHEET

Answer the following questions or take the action described to define the current situation :

1. How did we become aware of the problem ? What are the symptoms and when did they appear ?

2. Construct a flow chart of the process as it actually works. Does it show exactly how things are done now?

3. Did we talk to everyone in the command involved in the process to find out how it is realy done ?

4. What equipment, functions, material, etc., are involved ?

5. Do we have existing data that assess the process ?
   - If yes, analyze.
   - If no, take time to accumulate appropriate data and analyze.

6. Are there any patterns indicating where the symptoms or problems occur ?

7. What customers are involved ? How do they define the problem ?

8. What people are involved ? (We are not asking this to assign blame , but to get to the root of the problem).

9. After gathering the above information, is it necessary to rewrite your project statement (from Step 3) ?

STEP 5

SIMPLIFY THE PROCESS

You have described the process by developing a flow chart and analyzing data. The following questions should now be asked for each step of the process flow chart : Is this step necessary to achieve the desired results of the process ? What would happen if the step were eliminated ? If the answer to the first question is "no" and the answer to the second is that some resource (time, money, people, energy, etc.) would be saved, the team should propose to do away with that step.

This is the point where the documented flow chart with the proposed steps to be removed should be briefed to the chain-of-command. If approval for the changes is received, the unnecessary steps should be eliminated. Change the flow chart to reflect the new process or procedure.

It is critical that the people working in the process understand and use the new procedure. This may require a training effort.

Continue to monitor the results of the process (as in Step 4). Hopefully, with the obvious waste eliminated, some improvement will be seen. This will become the new baseline for the more analytic changes that will be tried in later steps of the improvement process.

TOOLS :	Flow Chart
	Check Sheet
	Pareto Chart
	Run Chart

STEP 5 . SIMPLIFY THE PROCESS WORKSHEET

To simplify the process, answer the following questions for each activity in the documented "as is" flow chart :

1. Is this step necessary ?

2. What would happen if the step were eliminated ?

After answering the above questions, proceed through the following actions.

3. List activities recommended for removal with reasons (answer from 1 and 2 above).

4. Seek approval from the chain-of-command.

5. Document the new process. Redraw the flow chart.

6. Make sure everyone working in the process know the new procedure.

7. Continue collecting data.

STEP 6

ANALYZE ROOT CAUSES

The previous steps have dealt with documenting the process associated with the problem. We now begin the phase known as Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA). PDCA involves identification of root causes, planning and improvement, testing the plan, checking the results, and acting to institutionalize the changes to the process.

The data you have looked at so far measure the results of the process. You want to find the root causes of the problem so you can find the right things to measure inside the process and improve them. Then the results of the process will also improve. You will pick some things to measure as part of Step 7, but first you must find the important root causes.

There exist various tools for the team to use. One of these is brainstorming. Use it to develop a list of the possible root causes of the problem.

Then develop a cause-and-effect diagram to organize these ideas and identify possible causes of the problem. Once the wide range of potential causes is listed, you can highlight those that seem to represent the root causes of the problem.

Now that you've highlighted possible root causes, it is important to verify with data how much these causes really affect the results. People are often surprised to find that what they think are primary causes really aren't. Use Pareto charts to organize your data to show relative importance.

If data are not available, use the multivoting technique to determine possible root causes.

TOOLS : Multivoting Cause-and-Effect Diagram Check Sheet Pareto Chart

STEP 6 . ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Answer the following questions or take the actions described to analyze the potential causes of the problem :

1. List the possible causes of the problem described in Step 4. Can any be verified with data ?

2. Prepare a cause-and-effect diagram.

3. Which of the causes are most likely ? Are data available ? Can we verify the causes with new data ?

4. If data are available, use Pareto charts to rank the causes by order of importance. If not, use multivoting.

5. Now that you have learned more about the problem and causes, are there other people who should be on the team ?

6. Select the root cause with the greatest possible impact and proceed to Step 7.

STEP 7

PLAN THE IMPROVEMENT

Working through the attached worksheet will result in a plan to implement process improvement.

In order to get chain-of-command approval to implement system changes, a clear explanation must be provided of the feasibility of success, how the implementation will be controlled, what the change will cost, and whether there are any risks or downsides to the proposed solutions. You should also be very clear on why this particular opportunity was chosen.

After the plan is finished and before going to Step 8, the team must get chain-of-command approval.

TOOLS :	Brainstorming
	Multivoting
	Flow Chart
	Check Sheet

STEP 7 . IMPROVEMENT PLAN WORKSHEET

Answer the following questions or take the actions described to plan the improvement :

1. What is the proposed solution ?

2. Who has responsibility for implementing the solution?

3. What has to be done to implement the solution ?

4. Where will the change be implemented ?

5. What will you measure in the process ?

6. How will you collect the data ?

7. Are there any risks associated with the possible solution ?

8. Are we going to test this on a small scale or fully implement ?
   - Who needs to approve ?
   - How long will the test last ?

9. Obtain permission to conduct the test.

STEP 8

DO THE TEST

Now that you have identified a potential solution, you need to test it. Depending on the situation, you may want to test it on a limited basis before applying it to the entire organization. In this way, the improvement can be proven, risks of failure avoided, and command-wide support obtained. This decision will have to be made on a case-by-case basis.

As the solution is tested, it is vitally important that appropriate data be collected to evaluate the solution. You must track the measures you selected in Step 7 as well as the overall results of the process you established in Step 4. A run chart may be used to wath trends.

TOOLS : Check Sheet
Run Chart

STEP 8 . TEST WORKSHEET

Take the actions indicated to test your solution.

1. Finalyze your test plan.

2. Train everyone involved in the test.

3. Prepare forms and check sheets for collecting data. Distribute.

4. Perform the test.

5. Collect and collate data.

STEP 9

CHECK THE RESULTS

So far, you have picked one root cause that you think led to the problem. You have made changes and picked some measures to see if you are making progress. Now that the system has been working under the new procedure and you have collected some data, you should check to see whether the expected results were achieved. This is a good time to describe any differences between your plan for improvement and the way the plan was executed.

TOOLS :	Check Sheet
	Run Chart

STEP 9 . CHECK THE RESULTS WORKSHEET

Answer the following questions to ensure that Step 9 has been thoroughly carried out.

1. How much improvement has been made ? Compare the data from the current situation in Step 4 to that gathered after the solution was tested.

2. Describe why an improvement was made (or why not) ?

3. Was the result what you expected ?

4. Did something happen that was not expected ? Can you determine why ?

5. Where there any problems with the plan ?

STEP 10

ACT ON RESULTS

Having checked the results of your test, you must now take action on the data and information gathered. Your team should submit its recommendations to the chain-of-command. In general, there are three options :

1. **Adopt.**
   If the test has accomplished the desired improvement, the recommendation should be to adopt the new process. Proceed to Step 11 to develop the actions necessary to standardize the process.

2. **Adjust.**
   If the desired improvement was not achieved to the degree expected, return to Step 6 and repeat the steps.

3. **Abandon.**
   If you have reached the point where you have no further solutions to test and no additional ideas for improving the process, proceed to Step 12.

STEP 10 . ACT ON RESULTS WORKSHEET

Answer the following questions or take the action described to act on the results of your test :

1. Was the test solution effective ?

2. What did we learn from the small-scale test that will help the full-scale implementation go smoothly ?

3. Brief the chain-of-command on your team actions and recommendations.

STEP 11

STANDARDIZE AND MONITOR

If your project has resulted in documented improvements, you want to make them last. You must develop a way to make the new way of operating the standard way of doing "it". This will be accomplished by changing an instruction, a manual, or a procedure. Training must be provided. Flow chart the new process or procedure. The new procedure must be monitored in order to hold the gains in performance you have achieved. This is best done by people in the process continually tracking those process measures that helped them achieve the process improvement.

Run charts placed where visible to the people who work in the process usually provide an incentive to continue with improvement.

TOOLS : Flow Chart Check Sheet Run Chart

STEP 11 . STANDARDIZE AND MONITOR WORKSHEET

Answer the following questions to ensure that Step 11 is thoroughly carried out :

1. Has the solution been approved ?

2. Have we flow charted the new process ?

3. Have we determined how the change to the new process will be made (e.g., changed procedure, training, manuals) ?

4. Who is responsible for implementing the new procedures ?

5. Is there a way to continue to monitor the process to ensure that the improvements last ?

STEP 12

FURTHER ACTION ?

Now is the time to review the process improvement procedure you have just completed and to identify what was learned. Some questions to be answered are on the future action worksheet.

Finally, and very importantly : **Document your project, including all worksheets and data.**

TOOLS :	Brainstorming
	Multivoting
	Flow Chart
	Check Sheet
	Pareto Chart
	Run Chart
	Cause-and-Effect Diagram

STEP 12 . FURTHER ACTION WORKSHEET

Answer the following questions or take the actions described to determine further action in this process :

1. Have the results of this project met our expectations ?

2. Review the cause-and-effect diagram and data. Can further gains be achieved ? Should we try any additional solution/test ?

3. What is in place to ensure that the new process remains in place and that we will not revert to the old way of doing business ?

4. Who will monitor the new process ? How will they monitor it ?

5. Where other problems uncovered that need to be addressed ? By whom ?

6. Are there lessons learned ? How can the word be spread ? Internally ? To other commands ?

c. Summary for the Commanding Officers.

The twelve steps for basic process improvement provide ways and tools for a command to get started without having to wait for formal TQL training.
But this is not a substitute for TQL education.
The Command's success will depend on how the CO personally employs TQL.

As CO, consider possible processes and pick one. Step 1 will help you in selecting an improvement project. For the first several processes, you will have to be personally involved.

Put together a team. First, pick a motivated person to be the team leader who is involved with the process and will help ensure the team's success. Next, ensure that the team leader understands the problem as you see it. Be as specific as possible. Take time with the team leader to ensure that he or she fully understands the steps and tools, and discuss the team leader's responsibilities. Avoid encumbering the team with rigid links up and down the chain-of-command. Trust the team leader to report and to request approval when needed. Finally, together with the team leader, pick the other team members. Step 2 gives guidance on the team leader's responsibilities and picking the team members.

After the team defines the problem (Step 3) and develops a plan on how improvements are to be made, it should get your concurrence before proceeding to Step 4. When the team leader reports to you, take the time to really listen to the team's definition of the problem and its proposed plan for making improvements. Make suggestions, if appropriate, but avoid telling the team how to do its job. It is critical at this stage of the process to clearly demonstrate your total support for the team. A good way to do this is to meet with the whole team to listen to their plan rather than just meeting with the team leader.
If you think that parts of the plan require revision, take the time to explain exactly what your concerns are.

After flow charting the process (Step 4), the team may find some steps that, if eliminated, would simplify the process. These steps are usually unnecessary to begin with and their elimination will save money, time, people, or energy. At this point, the team leader should make a formal recommendation for your approval. Again, take the time to listen to the proposed changes. If you are not briefed by the team leader, ask to see the team's flow chart and its plans for verifying that

the changes you approve will, in fact, improve the process. Again, you may want to meet with the entire team at this point, rather than just the team leader. Avoid disapproval of the team's recommendations unless you are sure that making the changes would be a mistake. If you must disapprove the team's recommendations, take the time to explain your concerns. Then let the team try to resolve the problems you have with their recommendations.

Your next critical involvement comes at the end of Step 7. The team has put together a detailed plan for implementing changes for improvement and needs your approval before the plan can be implemented (Step 8). Once again, take the time to listen to the team's plan. Step 7 provides guidance on what the plan should entail. Ask questions. If not briefed, ask to see the team's flow charts and cause-and-effect diagrams as well as any other tools they have used to develop the plan. If the plan will involve other senior leaders in the command, ensure that they are present when the team briefs its plan. If you have reservations about the plan, discuss them with the team and work with the team to resolve them. Unless safety is jeopardized or mission accomplishment impaired, consider letting the plan be implemented, at least on a limited, trial basis.

After a trial run of the team's changes, the team will recommend to you either full-scale deployment of the improvements, modifications to the proposed improvements, or abandonment of the project altogether. If full-scale deployment is recommended, ask to see the team's documentation of successful improvements. Step 11 has other guidance on what should be included in the team's report. If modifications are recommended, the team needs to go back to Step 6 in the approach to analyze causes once again and develop a new plan for improvement.

You're not through working on the process just because you approved fullscale deployment of the improvements. The team needs to recommend a way to monitor the process continuously to ensure it doesn't slide back to where it was before the improvements. You also need to look at other potential problems uncovered by the team and determine whether they need to be addressed. As a minimum, lessons learned by the team should be documented to help other teams making process improvements. Finally, you need to publicly recognize the efforts and success of the team and the team members.

B. LEADERSHIP IN THE BELGIAN NAVY

1. TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS

The complete text of the concepts on Naval Leadership as practiced in the Belgian Navy is beyond the purpose of this work. Here follows a synthesis.

a. What is Naval Leadership ?

Naval leadership may be defined as the art and the science by which a person is enabled to influence thoughts, direct plans and actions of others in such a matter as to obtain their confidence, their respect and their loyal cooperation in order to accomplish the Navy's mission through people.

b. The leader and the individual

In the relationship with the individuals whom he leads, the principal aim of the leader must be to create a climate of confidence and respect, so that his decisions will be accepted willingly and he will be able to receive the instant, unquestioning and whole-hearted response that the circumstances may demand.
The quality leader will achieve this aim by knowing his job backwards, by understanding and satisfying the needs of his people, by the way in which he develops and expresses his own character and by demonstrating and demanding the special virtues that are required by the profession of arms.

This requires a set of qualities and attitudes :

- Professional competence
- Understanding of the needs of individuals (Maslow), and satisfying them
- Practicing the Navy's "do's" and "don't's" (Culture)
- Character development and expression
- Physical and moral courage
- Integrity
- Tenacity
- Decisiveness
- Common sense
- Cheerfulness
- Enthusiasm
- Humanity
- Humility
- Self-control
- Faith
- Virtues

c. Authority and discipline

One definition of discipline is "a system of rules for conduct". No society can exist without it since it provides the communal framework within which we can all give of our best, knowing not only our own limits and freedoms but those of other people. The precise rules of conduct and the methods of achieving acceptance of them will of course vary from one society to another. Although, ultimately, the application of discipline may have to rest upon the exercise of authority, the Navy rightly puts the emphasis on self-discipline, which means bringing forth the best in people and evoking in them the loyalty and sense of responsibility to live of their own free will within the established rules of conduct. We can achieve this by good training, by explaining what we are doing and why, by being consistent in the demands that we make and by setting a good example ourselves.
People need to know where they stand. Leaders at every level make absolutely clear what is expected so that there can be no uncertainty or misunderstanding. Consistency in applying these standards is the essential. Never forget though, that punishment is no substitute for leadership. It is more a recognition that in some way or other leadership has failed. Inspiring people to give of their best, rather than instilling fear of the consequences, must always be our first and principal approach to discipline.

d. The leader and the team

The real crux of this relationship lies in the leader's ability to motivate his people and use their talents as a team. One often hears of sport teams which are well endowed with talented individual players but which lose to apparently weaker sides who play better together as a team. Thus team spirit is essential to success, and when we see a team that has it, we may be sure that good leadership has inspired a valued and common aim, forged a sense of corporate identity and created a feeling of mutual dependence and support.

The aim : .

The first step in motivating the team is to ensure that everyone in it knows what it is he is going to do. It will be helpful to a team to set its aim in the context of the higher level aim of the ship. It is always necessary for it to be achievable.

The spirit :

Teams look for self-esteem as much as individuals. We all want to be part of a successful and well administered organization with leaders who expect excellence, who notice and reward it and who are equally urgent at uprooting inefficiency. It is worth making a special effort to ensure some early and visible success, however small, to form a foundation of esprit-de-corps on which to build. Life in a ship is a series of minor aims met and this is where a good leader can cultivate a sense of common effort and achievement.
The more we can build up spirit by success, the easier it will be to cope with the occasional failure.

Involvement :

The final and most important key to motivation is involvement. Sometimes the circumstances themselves will provide this. Thus there is no need for any great effort on the part of the leader to make members of the fire-party feel involved when fighting a boiler-room fire. But on less exciting and stimulating occasions it is up to the leader to involve his team whenever possible in the planning and decision-making process. Consult them, tap their brains, ask for ideas and suggestions.

e. Communication

It has been said that most of the problems of the world are those of communication. It is certainly a key factor in getting people and teams to give of their best. The first essential is to create the environment in which communication can flourish, and we can achieve that by good management and by the care and personal interest that we take in people.

Transmitting and receiving :

A leader must make sure that people know as much as possible about programs, routines, affairs in general and what is expected of them. This requires thought and application. Every leader should brief his people regularly - face to face - on progress, policy, points for action and decisions with the reasons behind them. This briefing should be concerned principally with the business of the team being adressed. However, it can also be used for feeding information and instructions forward down the command chain, with each leader briefing his own subordinates who in turn brief theirs, and so on.

Receiving is not a purely passive activity. Certainly, we should keep cabin and office doors open, both literally and metaphorically. But whilst thus making it evident that we are always available to listen, we must never just wait for people to come to us. The best feedback comes from "walking the shop floor". So get out and about, talking informally to people and encouraging them to talk back; and plan time for this in the working-day.

Listening means far more than hearing. It means paying attention and having to decipher the message that may lie behind a difficulty or reluctance in expression. Watch out also for sign language. Listening in this full sense requires care, concentration and method.

f. The leader and the task

The only reason for grouping individuals into a team is to get something done. The importance of this must always be in the forefront of the leader's mind and in order to achieve it he may begin significantly to require the management skills of decisionmaking, planning, organizing and administering resources. The extent to which he does so will depend upon the type and the level of the task. Identifying the aim and setting up an appropriate organization will be common to every task.

The leader must remember that :

- the ultimate purpose of everything is to get things done - i.e. the task.
- any task, however small, must have some element of management skill applied to it by the leader if he is to do it well.
- these elements will include :
  * Selecting and defining the aim.
  * Ensuring that the tools for the job are available at the right time and place.
  * Defining those parts of the task that are delegated to individuals or to part of the team.
  * Informing and briefing.
  * Supervising and monitoring - i.e. seeing that the task is carried out.

and all of these elements will require forethought and planning.

Finally, the leader must also plan for the unexpected.

g. Leadership style and quality

Leadership style :

A close study of some of the great leaders of the past shows that whilst in one way or another they all had the gift of firing enthusiasm and getting the best out of people - in other words, they successfully satisfied the needs of the task, teams, and individuals - they by no means universally followed every guideline and counsel given.
We must also be ready to adapt our style to varying situations. Orientations are always balancing between "man" and "task".
At the end of the day, the most important things in leadership style are to be sincere and to be ourselves. The process, i.e. how the leader creates intrinsic motivation focused on the realization of a task by a group of men, is at the heart of leadership.

Quality :

Quality is much more than a technique, it's a mentality, a state of mind. Quality in naval leadership, is determined by it's fitness for use. It is the result of cooperation between people who are motivated to produce quality in their thoughts and actions. Quality must be present in the global system of the Navy, on each level and in each phase of the functional process. Where in the profit sector quality must be as good as necessary for the client, in the non profit sector and certainly in the Navy, quality should be as high as possible, for our productivity requires the best for the community.

h. Conclusion

This is the Navy's traditional way of getting things done through professional skill, intelligent and understanding discipline, sympathy and mutual respect between all ranks, concern for the individual, team spirit, and inspiring people to give of their best. It requires a pattern of behaviour, consistent relationship with those that we lead that is not unlike the best sort of parent/family relationship, and officers at every level have their part to play in achieving quality in naval leadership.

2. NEW DEVELOPMENTS

a. The Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel (Belgian Navy) was inspired by the recommendations on "achieving flexibility by empowering people" and "learning to love change : a new view of Leadership" as described by Tom Peters in his book "Thriving on Chaos".[11]
In a note to all naval authorities, the Chief of Naval Staff invited them to study the content, to discuss this with all team leaders, and to evaluate on performances.[12]
Each of the ten prescriptions received a "category", in order to translate the ideas to the reality of the Navy.
Thus, category A = max. application in the Navy is possible
category B = can be applied selectively
category C = can not be applied, or with difficulties.

So, as to "Achieving flexibility by empowering people", were highly recommended for application :

- P-1 : Involve everyone in everything
- P-3 : Listen/celebrate/recognize
- P-5 : Train and retrain
- P-7 : Provide an employee guarantee
- P-8 : Simplify/reduce the structure
- P-9 : Reconceive the middle manager's role
- P-10: Eliminate bureaucratic rules and humiliating conditions

Were considered as belonging to category C :

- P-4 : Spend time lavishly on recruiting.
  Reason : recruiting is centralised once a year by the General Staff for all the Armed Forces (the results are poor for technicians, and satisfactory for non-technicians).
- P-6 : Provide incentive pay for everyone.
  Reason : profit distribution is impossible, nor the possibilities of other pay incentives well known in the profit sector.

As to "Learning to love change : the new leadership", were highly recommended for application :

- L-1 : Master paradox
- L-2 : Develop an inspiring vision
- L-3 : Manage by example
- L-4 : Practice visible management
- L-5 : Pay attention (more listening)

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[11] Tom Peters, Thriving on Chaos (London : Pan Books, 1989), 281-477.

[12] Belgian Chief of Naval Staff, Toelichting inzake HRM-concept en aangepast leiderschap, 30 May 1991, Note No %S 430433 (Brussels), 12.

- L-6 : Defer to the front line
- L-7 : Delegate
- L-8 : Pursue horizontal management
- L-10: Create a sense of urgency

In fact, only one prescription by T.PETERS was put in category C :

- L-9 : Evaluate everyone on his love of change.
  Reason : local leaders assimilate change with negative decisions from "Brussels" (e.g. budget restrictions, cuts in personnel, etc.). First they have to realize that leaders transform changes in opportunities and new goals.

The categorisation showed the Admiral's perception and as a result, the "prescriptions" became guidelines ready for use and approved by the top.
In addition, all naval authorities were asked to measure their performances on new leadership and empowering people by the following 4 criteria :

(1) effectivity
(2) efficiency
(3) flexibility
(4) creativity

Some examples of shortages and remedies were given especially to explain flexibility and creativity as new performance criteria.

b. An other note was sent to all naval authorities until the level of first line manager, in order to assist these direct superiors in their daily confrontation with their collaborators.[13]
This coaching instrument is called the "Achieve Model", and is also used in the Dutch Royal Navy (since February 1991).
Its purpose is to support short term goals and long term development objectives.

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[13] Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel, Het Achieve Model, 28 June 1991, Note No ZS1/P 421119 (Brussels), 1-4.

The acronym "Achieve" stands for :

- A bility (knowledge, skills, experience needed for the execution of tasks)
- C larity (perception, understanding of objectives and their priorities)
- H elp (support from the organization : equipment, budget, personnel,...)
- I ncentive (motivation, willingness to perform : rewards, challenge, appreciation,...)
- E valuation (coaching and performance feedback)
- V alues (respect, trust honesty, equal treatment, mutual expectations,...)
- E nvironment (external factors : supplies, equipment, influencing performances)

These 7 factors have an influence on the performance of people. Leaders generally have no problems in noticing the weak performances of their people, but they don't know how to situate the causes of this poor results. The "Achieve Model" can help as a preparation for all kinds of interviews (performance, problem solving, discipline) as a guideline for coaching, and as a support for the evaluation.

c. Two notes do not make the difference, could be argued. This is not an isolated refreshing (or surprising for some) shower on a warm summer day. It is part of our effort to manage and lead our people in an interactive way, so that the Navy of the year 2000 may thrive on the remnants of the "chaos" of the nineties.
Since 1990, all existing courses on leadership are being reviewed, redesigned, and rethought. This includes the leadership education of all personnel, i.e. officers, non-commissioned officers (NCO's), and enlisted men. Instructors learn new ways of communication, how to work with people, and see leadership more as an interaction between followers and leader. New directions start with new education, so that people may understand, accept, and demonstrate this new way of doing things.
Combat efficiency will always require a hierarchical command structure. But every level of command has an active role to play. Today, leadership is marked by motivation, participation, delegation, and control. However, the practice of command (taking charge) is different in peace circumstances than in war conditions. The fundamentals of leadership remain, but the leader must master the art of flexibility and adaption to changing situations.

3. SURVEY RESEARCH ON THE PERCEPTION OF LEADERSHIP

a. Purpose and Population

The purpose was to know the perception of actual leadership among junior naval officers.
The population was composed of "first line" junior leaders in the four stadia of their first fifteen years of career, i.e. in the Royal Military Academy, in the Application School, on board of operational vessels, and during the course for candidate Commanders.
In total 29 officers participated, or 17% of this personnel category.

b. Questionnaires

Three questionnaires, in Dutch and French, were used (see Appendixes D,E, and F).
Questionnaire I will search for transactional and transformational leadership. Where as the first is more traditional in the sense that the leader influences mainly by convincing, transformational leadership involves people in values, meanings, and create fusion of purposes.[14]
Questionnaire II will indicate the flexibility in the choice of leadership style depending on different situations.[15]
Questionnaire III will tell more about leadership types in the 6 fields of action : communication, command, errors, complaints, animosities, and evaluation/rewards.[16]

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[14] James Mac Gregor Burns, Leadership (New York : Harper & Row, 1978).

[15] Paul Hersey and Ken H. Blanchard, "So You Want to Know Your Leadership Style ?" Training and Development Journal, Feb. 1974, 1-15.

[16] R.R. Blake and J.S. Mouton, "A Comparative Analysis of Situationalism and 9,9 Management by Principle, Organizational Dynamics", Spring 1982, 20-43.

c. Results of the Survey

1) Styles of Leadership

The results of the analysis of questionnaire II are shown in figure 3.
The most preferred style is selling (type II), where the leader provides both directive and supportive behavior.
Second best score is participating (type III) : decision making is shared, and the leader facilitates and communicates a lot.
Telling (type I), and delegating (type IV), have the lowest scores. This last finding is surprising in the sense that another research on organizational culture in the Navy (conducted in 1990, 91 and 92) reveals a great need for more delegation.



Figure 3

ERM = Royal Military Academy
OCA = Application School
A BORD = on board naval vessels
CFOS = candidate Commanders

One of the results of the analysis of questionnaire III is presented in figure 4. Here the vast majority prefers a qualitative style, i.e. the 9.9 style in the Managerial Grid of Blake and Mouton.[17]
In this "team management", work is done by committed people who trust and respect each other.



Figure 4

This open style, with lots of selling and participating, is typical on board where good relations must facilitate the execution of task.
Remark : the French codes on the figures based on the "Managerial Grid" correspond with :
- "Qualité" = 9,9 style (Team Management)
- "Compromis" = 5,5 style (Organization Man Management)
- "Rien" = 1,1 style (Impoverished Management)
- "Relations" = 1,9 style (Country Club Management)
- "Production" = 9,1 style (Authority-Obedience)

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[17] R.R. Blake and J.S. Mouton, The Managerial Grid (Houston : Gulf, 1964).

The balance between the convincing and the participating styles, as indicated by the candidate Commanders group (see figure 3, part CFOS), is remarkably confirmed by the results of the analysis of the questionnaire I.
Table 1 illustrates the equilibrium between **transactional** leadership, based on the capacity of conviction in order to perform short-term tasks, and **transformational** leadership, based on the fusion between individual needs and long-term organizational goals.

Questionnaire I:

Leadership transformationnel (Tf) ou transactionnel (Ta):

GROUPE	Tf	Moyenne Tf	Sigma	Ta	Moyenne Ta	Sigma
ERM	240	24	4	260	26	4
OCA	230	29	3	170	21	3
A BORD	164	23	3	186	27	3
CFOS	103	26	2	97	24	2
Total	737	25	4	692	25	4

Table 42

2) Flexibility

The result of the answers at questionnaire II is presented in figure 5.



Figure 5

The average score of 6 indicates the presence of a good amount of flexibility among the first-line officers, who have to adapt constantly their leadership style to the situation and to their people. A correct diagnosis and a just perception are needed in order to lead in a flexible way. Other qualities are needed still to forge a coherent group : communication with and within the group, motivation (interest, recognition, adhesion), self-discipline (justice, example), and a sense of initiative.

3) Communication

Figure 6 shows again the general tendency of quality, with an open communication in both directions. In second place comes the "Organization Man Management", typical for an organization where performances result from balancing tasks with good morale of people.



Figure 6

Active communication, and listening (e.g. during performance interviews, and through leading "by wandering around") are daily practices on board, within the divisional system. Not only the content of tasks is explained, how- and why-questions must also be answered as much as possible.

4) Command

Figure 7 shows, surprisingly perhaps in a military environment, the 1,9 style as the most important one. This style is characterized by thoughtful attention to needs of people.
As a result, the organization is marked by a friendly atmosphere and a comfortable work tempo.
In second place comes the 9,9 style, which favors team management.



Figure 7

Lowest scores have the 1,1 style (minimum effort-approach), the 5,5 style (compromise), and remarkably also the 9,1 style based on pure authority and obedience.

5) Errors

The perception of errors is represented in figure 8.



Figure 8

The 9,9 style is clearly dominating : errors are seen by the leader as an alert signal. It is typical that failures on board are confronted by a positive attitude : errors are analysed, discussed; lessons are learnt, equipment and methods are improved. Not only competence is scrutinized, also the level of motivation (of individuals, and of the section or group) and the efficiency of communication are examined as possible causes of human errors.
In exceptional cases however, when a serious professional mistake might endanger ship and crew or reduce the operational readiness, the 9,1 style based on authority and obedience will be applied by the leader. This style reduces to a minimum the possible interference of human factors by emphasizing directive behavior : clear and specific orders are given by the leader on what, how, when and where to do various tasks.

6) Complaints and Animosities

As shown in figure 9, complaints are generally treated in the same way as errors, i.e. in a positive way by active listening, eliminating the causes (removing the worries), and solving the problem using all formal and informal channels.



Figure 9

In second place lies the 5,5 or compromise style, especially visible on board where often no pressure is used upon an individual with a personal complaint. When the leader can not solve the problem at sea, technical support is given where needed and appropriate.
It is worth noticing that the candidate Commanders-group only see consensus as a way to handle complaints.

The answers on animosities, in figure 10, are different from those on complaints.



Figure 10

Here there is a balance between the perception that the team can not tolerate any sign of insubordination or lack of commitment to a common objective, and the need to restore satisfying relations within the group. This is the main attitude on board. In some cases, compromise or strict orders are considered to be appropriate.

d. Conclusions and new orientations

From the results of the survey on the perception of leadership among first line officers, some conclusions may be made and, consequently, new orientations can be recommended in the most important areas of leadership.

1) Education

The main opportunities for learning leadership are : trial and error, people, and education and training.[18]
There is no surrogate for learning by doing. The more chances you have to serve in leading roles, the more likely it is that you will develop the skills to lead. Important lessons often emerge from the failures and successes in live action.[19]
Mentors, superiors, and peers are also excellent sources for guidance. Mentors help to navigate the system. Superiors challenge, give trust, are consistent, are present when things go wrong. Peers give advise and feedback on the observed style and behavior.[20]
In developing leadership abilities, training and education are basic opportunities to learn away from work (especially in external programs). Here, courses can be taken in areas least known.[21]
In the process of learning leadership, the survey points especially at :
- the capacities and qualities of the leader to adapt;
- the perception on groups and situations.

The education starts from the first day in the Royal Military Academy with theory and practices in class and in supervised reality, such as a period with the para-troopers climbing rocks and being parachuted. Later on, real experience at sea in different roles and degrees of responsibility is another step. Staff functions and command at sea are consecutive other steps. So, during a whole career, there is always a way, and a need, to improve personal leadership.
New orientations in the naval education centers are :
* introduction of situational and transformational leadership;
* exchange and transfer of experiences.

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[18] James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner, The Leadership Challenge (San Francisco : Jossey-Bass, 1991), 284-290.

[19] Ibid., 284.

[20] Ibid., 286-87.

[21] Ibid., 289.

2) Qualities of the Leader

Genuine total **quality** of the leader must be present. No follower will accept any superficial behavior. Good leaders make the hearts beat faster. They always find an equilibrium between relations and task in a climate of **confidence** and **respect**.
These conclusions of the survey advance three axes for new orientations of leadership practice on board: communications, initiative-delegation-participation, and motivation.

(a) Communication

Junior naval officers ask for :
- better vertical information and internal communication;
- education in active (entrepreneurial) communication
- more horizontal communication in order to eliminate causes of errors.

Several formal committees exist, such as the Contact and Information Committee, at the first line level.
The organizational structure is flat : beside the top in Brussels, we find all first and second hierarchical levels in each of the three regional Commands. Being a small Navy, all ships are stationed in Zeebrugge, near their administrative, technical and logistical support. This structure allows short and direct channels of communication. Still, information is also a just-in-time matter. And those who sit and wait for the right information to come should start doing something about it themselves. Often, information is available a few hundred meters away. First line officers should know, at least, the answers on the questions: who has this specific information, where, and how can it be obtained. Good leaders are pathfinders, they put their people on the right track, they encourage them to persist, and they assist them to get results.

In order to improve communication, possible new orientations are :

* education and training in **communication techniques;**
* Knowledge and use of all **existing** information **channels.**

Communicate is active listening in the first place, it is mutual information between at least two persons, and it is also giving feedback.
In the Belgian Navy, evaluation and performance interviews exist, but we must consistently improve the process, e.g. by using the Deming cycle.[22]

(b) Initiative - Delegation - Participation

The efficiency of a ship in combat is the result of multiple specific attitudes and actions which are continuously convergent with the three basis operational conditions : Fight, Float, Move.
Problems can be solved in different good ways.
Initiative will allow natural capacities to emerge. Leadership style, depending on situations and opportunities, must remain flexible. Very rigid procedure though may be needed in times when no human error may endanger the execution of a task. Here, right combat reflexes are more important. But, during training sessions, there is time for explanation of both pre-programmed automatisms and non-programmed initiatives.
Junior officers ask for more delegation of authority and responsibilities, they like to take initiatives, and they want to participate in the decision making process.
In a large scale survey research on organizational culture in the Navy, 55% of the officers asked for more delegation.[23]
It is however remarkable that this present survey showed that, in general, the leadership style is based on convincing and participating (see figure 3). The delegation style (type IV) scored even lower than the directive style (Type I).
So, in order to increase intrinsic motivation and job satisfaction, possible new orientations are :
* **delegation** of authority and responsibility to the first line
* promotion of taking **initiatives.**

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[22] W. Edwards Deming, Out of the Crisis (Cambridge, MA : Massachusets Institute of Technology, 1986), 88.

[23] Belgian Navy, Enquête over de Organisatiecultuur (Evere : Naval Staff, 16 November 1990), 14.

(c) Motivation

Freely accepted discipline results from understanding why, and coincides with intrinsic motivation.
Also, there is a lot of osmose between motivation, participation, communication, and delegation.
On board, step-by-step successes are celebrated.
Leaders are very visible, 24 hours a day. They must be an example, and they must reward or sanction in a fair way. They will stimulate motivation by proposing challenges and targets to beat together.
Also, the reputation of their ship is their pride. Positive leadership, based on recognition of merits and mutual respect, will result in self-discipline, loyalty, and a unique group cohesion.
The survey points at three possible new orientations to increase motivation :

* The use of **intermediate objectives** to reinforce the experience of success.
* The confrontation of the group with **more challenges.**
* The development of **freely accepted discipline.**

3) Support

Instead of using a directive style, survey participants prefer education as a way to improve the maturity of the group.
To support is to facilitate, to enable others to act by coaching.
This face-to-face leadership means taking time to build a personal relationship with people. It involves sponsoring, counseling, confronting, and educating. Coaching means also value-shaping.[24]

Although this should be a common practice, the survey suggests as new orientation :

* To **coach** more intensively every member of the group.

4) Problem Solving

Two conclusions of the survey results concerning problem solving are :

- positive attitude towards errors;
- encourage the leader to get involved.

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[24] Tom Peters and Nancy Austin, A Passion for Excellence (New York : Warner Books, 1986), 383-446.

Here, reactions against animosities could improved. It is an opportunity for the leader to propose solutions to his superiors by simplifying, eliminating, replacing old procedures, or reducing bureaucracy. A reduction of the administrative weight, and the removal of worries (such as unclear task discriptions, career possibilities, no feedback, lack of means, poor own competence, no teamspirit, no information) will result in better relations and better execution of tasks on board, in schools, and in workshops.

The final new orientations emerged in the survey are :

* **Rethink** old **procedures** and rules.
* Leaders at all levels must stay open, solve complaints and animosities, and **get** personally **involved.**

e. Possible Actions

The possible actions, as a result of the previously mentioned choice of new orientations, may be grouped in the education of junior leaders and in the practice of leadership.

1) **Education of Junior Leaders**

Here we can use officers with outstanding specific knowledge and experience to present a punctual, concentrated program for the education of officers and non-commissioned officers. This basic, or intermediate, education program would consist of :

* an introduction to situational leadership
* an exchange of experiences (illustrate the needed qualities of adaption, different situations and people, opportunities, etc.)
* an education in the techniques of communication (presentations, briefings, meetings, evaluation and performance reviews, etc.)

2) **Practice of Leadership**

It could be interesting to make and distribute a plastic card (could be used in an agenda) mentioning some important leadership practices to be improved and the corresponding recommended actions.
Here follows a "blue-print" for such a card :

Leadership Practices	Recommended Actions
* Get the best from people	- Treat everyone as **unique** - Show **respect** and **confidence**
* Get results	- Stimulate **initiative** - **Delegate**
* Objectives : clear/reachable	- Win **many** small challenges
* Create Team spirit	- **Coach** - Give **example** - **Reward** - Use everyone's **strengths**
* Redesign/Rethink	- **Remove** old ways : change/improve
* Get involved (GOYA)[25]	- **Solve** problems - **Listen** - Explain - Find **new** opportunities/chances
* Decision making	- **Stable** goals and values - Don't play God : do introspection
* Communication	- Send/receive **right message**, at **right time** - Know/use **all** channels
	- I ACT NOW -

Table 43

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[25] Frederick Herzberg, "One more time : How do you motivate employees ?", Harvard Business Review, January-February 1968, 35. The acronym GOYA is derived from Herzberg's KITA, and stands for "Get Off Your Arse".

4. FIELD RESEARCH ON MOTIVATION, ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE, AND LEADERSHIP.

a. Population and Questionnaire

In November 1992, a field research was done in the Group Divers and Mine Disposal of the Belgian Navy.
On the whole population of 45 specialists, 73% responded. The respondents are officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men.
The purpose was to know what motivates, or not, this valuable group in the areas of performance, recognition, information/communication, function, occupation, workconditions, development, and environment.
The questionnaire, translated from Dutch into English, with the received results, is shown in Appendix G.

b. Motivators and Demotivators

The strongest motivations, as experienced by the participants, are listed in table 44.

Rank	10 strongest MOTIVATORS	%
1	Obtain trust and responsibility	87
2	Success in solving difficulties	78
3	Max. use of own capacities	73
4	Get opportunities for self-fulfilment	73
5	Get respect as adult human being	73
6	Get opportunities for further education	69
7	Be in charge of a task/mission	64
8	Have a challenge	64
9	Openess with collaborators	64
10	Qualitative improvement, and positive encouragement	60

Table 44

The first ranked motivator, to "Obtain trust and responsibility" seems to be also at the top (84% of all respondents) in Belgian profit organizations, such as banks.[26]
The motivators ranked 2,3,7,8 and 10 (qualitative improvement) are directly related with the execution of the mission of the Group Divers and Mine Disposal.
The motivators ranked 4,5,6,9 and 10 (positive encouragement) are more focused on each individual.
These actions are vital to achieve congruence between

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[26] R. Van keymeulen and L. Van Der Veken, Motivatie van de Kaderleden (Brussels, 1989), 6.

personal aspirations and the needs of the Navy. The fusion of individual and organizational objectives creates the strongest leverage in the practice of transforming leadership.[27]

The strongest demotivators in the Group are listed in table 45.

Rank	5 strongest DEMOTIVATORS	%
1	Low pay (salary, bonus)	87
2	Limitations of the function	86
3	Lack of recognition/esteem	82
4	Poor information	82
5	Poor channels of communication	77

Table 45

In the Navy, salary is based on the rank. Since most respondents are of a rather lower rank, there is a feeling of deprivation when they compare their pay with divers in the profit sector (e.g. those working in the North Sea oil industry).
Bonus is actually too low, and the Naval Staff is supporting a demand to increase financial compensations for this particular hard and risky job.
The demotivator ranked 2 calls for multiskilling, but it takes already at least three years to become an experienced diver whose expertise is needed for the execution of his limited function on board of a minehunter. The scarcity of young divers makes it difficult to broaden the prime function at sea.
They also need longer periods of recuperation, and they participate in the ship's exercises. A possible solution could be found in the double use of divers who are also specialist in mine disposal (now this is separated), but this has consequences in education, training, keeping up expertise in both fields, and location of work (ship or shore).

The numbers 3,4 and 5 are also experienced as demotivating factors in the profit sector. It shows the perception of "being left in the dark" by top management. Here the first and second line officers should take initiatives (e.g. by explaining the results of their findings to their own superiors, and by proposing solutions).

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[27] Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, In Search of Excellence (New York : Harper Collins Publishers, 1982), 83.

Some other factors are considered to be "not motivating": the policy of drafting (77%), the position of power (45%), and the pressure to perform more regardless the quality (31%).
It is clear that in a military organization, sudden jobrotations may occur with little warning time. People dislike this disruption in their family lifes. In the Dutch Navy, this problem seems partly solved by the possibility of solicitation for a new job. The Belgian Navy works with a system of individual preferences and every personal request is investigated.
In general, the place (on board/ashore), the function, the period, the kind of mission, the personal wishes, the individual fitness for use, and other factors make it difficult to put "the right man on the right place" because what is "right" may be interpreted in many ways. The decision-maker first satisfies the needs of the Navy by drafting a person who is as competent and as motivated as possible.
Finally, most divers do not seek a position of power, and they value quality in their performances.

c. Organizational Climate

For this part of the research, we have used the questionnaire and method developed in the Catholic University of Leuven (Belgium), which provides the profile of the organizational climate of the Group Divers and Mine Disposal.[28] (see figure 11)



Figure 11

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[28] G. De Cock, R. Bouwen, K. de Witte and J. de Visch, Organisatie-klimaat en cultuur (Leuven : Acis, 1986).

The profile of the existing climate gives a picture of a flexible Group with the focus slightly more directed at the organization (output, quality of the actions, mission) than at the individuals (relations, teamwork, self-fulfilment).
Innovation, aimed at a better process in achieving the mission, and support for individuals and teams, are considered for more important than the target directed information and the respect for rules.
This organizational climate corresponds well with the "professional bureaucracy"-configuration of Henry Mintzberg.[29]
Indeed, standardization of skills is the key coordinating mechanism and the operating core, i.e. the ships, is the key part of the organization. There is much horizontal specialization and much training. The grouping is functional and the pull to professionalize dominates. The support staff is large in order to back up the professionals in the operating units. The environment is complex but rather stable.

d. Leadership

In the Group, leadership can not be delegated.
During dangerous actions of mine counter measures and mine disposal, small teams need visible and dynamic leaders.
The Commanding Officer (C.O.) must listen to the multiple voices of his organization by wandering around. He must know strengths and weaknesses of his Group in order to reach his objectives in efficient and effective ways. He must be open to changes and autonomous actions of his experienced collaborators.
Each leader of a team should stimulate initiatives.
Team and leader should share the same inspiring values.
The leader investigates and improves workenvironment; he motivates others by his example and by setting high standards of competence and skills.

The C.O. is an engineer in underwater works and a specialist in mine countermeasures. He also had a command at sea before becoming C.O. of the Group.
His Executive Officer (X.O.) is the coordinator in the network of the divisions. He presides the organisation-effectivity commission, he distributes the tasks and controls the execution. He is quality oriented.
The first line officers and division chiefs are very experienced. They act as advisers for C.O. and X.O. and are in charge of the execution of the primary and secondary tasks. Therefore, in normal circumstances, they receive delegation of authority and they become

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[29] Henry Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations : A Synthesis of The Research (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, 1979).

co-responsible.
When new methods or techniques must be applied, it may be required that the C.O. acts initially as a convincing (selling), or participating leader in order to increase the psychological task-maturity of his collaborators.

e. Conclusions and New Orientations

The principal conclusions of this field survey are :

- The self-motivation of the members of the Group is high.
  Through the personal involvement and risk of the job, the focus is directed on total quality.

- Collaborators want te be consulted by their leaders. They like being responsible and display a positive behavior toward relations and tasks in their daily work.

- They want further education and training.

- They seek recognition and respect.

- Like all other naval personnel, divers and mine disposal specialists want to develop fully their potential capacities and thus experience self-fulfilment.

- They ask for better financial compensation, better information, more esteem, and less limited functions.

Recent new orientations are :

* Reorganization of the command structure, with the application of the subsidiarity principle.

* The establishment of the Organization Effectivity Commission.

* The use of evaluation- and performance interviews.

An additional new orientation could be :

* An improved reward system, with short term financial compensations and long term career consequences.

  This last possibility has to be accepted by the General Staff.

5. PUBLIC OPINION POLL

It seemed interesting not only to conduct a field research inside the Group Divers and Mine Disposal of the Belgian Navy known as NAVCLEARMIN, but simultaneously to organize a public opinion poll among the external clients of these particular services.
The average yearly interventions of the Group are :

- 450 missions of mine disposal
- 100 diving missions
- 5 anti-terrorism missions
- 1 search on sunken trawlers
- assistance during search and rescue (SAR) operations (with helicopters)
- assistance during anti-drug actions.

The need of the public for interventions of the Group is very real. So the Group wants to satisfy the need of their clients in the Belgian coastal area.

a. Population and Questionnaire

In November 1992, a selective public opinion poll was done in 4 coastal towns (Nieuwpoort, Middelkerke, De Haan, and Ostend) and in the capital of the coast province (Brugge).
In each town, 20 persons participated, making a total of 100 civilian participants, selected at random.
The purpose was to determine tendencies concerning :
- the knowledge of the Group among the population;
- the idea (or image) the population has of the Group and their personnel;
- the importance of the Group's services for the population.

The questionnaire, translated from Dutch into English, is shown in Appendix H.

b. Results and Conclusions

The results of the public opinion poll were :

19% know the meaning of NAVCLEARMIN.
36% have correctly situated the Group at Ostend.
5% know the colour of the mine disposal vehicles.
33% know the mark on the mine disposal vehicles.
5% know the mission of the Group.
83% consider neutralizing explosives a high risk job.
16% know th area of responsibility of the Group.
43% think that the specialists are very well paid idealists/adventurers.

75% consider the Group to be important for the general security.
72% find it normal that specialists are well paid in relation with the risks.
72% would not do this kind of job for less than 10.000Bf. per intervention.

The conclusions are clear :

- The Group is relatively not well known by the public.
- A high percentage find this a dangerous job, which is very useful and needed for the public's security.
- A high percentage associate (wrongly) this risky work with a very good remuneration.

c. New Orientations

The actual procedure for interventions by the Group Divers and Mine Disposal does not allow a direct contact of the users, i.e. the clients among the public, with the suppliers of this specific service. Indeed, each demand must pass through the channels of police (or "gendarmerie"). After their own control, green light is given by the police to the Group for deployment. So, the clients get the impression that the police is solving their problem, although they only play an intermediate role.

The new orientation therefore could be :

To restore the possibility of direct relation between each client and the Group Divers & Mine Disposal of the Navy.

The first consequence is that the role of the police in this matter would be reduced to local support and provisional security measures. After receiving a call for intervention, the Group would inform the local police before starting their own deployment.
This new procedure would clearly prove the personal commitment of each mine disposal specialist to remove each risk caused by the discovery of explosives by a member of the population. Better understanding and mutual appreciation would also improve the image of the Navy as a whole.

C. SPECIFICITY OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP

1. When preparing operations

Certain aspects of the military function do not exist in the public or private sector.
In general, the specificity of the military is very vaguely known by the population.
In normal peacetime conditions, i.e. when focus is put on training and readiness, the following aspects are specific for all military personnel :

- The obligation to obey and execute orders of superiors (refusal is possible when an order contradicts universal morals, the constitution, and laws).
- The personal liberty of movement is restricted (e.g. during holidays, special duties).
- The use of personnel is unlimited, regardless the hour or the day.
- Long absences (e.g. when embarked), causing disruption in the family.
- Physically very demanding work conditions (e.g. for divers), causing higher risks for professional diseases and injuries.
- Military discipline and specific jurisdiction (Court-Martial).
- Constraint to the practice of 3 languages (Dutch, French, and English).
- Some specialists, such as mine disposal specialists, risk their life at every intervention.
- Strict medical and physical requirements.
- Security clearance and compliance with military security regulations.
- Absence of the notion of profits (instead, quality in all performances are highly wanted and valued).
- Limited freedom of expression.
- High stress resistance.

2. When executing operations

Executing operations, whenever the government makes use of its armed forces, is the core activity of the military.
In real operations (e.g. during the Iraqi conflict in the Persian Gulf, where the Belgian Navy participated with 1.230 men and 6 ships), the specific nature of the military profession is obvious : peace must be protected, defended, and restored. This may mean to destroy targets, advance in enemy territory, make prisoners of war, and resist hardship.
Above all, death and injuries are a real possibility.

Here, leadership is about destroying the enemy, and keeping own losses as low as possible. It is bringing the own group out of chaos and restoring peace. It is taking charge, and leading in front.

In real combat situations, military leadership is focused on :

- Knowing your enemy : neutralize first your own weaknesses before analysing threats and opportunities of the enemy.
- Living in harmony : especially between leaders and followers.
- Investigate, act, and improve : choose targets, get organized, take action, and correct.
- Master all your weapons, and be strong at the decisive point.
- Focus all your resources on the objective (including communication systems, intelligence, logistics, and other weapon support).
- Respect what you do not understand : never become overconfident, and beware of your self-reference criterion.[30]
- Fight when it suits you best, i.e. when you are best prepared, moving at the right time and in the right direction.
- Adjust continuously tactics with strategy : adapt to the results in the field, and be unpredictable for the enemy.

In wartime, desertion in the face of the enemy or refusal to execute an order is punished by the firing-squad. Because lifes are at stake, Western military leadership is based on a "code of conduct".
The Code of Conduct of the U.S. Fighting Force was first promulgated by President Dwight Eisenhower on 17 August 1955, and reaffirmed on 8 July 1964 in the Department of Defense Directive n°1300.7. The six articles deal with ethical concerns as an American in combat :

. I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

. I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.

. If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

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[30] Warren J. Keegan, Global Marketing Management (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, 1989), 111.

. If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to comrades. If I am a senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

. When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their case.

. I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

Military leadership demands from the person in command great courage, deep dedication and high motivation. Military leaders must understand and believe strongly in the free democratic institutions of their country, trust in the justness of its cause, and keep faithful to high moral values and beliefs.
For the military leader who views his oath of office as his pledge to contribute to the common good of his society, "duty, honor, country" is a way of life and a moral commitment, which is not subject to contractual negociations as in a business environment.
A military leader accepts responsibility for the development of character of the people being led. The role of the military profession is best viewed by Aristotle who seeks rational harmony within the individual and in the state : peace is the natural state of man.

Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, Chief of Naval Operations, published the following statement about the U.S. Navy core values of honor, commitment, and courage, because of its relevance to expected behavior and leadership characteristics, working together as a team, and improving the quality of work and people.

N A V Y C O R E V A L U E S

* HONOR : "I WILL BEAR TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE..."
Accordingly, we will : conduct ourselves in the highest ethical manner in all relationships with seniors, peers and subordinates; be honest and truthful in our dealings with each other, and with those outside Navy; be willing to make honest recommendations and to accept those recommendations from junior personnel; encourage new ideas and deliver the bad news, even when it is unpopular; abide by an uncompromising code of integrity, taking responsibility for our actions and keeping our word; fulfill or exceed our legal and ethical responsibilities in our public and personal lives twentyfour hours a day. Illegal or improper behavior will not be tolerated. We are accountable for our professional and personal behavior. We will be mindful of the privilege we have to serve our fellow Americans.

* COMMITMENT : "I WILL OBEY THE ORDERS..."
Accordingly, we will : demand respect up and down the chain of command; care for the safety, professional, personal and spiritual well-being of our people; show respect toward all people without regard to race, religion, or gender; treat each individual with human dignity; be commited to positive change and constant improvement; exhibit the highest degree of moral character, technical excellence, quality, and competence in what we have been trained to do. The day-to-day duty of every Navy man and woman is to work together as a team to improve the quality of our work, our people, and ourselves.

* COURAGE : "I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND..."
Accordingly, we will : have courage to meet the demands of our profession and the mission when it is hazardous, demanding, or otherwise difficult; make decisions in the best interests of the Navy and the Nation, without regard to personal consequences; meet these challenges while adhering to a higher standard of personal conduct and decency; be loyal to our Nation by ensuring the resources entrusted to us are used in an honest, careful, and efficient way. Courage is the value that gives us the moral and mental strength to do what is right even in the face of personal or professional adversity.

The function of the military mission has been characterized as the management of violence (Lasswell, Huntington), the containment of violence (General Hackett), or as constabulary (Janowitz).
The military virtues are obvious :
subordination of the good of the self to the good of the nation; and military unit, courage, obedience, loyalty, integrity.
The last one, integrity, is the foundation virtue for military leaders if they wish to successfully develop loyalty and obedience in their subordinates.
These virtues are a functional necessity : success in battle is impossible without them; preparation for battle requires their inculcation. The contractual view of one's role in the profession generated from Thomas Hobbes' view of living up to the contract is "justice", and the egoistic search for promotion as symbol of personal success may be acceptable for leadership in a business environment; it can not serve as the ethical foundation for military leadership.[31]
The relationship between a military leader and his men can not be merely contractual; the leader accepts responsibility for transforming followers with an eye to inculcating the specific military virtues mentioned earlier. Thus, the transformational leader adds to performance an emphasis on education. He sets the moral tone for his subordinates by the example of integrity he provides in his official duties and in his private life. Honesty and courage can not be instilled by contract; they may be enhanced by education about their importance to mission accomplishment, and by example of the leader. The former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Meyer commented like this :[32]
"The obligation of service and commitment inherent in the military ethic imposes burdens not customary in the larger society where obligations are normally contractual in nature and limited in degree of personal sacrifice expected.
For the soldier, the obligation is complete : to death if necessary."

For the military leader, professional competence is a moral obligation, because the stakes are so high in terms of the survival of his society, loss of human life, and use of national treasure.
With respect to the development of tactics, weaponry, strategy, and the conditions for employing weapons systems, the military leader's competence is a crucial issue. Indeed, in the military profession the line between incompetence and immorality may become very thin. An incompetent military leader could cause needless loss

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[31] Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan (1651), n.p.

[32] Edward C. Meyer, General, Professional ethics is key to well-led, trained army, 1980, Army 30, 10 : 11-14.

of life and, in extreme situations, destroy important parts of humanity.
Given this critical uniqueness, no nation can afford to have military leaders to be intellectually incompetent or morally insensitive.
And it is clear that leaders must extend this concern for competence to all levels of the military hierarchy.

Professor Janowitz segmented the tasks of military leadership in three characterizations : the direct combat roles of the heroic leader, the organizational and administrative functions of the military manager, and the specialized skills of the military technologist.[33]
In contempary military leadership, virtues such as duty, honor, country, responsibility for the lives of one's followers, and victory on the battlefield, seem remote from the hightec tasks performed in the actual complex military structure. As a result, the distinction between military and civilian jobs becomes narrower, and the relationship between leader and led tends to become more contractual. Charles Moskos has warned against dangers to military legitimacy and effectiveness should the military institution see its specific values replaced by the self-interested behavior of "defence contractors".[34]
The military function keeps its unique and necessary role of protection of a way of life. The challenge and difficulty remains in the ability to attract and retain leaders who understand and accept the ethical dimensions of professional competence, and who themselves exemplify the highest intellectual and moral qualities. And it is obvious that the exercise of leadership that is part of a democratic system must reflect democratic values, which also includes firmness and discipline.

The essence of military leadership has stayed unchanged since Sun Tzu wrote 500 years before the time of Christ :[35]

"And therefore the general who in advancing does not seek personal fame, and in withdrawing is not concerned with avoiding punishment, but whose only purpose is to protect the people and promote the best interests of his sovereign, is the precious jewel of the state.
Because such a general regards his men as infants they will march with him into the deepest valleys. He treats them as his beloved sons and they will die with him.
If he cherishes his men in this way he will gain their utmost strength."

In our modern Western defense systems, there is clearly a need for both managers and leaders, but individuals must be effectively selected, placed and trained for the

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[33] M. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York : Macmillan, 1960), Ch.2.

[34] Charles Moskos, "From institution to occupation", Armed Forces and Society 4,1 (1977) : 41-50.

[35] Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. S.B. Griffith (New York : Oxford University Press, 1971), 128.

positions they fill. The centralized "command, control, and communication" chains must give authority and responsibility to the leaders of the line.
Finally, modern military leaders must feel part of the civilian society and its values. Because the ultimate risks are so high, military leadership, especially in operational circumstances, is unique and it is the duty of the leader to uphold the specific military virtues and set an example through his own daily behavior.

D. GENERAL GUIDANCE ON FUTURE LEADERSHIP IN THE BELGIAN NAVY.

* Top leaders must learn to become exemplars, and teachers of quality.[36]

  - Top leaders plan and strategize, select targets and priorities; they are the instructors and promotors of transformation.
  - They seek to improve a system. They listen and try to make more time for precision and care, based on more analyses and data.
  - They learn to see themselves as suppliers to internal customers whose needs and expectations they will identify and meet where appropriate.
  - They become instructors in seminars and presentations on TQL.
  - They seek more resources for their own education, and recommend these to others.
  - They identify obsolete symbols of the chain-of-command organization and change them to reflect a new outlook.
  - They spend sufficient time listening to personnel at every level.
  - They must reduce people's resistance to transformation by explaining the benefits of the new navy.

* Top leaders must prove their credibility to the family of officers by placing quality before traditional concepts such as seniority and rank. They should put those officers in high positions who are respected by all personnel for their knowledge, their vision, their way of thinking and acting, and their mastership in the education of self and others.
  Top leaders can never become symbols of TQL if they use seniority and personal preference as criteria for important assignments, if they promote persons who will help them in solving short-term problems (instead of promoting persons who contribute to the improvement of the whole Navy in realizing long-term objectives such as TQL), and if they delegate TQL strategy to their deputies.
  Effective top leaders break the top-down pattern of imposed quantitative objectives. They want to improve their organization as a whole, not to cause a mere managerial effect.

* Officers must establish improvement projects that are carefully selected and guided, conducted by cross-divisional teams using a scientific approach, and coached by technical advisers.[37]

  - Officers achieve a measurable betterment of a product, service, or process, by solving a problem, reducing

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[36] W. Edwards Deming, Out of the Crisis (Cambridge, MA : Massachusets Institute of Technology, 1986), 54-59 and 88ff.

[37] Patrick Townsend, Commit to Quality (New York : John Wiley, 1986), pp.51ff.

costs and time, less errors, etc.
- They solicit project suggestions from lower ranks.
- They understand why lasting improvements cannot be rushed.

* Top and senior leaders engage in quality transformation planning starting with a two-year blueprint for preparation, start-up, and early expansion.

- They do the planning themselves, or at top level, they do not delegate planning of TQL downward in the organization.
- In the two-year blueprint, they adress questions such as :
  - ♦ What strategic issues should be considered in the selection of the first efforts ?
  - ♦ Who will be the coordinator ? What about preparation of everybody involved ? How can top or middle management give support ?
  - ♦ Who will provide technical assistance ?
  - ♦ What are the secondary targets ?

* Superiors must establish processes for the internal coordination, oversight, technical training and assistance needed to support all TQL improvement efforts.[38]

- They must know the long-term vision.
- They must assess the effect of transformation efforts; they must ensure that the right things are being done in a successful way.
- They must assess needs, coordinate training and the deployment of in-house technical resources.
- They must provide for the continuous education; they must be presenters and instructors for workshops and seminars.
- They must provide technical assistance to project teams and others engaged in TQL.
- They must give orientation to new officers and key personnel.
- They must coordinate information and publicity about TQL efforts.

* The implementation coordinator, a senior officer of the Naval Staff, must be a capable leader and have a solid understanding of Deming's teachings.

- He should report to the Chief of Naval Staff directly.
- This coordination function should be exclusive and may expand into a TQL coordination section that includes a statistician and an organization development specialist.
- He provides support services to the chain-of-command,

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[38] W. Edwards Deming, Out of the Crisis (Cambridge, MA : Massachusets Institute of Technology, 1986), 465-474.

which is responsible for the TQL-transformation. His task is not to build a separate quality empire.
- He has an informal relationship to local-site coordinators and technical advisers.

* Direct superiors must undertake specific efforts to change the organizational culture to one more supportive of TQL.[39]

- They must ask questions such as :
  - ♦ How does the individual subordinate feel about working here ? About his work group, teamwork, loyalty, trust, collaboration ?
  - ♦ How does each subordinate feel about his unit, command, and the Navy ? Valued, included, proud ?
  - ♦ How does he (or she) feel about the job ? About the daily work ? Competent at it, proud of it, workwhile ?
- They must be convinced that subordinates who feel relatively good about their jobs, their colleagues at work, their superiors, and the Navy at large, are more likely to join a never-ending pursuit of total quality.
- They make efforts to earn their subordinates' trust and cooperation, by asking them :
  - ♦ What quality problems they experience ?
  - ♦ What stands in the way of pride of work ?
  - ♦ What stands in the way of teamwork ?
  - ♦ What would help them to feel more a part of the organization ?
- They should conduct focused discussions among small groups and ask what they, as direct superiors, can do to :
  - ♦ eliminate fear and barriers,
  - ♦ encourage of spirit of closeness to the customer,
  - ♦ encourage a common commitment to scientific approach, and
  - ♦ encourage commitment to continuous improvement.
- They must review the existing policies, with their subordinates, asking :
  - ♦ do any policies suggest the old concept of the Navy?
  - ♦ how can these policies be changed to complement the new view of the Navy ?
  - ♦ do any policies suggest distrust or disrespect of subordinates ?
  - ♦ how can these policies be replaced with trustful and respectful policies ?
  - ♦ how can the Navy's system create a level of pride and respect that will eliminate any need for paternalistic regulation ?
- They should daily employ the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle.[40]

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[39] Edgar Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco : Jossey Bass, 1985), and Rosabeth Moss Kanter, The Change Masters (New York : Simon & Schuster, 1983).

[40] W. Edwards Deming, Out of the Crisis (Cambridge, MA : Massachusets Institute of Technology, 1986), 88.

- They must work at real system improvements, not at management by objectives (MBO) and performance standards which work against a TQL-culture.[41]

Direct superiors must be more preoccupied with giving good service to their cooperators than with self-interest. Patronizing concern for people, and unlimited career promises are not the true dimensions of managerial behavior. Every direct superior throughout the chain-of-command must place the common interest of the Navy above his personal benefit.
Direct superiors are together with the crew in the same boat, their survival or success will depend on their capacity to row together.
A concern for the common interest and teamwork must be the dominant values. Direct superiors can not lead from a distance, nor for their own purposes.

* Each senior officer in command of a ship or of a naval establishment must invest in education and training, based on their leadership, planning, coordination, oversight, and support.[42]
They may distinguish the following types of education and training :

- Technical training related to specific job skills.
- Systems orientation for all individuals and groups, in order to understand :
  - ♦ how jobs fit into the system
  - ♦ who the internal suppliers and customers are
  - ♦ how individual work affects the final product or service delivered to the outside customer or user.
- New technical and maintenance skills, not only for technicians but also for operators.
- Basic orientation to quality, to be taught to everyone at the start of the transformation effort.
- Technical adviser training, in order to know the tools of the scientific approach, the skills of project planning, and the basics of team development.
  Technical advisers must also know how to teach others.
- Basic improvement skills for everyone in the Navy (gradually), taught through selective just-in-time training.
- Quality leadership : education, training, and development for officers, key personnel, and direct supervisors at every level.
  - ♦ They must study Deming's teachings.
  - ♦ They must understand variation, in order to be effective.
  - ♦ They must make use of data and do statistical thinking.

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[41] Ibid, pp.70 ff. and 101-120.

[42] Ibid, 52-54 and 86.

The future leadership in the Belgian Navy will have to realize the transformation to a total quality organization. Unlike the first year of the Human Resource Management approach (in 1990), the best way to create irreversible change is not through the immersion technique or an overdose of the new medicine.
Patiently and persistently, leaders will convert one process after another, strive for constant improvement and continuous education and training. And they will have to develop a pace of change that does not overextend their capability to coordinate and support.
Finally, leaders should always have the following rules of thumb in mind :

- Recognize the informal organization; you will need its cooperation to implement change.

- Seek the active support of a critical mass; sufficient influential people are needed to create a sense of momentum.

- People do not resist change, they resist being changed (active listening is an excellent remedy). Drive out fear and resistance of new knowledge.

- When possible, organization change should be planned with a mixture of gradualism and surprise; help people to stretch themselves, but not too much at a time. A shift of symbols can underline a shift of vision.

- Efforts to implement change should be anchored through networks.

- The more profound, comprehensive, and widespread the proposed change, the more absolute is the need for deep understanding and active leadership by the top officers. Leading the transformation can not be delegated.

Without the active leadership of the top officers in the three Commands of the Belgian Navy, many officers in the second and first echelons will probably use the wait-and-see tactic, as they often did during the past HRM years. If the TQL effort will receive a passive, shallow, or incoherent support from the Commanding Officers in the local Commands, TQL will soon be displaced by the familiar priorities and behavior that may well contradict the goals of the intended fundamental change.

One final warning based on the facts and recent experience. One of the conditions to start any important organizational change, HRM or TQL, is to reserve sufficient capacity.

During the HRM period, the HRM adviser of the Chief of Naval Staff was expected to push and pull the whole project through all levels of Command; he was also the HRM architect, the educator, coordinator, and evaluator.
The development and implementation of HRM was not considered to be an exclusive full-time job. In addition to that, the HRM budget was kept very low; and for the year 1993, it was cut by two thirds leaving insufficient oxygen to continue external education as planned.
At the start of this promising TQL era, the Navy should not step open-eyed into the same pitfalls again.
The hierarchy of ideas for improvements in managing work and leading people, is more important than the hierarchy of ranks and position. But, the quality of the output of the Navy can never be better than the quality directed at the top. Hard work and best efforts are no substitute for guidance and knowledge. Quality is conceived at the top, and produced at all levels by everyone who has acquired TQL knowledge and who has applied the principles of transformation to himself first.

One basic idea of HRM though will also remain a key concept in TQL : leaders must create favorable conditions so that cooperators can let mature their own ideas for improvement.
Empowerment, communication, and development of self will continue to be the life-jackets of all naval personnel in the restructured Belgian Navy of the year 2000.

RETENTION SURVEY among TECHNICIANS

(Questions translated from Dutch)

Q1. What is your specialty ?

O mechanic O electricien O electro-technicien O repairer

Q2. What is your age ? .....years old.

Q3. What is your level or rank ?

O cand.B2 O B2 O B1 O BM O LT- LtCDR O CDR+

O B4

Q4. Where is your place of work ?

O COMINAV O COMOPSNAV O COMLOGNAV O ADM/DIV

Q5. What diploma or certificate do you possess ?

.....

Q6. Why did you join the military ?

O job security O certainty of occupation

O career possibilities O other reasons (fill in)

.....

Q7. Why did you choose the Navy ?

O for the uniform O for the good spirit

O it is near the place I live O for the adventure

O other (describe)

.....

Q8. If you could choose again, would you make the same choice ?

O Yes O Probably yes O Probably not O No

Q9. Do you find the specialty education in the Navy

O a complement of O a repetition of

O not adapted with the basic education received before in civilian life, or in the Navy

Q10. Do you find it necessary to receive other periodical education outside the formal education (B2, B1, BM) ?

O Yes O every 3 years O every 2 years O every year

O ..... O No

Why ? .....

Q11. Do you wish to transfer your knowledge to colleagues and co-workers ?

O Yes O No

O Why ? .....

Q12. Is the naval education you received adapted to the execution of your tasks ?

O Too much O Tailored O Too Shallow O Not adapted

Q13. Would you study useful techniques for the Navy in civilian life at your own expense, if you would receive credit-hours for it ?

O Yes O Maybe O No idea O No

Q14. Do you find the design of a "type-career" meaningful ? What are, in your opinion, advantages and disadvantages ?

O Yes O No

Advantages .....

.....

Disadvantages .....

.....

Q15. Are the objectives of the Navy clear to you ?

O Yes O No

(Comment) .....

.....

Q16. What are your personal expectations towards the Navy ?

O a steady job O a good pension O render a service to my country

O other .....

Q17. Do you think these goals can be combined with the Navy's mission ?

O Yes O No O Maybe O If not, I quit

Q18. Do you find the total package of salary, allowances, and pension sufficient ?

O Yes O No O Only on board O I do, but not my wife

O .....

Q19. Are you satisfied with your present work ?

O Totally O Mostly O 50/50 O Mostly not O Not at all

Q20. Could you make suggestions to improve quality and content of work ?

O Yes O No

Q21. Did you make such suggestions and were they gratefully accepted ?

O Yes O No

Q22. Do you find your present work corresponding with the goals of the Navy ?

O Yes O No O I do not know

Why ? .....

Q23. What kind of work would you mostly prefer to do ?

O Education O Repairs O Routine O Administration

O Other .....

.....

Q24. If you would win in a lottery, would you leave the Navy ?

O No O Yes, if over 2 million O If over 5 million

O If over 20 million

Q25. Are you satisfied with the knowledge and leadership of your superiors ?

- 1st line superior :

O Very pleased O Pleased O Moderately pleased

O Not at all pleased

- 2nd line superior :

O Very pleased O Pleased O Moderately pleased

O Not at all pleased

- Command level (3rd and 4th line) :

O Very pleased O Pleased O Moderately pleased

O Not at all pleased

Free comment : .....

.....

Q26. Are you satisfied with the quality of social relations at your work ?

O Very pleased O Pleased O Moderately pleased

O Not at all pleased

Q27. Do you find watch- and sea-allowances sufficient as a compensation for the lack of family life ?

O Yes O No

Q28. What period do you find as sufficient to function efficiently in a job ?

O 1 year O 2 years O 3 years O 4 years O 5 years

O ..... years

Q29. Do you find that :

O Tasks and processes must be rigidly defined by the superiors.

O You must participate in determining tasks and ways of execution.

O Only objectives must be defined and means put at your disposal.

O You know best what task is to be executed, and how.

O It is a continuous task of the superior and his team to look for an optimal task execution with a minimum of means ?

Q30. Do you find the present workload

O Too high O Rather high O Adapted O Rather low

O Too low

Q31. Do you find the requirements imposed by your superior

O Too high O Rather high O Adapted O Rather low

O Too low

Q32. Do you find the means at your disposal for the execution of your task

O Too many O Rather many O Adapted O Rather insufficient

O Totally insufficient O Available but not appropriate

Q33. Are you sufficiently informed to be able to execute your task ?

O Well O Rather well O Moderately O Rather poorly

O Poorly O Lots of information is not relevant

Q34. Do you think your team is performing better than comparable ones in the Navy ?

O A lot better O Better O Equally O Worse

O A lot worse

Q35. Mark the degree of your agreement about the following statements.

1 = I do not agree at all
2 = I rather disagree
3 = I rather agree
4 = I completely agree

- I have clearly formulated missions	1	2	3	4
- I have clearly formulated tasks	1	2	3	4
- The majority of my co-workers stand behind those missions	1	2	3	4
- I feel strongly committed to my missions	1	2	3	4
- My work stimulates me in my permanent learning	1	2	3	4
- I stay motivated, also after being drafted	1	2	3	4
- The Navy gains with continuous education of personnel	1	2	3	4
- In my service, a newcomer is enthusiastically received and supported in learning his tasks	1	2	3	4
- In my service everyone is very competent	1	2	3	4
- Changes in order to improve the Navy are needed	1	2	3	4
- We'll make the best of changes imposed by political authority	1	2	3	4

Q36. What do you find of the present efforts in the area of Human Resource Management in the Navy ?

O Good ideas, but will need time

O Good ideas, but are not put into practice

O Not needed when the superior is good

O I do not know

O Other

.....

QUESTIONNAIRE (translation from Dutch)*

ORGANIZATION CULTURE IN THE BELGIAN NAVY

° Population : OFFICERS
° Date : June 1990.

(*) The joint letter from the Chief of Naval Staff and the explanatory note have not been translated.

QUESTIONS

Q1. In what degree are you generally satisfied with the functioning of the Navy ? (encircle your answer)

Not at all 1
Little 2
Moderately 3
Fairly 4
Very 5

Q2. In what degree are you generally satisfied with your present life ?

Not at all 1
Little 2
Moderately 3
Fairly 4
Very 5

Q3. In what degree do you expect to be satisfied with your life within five years ?

Not at all 1
Little 2
Moderately 3
Fairly 4
Very 5

Q4. In what degree are you generally satisfied with your present function ?

Not at all 1
Little 2
Moderately 3
Fairly 4
Very 5

Q5. You find some statements concerning your work.
Mark for each expression how far you agree :

1 = I do not agree at all
2 = I rather do not agree
3 = I rather agree
4 = I fully agree

- I love my work (the kind of job)	1 2 3 4
- I work in a pleasant environment	1 2 3 4
- My work is interesting	1 2 3 4
- I make good money	1 2 3 4
- The work spirit is good	1 2 3 4
- My working hours fit perfectly	1 2 3 4
- My superiors recognize my capacities	1 2 3 4
- I work well with my colleagues	1 2 3 4
- I work well with my superiors	1 2 3 4
- My capacities are well used	1 2 3 4
- My team and I collaborate well in realizing the tasks	1 2 3 4
- I have enough chances to determine and solve problems together with my superior	1 2 3 4
- I have the autonomy to take decisions concerning problems within my responsibility	1 2 3 4
- I am satisfied with the way my superior organizes his service	1 2 3 4

Q6. In what degree are the following factors demotivating in the execution of your function ?

1 = not at all demotivating
2 = a little demotivating
3 = very demotivating

- Salary and allowances	1 2 3
- Guards and night duties	1 2 3
- Irregular service hours	1 2 3
- Absence from home	1 2 3
- Planned draft on board	1 2 3
- Unscheduled draft on board (stand-in for unavailable person)	1 2 3
- Draft ashore	1 2 3
- Not receiving sea-allowances (alongside)	1 2 3
- Lack of information on career possibilities	1 2 3
- Lack of recognition of my performances	1 2 3
- Insufficient delegation (responsibilities)	1 2 3
- Insufficient self-development	1 2 3
- Too much workload	1 2 3
- Too much paper-work	1 2 3
- Too few means (personnel, material, budget)	1 2 3
- The promotion system (too slow, automatic)	1 2 3
- Others : (PRECISE)	1 2 3

.....
.....
.....
.....

Q7. The following statements concern motivation.
Mark for each expression how far you agree :

1 = I do not agree at all
2 = I rather do not agree
3 = I rather agree
4 = I fully agree

- I have clearly formulated missions	1 2 3 4
- I have clearly formulated tasks	1 2 3 4
- I can situate these tasks within the overall objectives of the Navy	1 2 3 4
- The majority of my collaborators support their tasks	1 2 3 4
- I am totally committed to mission & tasks	1 2 3 4
- My worksituation stimulates permanent education and training	1 2 3 4
- I give sufficient attention to the development of my collaborators' potentials	1 2 3 4
- My work-motivation stays the same, also if work or place change	1 2 3 4
- Permanent education and training of all lead to better results on board	1 2 3 4
- Permanent education and training of all lead to better results ashore	1 2 3 4
- Results of permanent education and Trg are communicated to all participants	1 2 3 4
- In my service, motivation and competence are stressed and discussed	1 2 3 4
- In my service, the present commitment is generally high	1 2 3 4
- In my group, the present level of competence is generally high	1 2 3 4
- In my group , the present commitment of new-comers is high	1 2 3 4
- In my group, the present level of competence of new-comers is high	1 2 3 4
- In my service, new ideas are accepted and changes are sufficiently explained	1 2 3 4

Q8. How do you think to respond yourself to the expectations that the Navy has put in you ?

Very badly 1
Badly 2
Well 3
Very well 4

Q9. What is your age ?

.....years old

Q10. What is your sex ?

Male 1
Female 2

Q11. How long do you work in your present service ?

Less than six months 1
Between 6 months and 1 year 2
Between 1 and 2 years 3
Between 2 and 5 years 4
More than years 5

Q12. To which category do you belong ?

LtCdr and below 1
Superior officer 2
Flag officer 3

Q13. To which corps do you belong ?

Deck 1
Technical 2
Services 3

Q14. What suggestions do you have to increase the competence of your collaborators ? (FILL IN)

.....

Q15. What do you do to improve the motivation of your collaborators ? (FILL IN)

.....

QUESTIONNAIRE (translation from Dutch)*

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IN THE BELGIAN NAVY

° Population : a. **NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS** (NCO's)
b. **ENLISTED MEN**
° Date : a. June **1991** (NCO's)
b. June **1992** (Enlisted men)

(*) The joint letter from the Chief of Naval Staff and the explanatory note have not been translated.

QUESTIONS

Q1-4. : unchanged (same as in the officers' questionnaire, in 1990)

Q5. : same as Q5-officers' questionnaire, but extended with :

My direct superior

- takes my ideas/suggestions serious	1 2 3 4
- stimulates my motivation	1 2 3 4
- uses performance interviews	1 2 3 4
- supports me with advice and action	1 2 3 4

Q6. : unchanged

(new) Q7. :
During your career, how many times have you been drafted for urgent/unscheduled reasons (with 3 days or less warning time) ?

- On board .....times
- Ashore .....times

(new) Q8. :
The following statements concern the way drafts are organized in the Navy.
Mark for each expression how far you agree :

1 = I do not agree at all
2 = I rather do not agree
3 = I rather agree
4 = I fully agree

- For my drafts, my own preferences were sufficiently taken into account	1 2 3 4
- The period of my previous function was too short to acquire experience	1 2 3 4
- I must move out too often due to drafts	1 2 3 4
- Drafts cause practical and financial inconveniences	1 2 3 4
- If I get a draft which is inconvenient, I'll leave the Navy	1 2 3 4

Q9. : same as Q7 in the Officer's questionnaire.

(new) Q10 :
Here follow some concrete ways to increase the motivation of your collaborators. Choose the three ways that appear the most important ones for this purpose, and mark the corresponding number beneath the list.

Nb. 1. Congratulations for the quality of their results.
2. Giving self-responsibility, based on a mutual trust and delegation of authority.
3. Giving a chance to test and prove themselves.
4. Explaining them the reason of decisions.
5. Using their capacities at a maximum.
6. Helping them in their self-realization.
7. Involving them in the definition of the team's objectives.
8. Demanding their advice how to solve problems.
9. Helping them to realize their own wishes.
10. Having regular talks about the job and the possibilities of each collaborator.
11. Having good human relations.
12. Showing respect.
13. Showing interest in their family and social problems.
14. Working really as a team.
15. Giving the example yourself (motivated, enthousiastic, humour).
16. Matching periodical evaluation-scores with their merits.

Number of chosen mean (in order of importance)

1. .....
2. .....
3. .....

(new) Q11 :
This list represents some concrete ways to improve the competence of your collaborators. Choose the three ways that seem the most appropriate for this purpose, and mark the corresponding number beneath the list.

Nb. 1. By contributing myself to the permanent education and training.
2. Bij depending their promotion-chances on the improvement of their performances.
3. Being demanding about quality and output.
4. By sharing my knowledge and experience with them.
5. Accepting errors from those who take many initiatives.
6. By keeping them in my service during a minimal period (1-3 years).
7. Being more at sea and doing less routine work.
8. By following closely the trainees.
9. By encouraging social promotions and changes to better personnel categories.
10. By creating a motivating work-atmosphere.
11. Explaining better procedures and methods.

Number of chosen way (in order of importance)

1. .....
2. .....
3. .....

Q12. : same as Q8 in the officer's questionnaire.

(new) Q13. :
Have you participated in the operations in the Persian Gulf ?

		yes	no
In 1987/88 :	- Directly (on board/on the spot)	1	2
	- Indirectly (support)	1	2
In 1990/91 :	- Directly (on board/on the spot)	1	2
	- Indirectly (support)	1	2

(new) Q14. :
(Only for those who participated in the Gulf operations)
What did this experience represent for you ?

1 = I do not agree at all
2 = I rather do not agree
3 = I rather agree
4 = I fully agree

- A purely financial matter	1 2 3 4
- A precious professional enrichment	1 2 3 4
- A unique personal experience	1 2 3 4
- A too long absence	1 2 3 4
- A reason to stay in the Navy	1 2 3 4
- A reason to leave the Navy	1 2 3 4

(The final 5 questions concerned data on age, sex, period in the unit, level of qualification, and kind of specialty).

Taal / Langue : N / F
Geboortejaar / Année de naissance : .....

QUESTIONNAIRE I - VRAGENLIJST I

Per vraag verdeel 5 punten tussen de uitgedrukte standpunten volgens de relatieve waarde die u aan elk standpunt geeft:

Par question, répartissez 5 points entre les points de vue exprimés suivant la valeur relative que vous leur accordez:

1. A. .... Als leider bestaat mijn allereerste opdracht erin de stabiliteit te bewaren.
En tant que chef, ma tâche principale est de préserver la stabilité.

   B. .... Als leider bestaat mijn allereerste opdracht erin verandering te stimuleren en te begeleiden.
En tant que chef, ma tâche principale est de stimuler et de suivre les changements.

2. A. .... Als leider lig ik vaak aan de basis van nieuwe dingen en werkwijzen.
En tant que chef, je suis souvent à la base de nouvelles choses et méthodes de travail.

   B. .... Als leider heb ik vooral een steunende en faciliterende rol t.o.v. de taken van mijn medewerkers.
En tant que chef, j'ai surtout un rôle où je me dois de supporter mes collaborateurs et de faciliter leurs tâches.

3. A. .... Ik zorg ervoor dat mijn medewerkers op rechtvaardige wijze voor hun werk worden beloond.
Je veille à ce que mes collaborateurs soient récompensés de juste manière pour leur travail.

   B. .... Ik heb aandacht en zorg over wat mijn medewerkers verwachten van hun leven.
J'ai de l'attention et je me préoccupe de ce que mes collaborateurs attendent de leur vie.

4. A. .... Bij voorkeur denk ik op lange termijn: wat zou kunnen?
Je pense de préférence à long terme: que serait-il possible?

   B. .... Bij voorkeur denk ik op iets kortere termijn: wat is realistisch (haalbaar)?
Je pense de préférence à plus court terme: qu'est-ce qui est réaliste (réalisable) ?

5. A. .... Als leider besteed ik aanzienlijke energie in het coördineren van afzonderlijke, maar met elkaar verbonden doelstellingen.
En tant que chef, je consacre une bonne part d'énergie à coordonner des objectifs liés l'un à l'autre quoique séparés.

   B. .... Als leider besteed ik aanzienlijke energie in het opwekken van hoopvolle verwachtingen en aspiraties bij mijn medewerkers.
En tant que chef, je consacre une bonne part d'énergie au développement d'aspirations prometteuses chez mes collaborateurs.

6. A. .... Ik geloof dat een belangrijk gedeelte van mijn "leider-zijn" bestaat in een leraars-rol hoewel uiteraard niet op schoolse wijze.
Je crois qu'une partie importante de ma fonction de leader consiste en une tâche d'instruction mais bien sûr pas comme à l'école.

   B. .... Ik geloof dat een belangrijk gedeelte van mijn "leider-zijn" bestaat in een faciliterende en coördinerende rol.
Je crois qu'une partie importante de ma fonction de leader consiste en une tâche de coordination qui permet aussi de faciliter la tâche des autres.

7. A. .... Als leider moet ik me op hetzelfde ethisch en moreel niveau bevinden als mijn medewerkers.
En tant que chef, je dois me situer au même niveau éthique et moral que mes collaborateurs.

B. .... Als leider moet ik een hogere ethische en morele orde vertegenwoordigen.
En tant que chef, je dois représenter un ordre éthique et moral plus élevé.

8. A. .... Ik beleef vreugde aan het stimuleren van medewerkers om nog meer en beter te presteren.
Je retire de la satisfaction de pouvoir stimuler mes collaborateurs à mieux prester.

B. .... Ik beleef vreugde aan het belonen van medewerkers voor behoorlijk uitgevoerde taken.
Je retire de la satisfaction de pouvoir récompenser mes collaborateurs pour leurs tâches correctement exécutées.

9. A. .... Leiderschap moet vooral practisch gericht zijn.
Le leadership doit être surtout orienté pratiquement.

B. .... Leiderschap moet vooral inspiratie verschaffen aan de medewerkers.
Le leadership doit surtout être une source d'inspiration pour mes collaborateurs.

10. A. .... De (feitelijke) macht die ik heb om anderen te beïnvloeden komt voornamelijk voort uit mijn vermogen om mensen zich te laten identificeren met mezelf en mijn ideën en voorstellen.
Le pouvoir (de fait) que j'ai d'influencer les autres provient surtout de ma capacité à pousser les autres à s'identifier avec moi ainsi qu'à mes idées et mes propositions.

B. .... De (feitelijke) macht die ik heb om anderen te beïnvloeden komt voornamelijk voort uit de positie en de status die ik heb binnen de organisatie.
Le pouvoir (de fait) que j'ai d'influencer les autres provient surtout de la position et du statut que j'ai au sein de l'organisation.

ERM/KMS - Applic - CMT

Taal / **Langue** : N / F
Geboortejaar / **Année de naissance** : .....

QUESTIONNAIRE II - VRAGENLIJST II

Veronderstel dat u bij de volgende 12 situaties betrokken bent. Bij elke situatie staan 4 mogelijke reactiewijzen. Kies daaruit de aktie die u zou willen nemen in die situatie. Omcirkel de letter van uw keuze. **Slechts 1 keuze mogelijk.**

Supposez que vous êtes impliqué dans les 12 situations suivantes. A chaque situation il y a 4 réactions possibles. Choisissez parmi ces comportements celui que vous voulez adopter dans cette même situation. Entourez la lettre de votre choix. Un seul choix possible.

SITUATIE SITUATION	GEDRAGSPATRONEN COMPORTEMENTS
1. De laatste tijd lijkt er in uw groep iets veranderd. U bent nog steeds even vriendelijk en bezorgd voor uw medewerkers. Toch krijgt u minder reaktie. Bovendien merkt u de laatste maanden dat de resultaten steeds meer achteruit gaan	A. U benadrukt het gebruik van vaste procedures en de noodzaak de taak te vervullen. B. U stelt zich beschikbaar voor bespreking, maar u dringt niet aan. C. U praat met uw medewerkers en geeft nauwkeurig aan wat u van hen verwacht. D. U komt bewust niet tusssen.
Dernièrement, il semble que quelque chose a changé dans votre groupe. Vous êtes toujours aussi amical et concerné envers vos collaborateurs. Pourtant ils réagissent moins et vous remarquez que les résultats sont en baisse ces derniers mois.	A. Vous insistez sur l'emploi de procédures déterminées et sur la nécessité d'accomplir la tâche. B. Vous indiquez votre disponibilité pour la discussion mais sans les forcer. C. Vous parlez avec vos collaborateurs et indiquez exactement ce que vous attendez d'eux. D. Sciemment, vous n'intervenez pas.
2. U hebt ervoor gezorgd dat iedereen weet wat er van hem verwacht wordt. Daarom bent u blij met de laatste resultaten. De kwaliteit van het werk stijgt.	A. U houdt zich bezig met vriendelijke kontakten. Toch gaat u verder met u ervan te verzekeren dat iedereen zich bewust is van zijn taken en opdrachten. B. U besluit nu niet tussen te komen. C. U zorgt ervoor dat de groep zich belangrijk en er zich bij betrokken voelt. D. U benadrukt de belangrijkheid van het respekteren van de tijdslimieten en het afwerken van hun taken.
Vous avez veillé à ce que chacun sache ce que l'on attend de lui, vous êtes d'ailleurs content des derniers résultats. La qualité du travail s'améliore.	A. Vous maintenez des contacts amicaux mais vous allez plus loin en vous assurant que chacun est conscient de ses tâches et missions. B. Vous décidez de ne pas intervenir. C. Vous veillez à ce que le groupe se sente important et concerné. D. Vous soulignez l'importance du respect des échéances et de l'achèvement de leurs tâches.
3. U bent tevreden over hetgeen uw medewerker presteert. Ook de onderlinge relaties zijn prima. U laat hem zelfstandig werken. Bij een opdracht merkt u dat hij een probleem niet opgelost krijgt.	A. U stelt hem een oplossing voor. B. U laat hem zelf het probleem oplossen. C. U reageert snel en vastberaden met een oplossing. D. U moedigt hem aan om aan het probleem te werken en blijft beschikbaar voor bespreking.
Vous êtes content des prestations de votre collaborateur. Les relations mutuelles sont bonnes. Vous le laissez travailler seul. Vous remarquez qu'il ne parvient pas à résoudre un problème lors d'une mission que vous lui confiez.	A. Vous lui proposez une solution. B. Vous le laissez résoudre seul le problème. C. Vous réagissez vite et résolument avec une solution. D. Vous l'encouragez à s'attaquer au problème et restez disponible pour en discuter.

4. U bent naar een informatie vergadering van de direktie geweest. Door de algemene reorganisatie moet u in uw goed werkende groep belangrijke veranderingen invoeren. UW medewerkers zien in dat dit noodzakelijk is.

A. U laat groepsbetrokkenheid toe bij het plannen van de veranderingen, maar u dringt niet aan.
B. U kondigt de veranderingen aan en voert ze onder nauw toezicht.
C. U laat de groep toe haar eigen ideën te formuleren.
D. U noteert de groepsaanbevelingen, maar u neemt de beslissing.

Vous revenez d'une réunion d'information de la direction; suite à une réorganisation générale il vous faut introduire des changements importants dans votre groupe qui fonctionne pourtant bien. Vos collaborateurs comprennent la nécessité des changements.

A. Vous laissez l'intéressement du groupe jouer pour la planification des changements, mais vous ne forcez pas.
B. Vous annoncez les changements et les exécutez en contrôlant strictement.
C. Vous laissez le groupe formuler ses idées lui-même.
D. Vous notez les recommendations du groupe mais vous prenez la décision.

5. Het is in het verleden voorgekomen dat u niet tevreden was over uw mensen. U loste dat op door ieders taak opnieuw te omschrijven en hen er regelmatig op te wijzen goede kwaliteit te leveren. De laatste maanden gaat het opnieuw bergaf. U merkt dat een bepaalde medewerker zich niet om de opdrachten bekommert.

A. U laat de medewerker toe zijn eigen richting te bepalen.

B. U noteert aanbevelingen, maar zorgt ervoor dat de opdracht uitgevoerd wordt.

C. U herformuleert de opdracht en houdt zorgvuldig toezicht.

D. U betrekt de medewerker bij het bepalen van de opdracht, maar dringt niet aan.

Dans le passé, il vous est arrivé d'être mécontent de votre personnel. Vous aviez résolu cela en précisant à nouveau leurs tâches et en leur indiquant régulièrement la nécessité d'une bonne qualité du travail. Ces derniers mois cela va à nouveau mal. Vous remarquez qu'un de vos collaborateurs, en particulier, ne se préoccupe pas de ses missions.

A. Vous laisser le collaborateur déterminer sa propre direction.

B. Vous notez les recommandations, mais vous veillez sur l'éxécution de la mission.

C. Vous reformulez la mission et vous contrôler soigneusement.

D. Vous faites participer le collaborateur dans la definition de la mission, mais vous n'insistez pas..

6. U neemt de dienst van uw collega Jansen over. Deze hield zijn mensen altijd kort. Hij had een efficiënt werkende groep. Als nieuwe chef wil u graag wat menselijker met uw medewerkers omgaan. Maar u wilt wel produktief blijven werken.

A. U zorgt ervoor dat de groep zich belangrijk en betrokken voelt.
B. U benadrukt de belangrijkheid van snelheid en kwaliteit bij het afwerken van de opdrachten.
C. U vindt het beter om nu geen aktie te nemen.
D. U betrekt de groep bij de beslissing, maar ziet erop toe dat de opdrachten uitgevoerd worden.

Vous reprenez le service de Jean. Il tenait son personnel toujours "assez court". Il avait un groupe efficace et rôdé. En tant que nouveau chef vous désirez être plus humain avec vos collaborateurs mais vous désirez aussi garder un groupe productif.

A. Vous veillez à ce que le groupe se sente important et concerné.
B. Vous soulignez l'importance de la vitesse et de la qualité lors de l'accomplissement des missions.
C. Vous pensez qu'il vaut mieux ne pas prendre d'action maintenant.
D. Vous intéressez le groupe à la prise de décision mais veillez à ce que les missions soient remplies.

7. Om aan recente veranderingen het hoofd te kunnen bieden, vindt u het nodig uw groep anders te organiseren. Uw mensen hebben zelf een aantal suggesties en u kent hen als een flexibel werkende groep.

A. U bespreekt de verandering en houdt zorgvuldig toezicht.
B. U verwerft de goedkeuring van de groep over de verandering en u laat uw medewerkers toe de uitwerking ervan te organiseren.
C. U bent bereid de aanbevelingen van uw medewerkers door te voeren, maar u kontroleert de toepassing.
D. U vraagt uw medewerkers om zelf de werking te reorganiseren.

Pour affronter de récents changements vous estimez nécessaire d'organiser autrement votre groupe. Votre personnel a déjà un nombre de suggestions et vous les considérez comme un groupe rôdé et flexible.

A. Vous discutez du changement et assurez le suivi.
B. Vous suscitez l'approbation du groupe sur le changement et laissez vos collaborateurs organiser l'exécution.
C. Vous êtes prêt à exécuter les recommendations de vos collaborateurs mais vous en contrôlez l'exécution.
D. Vous demandez à vos collaborateurs de réorganiser eux-mêmes le travail.

8. U twijfelt eraan of uw medewerker wel genoeg leiding krijgt. De rapporten, tonen nochtans aan dat de prestaties goed zijn. U weet dat de sfeer prima is.

A. U laat de medewerker verder werken zoals hij bezig is.
B. U bespreekt met hem de situatie en suggereert de noodzakelijke veranderingen.
C. U verzekert u ervan dat uw medewerker volgens een welomschreven manier gaat werken.
D. U bespreekt de situatie met uw medewerker en vraagt hem de nodige veranderingen voor te stellen.

Vous n'êtes pas sûr que vous dirigez correctement votre collaborateur. Les rapports montrent cependant que les prestations sont bonnes. Vous savez que le climat d'entente est bon.

A. Vous laissez le collaborateur travailler ainsi.
B. Vous discutez avec lui de la situation et suggérez les changements nécessaires.
C. Vous vous assurez que votre collaborateur travaillera d'une manière spécifiquement déterminée.
D. Vous discutez de la situation avec votre collaborateur et vous lui demandez de proposer les changements nécessaires.

9. Uw chef zet u aan het hoofd van een werkgroep. Stuk voor stuk bekwame mensen, maar er staat geen aanbeveling op papier en de tijdslimiet is al overschreden. Men is het niet eens over de doelstellingen, er zijn steeds afwezigen en er wordt meer gekletst dan gewerkt.

A. U vindt het beter om nu niet op te treden.
B. U houdt rekening met de groepsaanbevelingen, maar u ziet erop toe dat de doelstellingen bereikt worden.
C. U bepaalt zelf de doelstellingen en houdt zorgvuldig toezicht.
D. U laat groepsbetrokkenheid toe in het bepalen van de doelstellingen, maar u dringt er niet aan.

Votre chef vous désigne à la tête d'un groupe de travail. Les membres sont tous des gens compétents, mais il n'y a encore aucune recommendation sur papier et l'échéance est déjà dépassée. On ne s'accorde même pas sur les objectifs et il y a toujours beaucoup d'absents. On parlotte plus que l'on y travaille !

A. Vous trouvez mieux de ne pas intervenir.
B. Vous tenez compte des recommendations du groupe mais veillez à ce que les objectifs soient atteints.
C. Vous déterminez vous-même les objectifs et assurez le suivi.
D. Vous permettez l'intéressement du groupe dans la détermination des objectifs mais vous ne forcez pas.

10. Uw medewerker die de vroegere procedure knap aankon, reageert maar matig op de nieuwe werkwijze. U vindt hem nochtans bekwaam om verantwoordelijkheden te nemen.

A. U laat betrokkenheid toe bij het herzien van de nieuwe werkwijze maar dringt niet aan.
B. U verduidelijkt de nieuwe werkwijze en houdt zorgvuldig toezicht.
C. U vindt het beter om geen druk uit te oefenen.
D. U luistert naar de aanbevelingen, maar ziet erop toe dat de nieuwe werkwijze toegepast wordt.

Votre collaborateur qui auparavant savait bien se débrouiller réagit assez moyennement à la nouvelle méthode de travail. Vous le trouvez pourtant encore capable de prendre des responsabilités.

A. Vous laissez l'intéressement jouer dans la redéfinition de la nouvelle méthode de travail, mais ne forcez pas.
B. Vous donnez des éclaircissements sur la nouvelle méthode et assurez le suivi.
C. Vous trouvez meilleur de ne pas exercer de pression.
D. Vous écoutez les recommendations mais veillez à ce que la nouvelle méthode soit appliquée.

11. U bent gepromoveerd. U hebt nu de leiding over een groep met een uitstekende staat van dienst. U merkt al snel dat ook de onderlinge relaties vlot verlopen; uw voorganger had de gewoonte de groep zijn gang te laten gaan.

A. U laat uw onmiddellijke medewerkers werken volgens een welomschreven manier.
B. U betrekt de medewerkers bij het nemen van de beslissingen en u bedankt hen voor hun goede bijdrage.
C. U bespreekt de voorgaande prestaties met de groep en u onderzoekt de nood aan nieuwe richtlijnen.
D. U laat de groep verder werken zoals ze bezig zijn.

Vous êtes promu. Vous avez maintenant la direction d'un groupe aux états de services excellents. Vous remarquez vite que les relations internes sont souples; votre prédécesseur avait l'habitude de laisser le groupe fonctionner seul.

A. Vous faites immédiatement travailler vos collaborateurs directs suivant une manière bien définie.
B. Vous concernez/intéressez les collaborateurs à la prise de décision et vous les remerciez pour leur contribution.
C. Vous discutez des prestations précédentes avec le groupe et vous investiguez la nécessité de nouvelles directives.
D. Vous laissez le groupe travailler comme précédemment.

12. U leidt een bekwame groep. U krijgt regelmatig komplimenten voor wat ze bereikt. De werksfeer is prima. Maar op een ochtend klaagt uw rechterhand over interne wrijvingen in de groep.

A. U test ideën bij uw medewerkers en u onderzoekt de nood aan nieuwe opdrachten.
B. U laat de groep toe om dit uit te werken.
C. U reageert snel en vastberaden om te verbeteren en bij te sturen.
D. U stelt zich beschikbaar voor bespreking.

Vous dirigez un groupe compétent. On vous complimente régulièrement pour ses prestations. Le climat de travail y est excellent. Mais un matin, votre bras droit se plaint de dissensssions internes.

A. Vous testez des idées chez vos collaborateurs et vous investiguez la nécessité de nouvelles missions.
B. Vous laissez le groupe solutionner ceci.
C. Vous réagissez vite et résolument afin de corriger la situation.
D. Vous vous proposez comme disponible afin d'en discuter.

ERM/KMS - Applic - CMT - CFOS

APPENDIX F

Taal / Langue : N / F
Geboortejaar / Année de naissance : .....

QUESTIONNAIRE III - VRAGENLIJST III

Per onderwerp omcirkel het standpunt dat volgens u het beste is:
Par sujet entourez le point de vue que vous jugez le meilleur:

1. Communicatie - Communication

A. In een organisatie moet meestal van boven naar beneden gebeuren.
Dans une organisation doit exister surtout du haut vers le bas.
B. Het is belangrijker een goede sfeer te scheppen om het werk te stimuleren.
Il est plus important de créer un bonne atmosphère afin de stimuler le travail.
C. Communiceren is boodschappen/opdrachten/verslagen korrekt doorgeven.
Communiquer c'est transmettre correctement les messages / rapports / missions.
D. Communiceren is alle formele en informele middelen gebruiken. Daarom kunnen problemen ontdekt worden.
Communiquer c'est utiliser tous les moyens, formels et informels. Ainsi l'on peut découvrir les problèmes.
E. Communiceren is open en eerlijk zijn. Het is een vrij uitwisseling van mening. Het is betrokkenheid.
Communiquer c'est être ouvert et honnête. C'est un échange libre d'opinion. C'est de la concertation.

2. Leiding geven, Bevelen - Diriger, Ordonner

A. Klaar,gedetailleerd en duideluik, er moeten geen vragen zijn.
Clair, détaillé et précis. Il ne peut y avoir de questions.
B. Als er vragen zijn is het goed dan zijn de medewerkers betrokken.
S'il y a des questions c'est bon, les collaborateurs sont concernés.
C. Blijf algemeen, de medewerker moet alle initiatief hebben.
Restez général, le collaborateur doit avoir toute initiative.
D. Algemeen blijven en geen druk oefenen is beter, maar men moet beschikbaar zijn indien nodig.
Rester général et ne pas exercer de pression c'est mieux, mais il faut rester disponible si besoin est.
E. Taken zijn niet afgedwongen behalve als de noodzaak primeert. Taken vloeien uit het bepalen van de doelstellingen als gevolg van de communicatie
Les tâches ne sont pas imposées sauf en cas de nécessité. Elles découlent de la détermination des objectifs suite à la communication.

3. Fouten - Fautes

A. Zijn het gevolg van een inkorrekt gedrag en moeten gesanctioneerd worden.
Sont la conséquence d'un attitude incorrecte et doivent être sanctionnées.
B. Men moet begrip ervoor hebben. Medewerkers moeten gesteund worden.
Il faut avoir de la compréhension et soutenir vos collaborateurs.
C. Kijk er niet naar, blijf optimistisch.
Ne les regardez pas, soyez positif.
D. Ze kunnen niet vermeden worden. Beter de regels volgen !
On ne peut les éviter. Il vaut mieux suivre les règles !
E. Ze moeten geanaliseerd worden om de oorzaken te vinden.
Il faut les analyser afin d'en trouver les causes.

4. Klachten - Plaintes

A. Allen zwakke mensen klagen, trouwens zijn klachten altijd overdreven.
Seuls les faibles se plaignent, d'ailleurs les plaintes sont toujours surfaites.
B. Er zijn altijd klachten. Als ik iets kan doen zal ik wel proberen maar het systeem is eenmaal zo.
Il y a toujours des plaintes. Si je peux y faire quelque chose j'essaierai mais le système est ainsi fait...
C. Ze moeten zorgvuldig geregistreerd worden en naar de bevoegde autoriteit verstuurd worden.
Il faut attentivement les enregistrer et les envoyer à l'autorité compétente.
D. Men moet niet te emotioneel zijn. We kunnen even wachten en dan zien als het op te lossen is. De formulatie moet rationeel zijn.
Il ne faut pas être trop émotionnel, sans doute qu'un peu d'attente tassera les choses et on pourra résoudre cela. La formulation doit être rationelle.
E. Men moet naar de klachten luisteren en men moet ze begrijpen. Het is ook een informatie bron.
Il faut les écouter et les comprendre. C'est d'ailleurs une source de renseignements.

Code A. = 9.1
B. = 1.9
C. = 1.1
D. = 5.5
E. = 9.9

5. Wrijvingen - Animosités

A. Zijn een teken van insubordinatie en niet aanvaardbaar.
C'est un signe d'insubordination et on ne peu les tolérer.
B. Het is erg, en de goede relaties in de groep moeten hersteld worden.
C'est grave et il importe de rétablir les bonnes relations dans le groupe.
C. Beter luisteren maar niet reageren, het zou erger worden.
Il vaut mieux écouter sans réagir, sinon on ne ferait qu'empirer les choses.
D. Men moet niet te emotioneel zijn. We kunnen even wachten en dan zien als het op te lossen is.
Il ne faut pas être trop émotionnel, sans doute qu'un peu d'attente tassera les choses et on pourra résoudre cela.
E. Er is iets dat niet goed werkt.
Il y a quelque chose qui ne marche pas.

6. Beoordelingen - Evaluations

A. De goede belonen en de slechte straffen.
Récompenser les bons et punir les mauvais.
B. De goede punten naar voor brengen, positief blijven. Vermijden over de slechte prestaties te spreken.
Mettre les bons points en avant, rester positif. Eviter de parler des mauvaises prestations.
C. Als je te grote eisen stelt lukken ze nooit, op hun niveau blijven.
Si vous mettez les exigences trop haut ils n'y arriveront jamais, restez à leur niveau.
D. De medewerker zal wel zijn fouten kunnen ontdekken dan kunnen we erover praten.
Le collaborateur découvrira bien ses fautes et alors on pourra en parler.
E. Men moet er zich allebei over buigen, evalueren is alles bespreken (van + en -).
On doit se pencher tous les deux dessus, évaluer c'est discuter de tout (du + et du -).

QUESTIONNAIRE IV

RESEARCH ON MOTIVATION
IN THE GROUP DIVERS-MINE DISPOSAL (BE NAVY)
(translation of original questionnaire)

1. DATA

LANGUAGE : DUTCH 82% FRENCH 18%
POPULATION : 45 (3 OFF - 26 NCO - 16 ENLISTED)
AGE : 23 - 53 (majority 30-45)
RESPONSE : 73%
DATE : NOVEMBER 1992

2. MOTIVATORS

	RESULTS (in %)			
a. PERFORMANCE	not motiv	motiv	very motiv	no answ
(1) to work for the realization of our mission	4	41	55	-
(2) to work for personal objective	4	50	46	-
(3) pressure to improve in quantities	31	51	18	-
(4) pressure to improve in quality	4	36	60	-
b. RECOGNITION				
(5) to receive positive encouragements	4	36	60	-
(6) to receive trust and responsibility	9	4	87	-
(7) to get a possibility of self-fulfilment	4	23	73	-
(8) to experience success	18	36	42	4
(9) to feel recognized and participating	18	18	60	4
(10) to be respected as human being	14	9	73	4
c. INFORMATION - COMMUNICATION				
(11) to get full and exact information	9	55	36	-
(12) to understand the reasons of decisions	9	50	37	4
(13) to participate in allocation of tasks	9	36	41	14
(14) to use effective channels of communication	4	50	46	-
(15) openess among collaborators	9	23	64	4
d. FUNCTION				
(16) to use fully your capacities	-	27	73	-
(17) content of your function	5	45	41	9
(18) to have a challenge	4	23	64	9
(19) to succeed in solving problems	-	18	78	4
(20) to may and can take risks	9	23	59	9
(21) to be responsible	4	32	64	-
(22) to contribute to the motivation of collaborators	4	41	46	9
(23) to be in a position of control	23	50	18	9
(24) to have a position of power	45	37	9	9

(25) to have international/interforces contacts	9	55	32	4
e. OCCUPATION				
(26) assurance of work in actual job	9	36	55	-
(27) competence and quality of leaders	9	46	36	9
(28) relations with superiors and collegues	9	36	41	14
(29) a climate stimulating creativity	18	27	41	14
(30) participative management	14	54	18	14
(31) the existing drafting policy	77	14	-	9
f. WORKCONDITIONS				
(32) my salary level	68	24	4	4
(33) pay related with performance	32	32	27	9
(34) to receive a fair bonus for diving and mine-disposal	18	23	50	9
(35) flexible working hours	-	54	32	14
(36) more holidays and flexible choice	9	50	32	9
g. DEVELOPMENT				
(37) real chances of promotion	14	36	46	4
(38) internal recruitement	23	32	36	9
(39) consultation about promotion and mobility	18	23	45	14
(40) chances for self-development	14	32	50	4
(41) chances for education/instruction	9	18	69	4
(42) to choose own Trg-/programs	9	59	14	18
(43) to receive evaluations on potentiality	9	59	23	9
(44) to become an expert	9	32	50	9
h. ENVIRONMENT				
(45) improve workconditions; balance workload	9	50	27	14
(46) to reserve time for relaxation	-	64	36	-
(47) total quality management	-	64	32	4

3. DEMOTIVATORS (in your function)	not demot	demot	very demot	no answ
(1) too much pressure for performances	32	27	23	18
(2) lack of recognition	4	14	68	14
(3) failing information	-	23	59	18
(4) bad channels of communication	4	9	68	19
(5) limitations in your function	4	27	59	10
(6) uncertainty of the future	4	23	50	23
(7) lack of quality among leaders	4	23	45	28
(8) pay level	4	27	60	9
(9) workconditions	23	55	-	22
(10) unsufficient continuous education	-	45	32	23
(11) planning of drafting (mutations)	18	27	23	32
(12) not enough feedback	-	32	27	41
(13) too many/not enough performance interviews	27	36	14	23

QUESTIONNAIRE V

PUBLIC OPINION POLL in the Belgian Coastal Area
(translation from Dutch)

1. What does NAVCLEARMIN mean to you ?
   a. It is the divers-team of the fire-brigade.
   b. It is a navigation instrument.
   c. It is the Group Divers and Mine Disposal of the Navy.
   d. No idea.

2. Where is the Group Divers and Mine Disposal situated ?
   a. At Zeebrugge.
   b. At Nieuwpoort.
   c. At Ostend.
   d. No idea.

3. What is the colour of the Mine Disposal vehicles ?
   a. White.
   b. Green.
   c. Blue/grey.
   d. No idea.

4. Which mark is seen on the vehicles of the Mine Disposal teams ?
   a. A seamine.
   b. A red bomb.
   c. A picture of a diver-mine disposal specialist.
   d. No idea.

5. What is the mission of the Group Divers and Mine Disposal ?
   a. Mine disposal at sea.
   b. Mine disposal ashore and at sea.
   c. Diving and mine disposal ashore and at sea.
   d. No idea.

6. To neutralize explosive devices is a job with :
   a. Few risks.
   b. High risks.
   c. No risks.
   d. No idea.

7. The Group Divers and Mine Disposal is responsible for neutralizing mines :
   a. At sea, in the coastal waters.
   b. At sea, in the Belgian harbours, and in the coastal towns.
   c. At sea, in the coastal waters and in the Belgian harbours.
   d. No idea.

8. The personnel of the Group Divers and Mine Disposal is :
   a. adventurous and very well paid for taking the risks.
   b. idealistic and very well paid for taking the risks.
   c. idealistic, doing a dangerous job for a neglectable financial compensation.
   d. No idea.

9. Is the Group Divers and Mine Disposal of the Navy an important component for the security of our society ?
   a. Yes.
   b. No.
   c. No idea.

10. Do you find it normal that mine disposal specialists risk their life for the security of our society ?
   a. Yes.
   b. No.
   c. No idea.

11. Do you think that mine disposal specialists are well paid for the risks they have to take ?
   a. Yes.
   b. No.
   c. No idea.

12. Supposing you are a mine disposal specialist, for what amount of money would you neutralize a dangerous explosive device ?
   a. 300 Bf. net.
   b. 5.000 Bf. net.
   c. More than 10.000 Bf. net.

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