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Development Planning: a perspective for the fisheries sector.

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Abstract
'Development' is defined and the task now facing development planning in a turbulent environment clarified. The short-comings of previous approaches to development planning are highlighted as is the alternative approach of the collective-action sector. A development planning paradigm based on state, market and collective-action sectors is described, together with possible planning methodologies. The implications for the fisheries sector in developing countries is briefly assessed.

Keywords: Development, planning, collective-action, fisheries.

A new context for planning ?
Planning is a rational action humans take to achieve desired ends. Specifically, planning is 'defining courses of action for achieving objectives' (Reading, 1976). However, in the context of today's world, traditional planning as a science of comparative static between now and a point in the future is no longer valid. The 'now' part, the initial state is constantly changing and so requires a constantly changing response. We face a situation we have never faced before and it requires approaches to planning that have not existed or been necessary before.

Today's world is characterised by 'turbulence' (Ramirez, 1983; Sagasti, 1988; Carley & Christie, 1992). The idea of turbulence derives from organisation theory and general systems theory (e.g. Emery & Trist, 1973). In conditions of turbulence, change - defined as a process that makes outcomes mismatch expectations - occurs beyond the ability of organisations to deal with it. This is due to:

- the rapid pace of change
- the complexity and interrelatedness of change. Problems are no longer discrete, but *meta-problems* or *problematiques*.

The turbulent environment encompasses the natural, bio-physical world and the social, human world. It encompasses the multiple interactions within the natural world (Ecology) and the multiple interactions between different organisations within the human world (Human Ecology). And critically, in encompasses the interactions between the natural and the social world, which are increasing both in number and magnitude.

In a turbulent environment, systems of interrelated problems are exacerbated by the independent and dissonant actions of many unrelated organisations. In competing to meet their own objectives they externalise as many costs and internalise as many benefits as possible. The change they face can be rapid and complex, even bewildering and apparently chaotic. And importantly, turbulence is increased by organisations' responses to it.

The turbulent environment can be viewed at the local level - the direct interaction of a local community with its immediate environment (e.g. an inshore fishery), through every level up to the global level - the interaction of humanity and the biosphere (e.g. global warming). Finger & Verlaan (1995) term it the 'global ecological crisis'in which 'environmental degradation will reinforce and accelerate already existing social, economic, and cultural trends towards environmental despoliation, which in turn rapidly diminish society's options to deal (with it) effectively ...in an ever-accelerating vicious circle'.

The turbulent environment is a result of what Daly has termed 'full-world economics' (Daly, 1989). It is caused by the innovations of the human world and the pervasive spread of the human world. It is caused by a large and exponentially expanding world population in a finite bio-physical world. It is caused by the

globalisation of that world, brought about by technological developments in transport and communications, by the end of the cold war, and by environmental problems themselves (Finger & Verlaan, 1995).

Sagasti (1988) comments,

> 'It..imposes the need for serious evaluation and reappraisal of development planning theory and practice: social values and objectives acquire greater importance, flexible time horizons and a long-term perspective become essential, contextual factors play an increasingly larger role, and new institutional arrangements must be brought into place. The conventional approach to planning, with its rigid time frames, its breakdown of planning tasks into sectors and regions, and its centralized and technocratic perspective on plan formulation and implementation is most unlikely to be effective in an increasingly turbulent environment.'

Thus we need innovative and flexible approaches to planning, which themselves will be in a process of constant change. The real challenge therefore, is not to develop a new system of planning, but, in Wiarda's words 'to fashion a dynamic theory of change' (Wiarda, 1983) and to develop an organisational *culture* to harness change for developmental ends. It is a big challenge, but one about which Julian Simon is optimistic;

> 'we do not say that a better future happens automatically or without effort. It will happen because men and women - sometimes as individuals, sometimes as enterprises working for profit, sometimes as voluntary nonprofit-making groups, and sometimes as governmental agencies - will address problems with muscle and mind, and will probably overcome...the solutions usually leave us better off than if the problem had never arisen; that is the great lesson to be learnt from human history.' (in Tyler Miller, 1990, p.26-28)

What is development ?

Bailey & Jentoff (1990), suggest that development is,

> 'a *process of change* through which *sustainable* and *equitable improvements* are made to the *quality of life* for all or most members of society'(my italics).

Carley & Christie (1992) see that,

> 'Development is a *process* by which the members of a society increase their *personal and institutional capacities* to mobilize and manage resources to produce *sustainable* and *justly distributed improvements* in *quality of life* consistent with their own aspirations'(my italics).

Both are fairly representative of current notions of 'development' in the academic literature. Extracting the individual themes from these definitions, we find the following key elements:

- *change* - in the sense of deliberate change to make things different now and in the future to what they were in the past. In the context of a turbulent environment, development efforts must also respond to exogenous change.
- *process* - development is a process, rather than an end product. That is, it is on-going over time, has no beginning and no end; it is dynamic, not static. Thus, it makes no sense to talk of either 'developed' countries or 'undeveloped' countries. All countries are in such a process, some being presently characterised by having more attributes thought to be characteristic of 'development' and others less. Also, it makes no sense to assume that the development process will be much the same for all countries, no matter where they are or at what point in time.
- *improvements* - implies that development is about things getting 'better', not worse (or even just different), going forwards, not backwards (or even remaining stationary). This is clearly a subjective measure, and one that can only be decided upon by a *process of political consensus*. Not only what is and what is not an 'improvement', but in a constrained world, *which* improvements.
- *sustainable* - the improvements achieved in the process of change should be maintained, so that

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the process of improvement becomes cumulative over time. This implies, in particular reference to natural resources, that the capital stock is not reduced over time; the idea of inter-generational equity. Thus future generations - most simply our children and grandchildren - must be constituencies in the process of political consensus and decision making in the current time.

- **distribution** - how the improvements are distributed within society is clearly a key aspect of development. Bailey & Jentoff (1990) suggesting that 'equity' is the principle of distribution compatible with development, whereas Carely & Christie (1992) suggest 'justice' as their principle of distribution - a far more nebulous term - but one by which we will assume they mean much the same thing. Lal (1985) points out, however, that we lack an agreed ethical system with which to judge issues of distribution and that any such system is unlikely to be universal in its appeal. He also makes the important point that poverty alleviation is not necessarily synonymous with equity - which it is often assumed to be. Indeed, that equality is widely and glibly assumed as an appropriate principle of distribution is criticised by Bauer (1992, esp. chap.1), especially in relation to the attitudes implicit in this approach. What is a 'just'distribution of the benefits of development can, again, only be defined by a *political process.*[1]

- **quality of life** - improvements should be to the 'quality of life'. While this term is open to wide interpretation, it clearly embodies a much broader range of measures than simply material wealth. While the UNDP Human Development Report has since 1990 been providing the mainstream ideas, clearly 'one size doesn't fit all'. Quality of life should be the subject of *local level research* and of *continual democratic consensus forming* in order to determine development priorities. It makes sense in a constrained world to target development efforts on those things that it is thought will add most to the quality of life.

It is clear from this that development is a normative concept. Thus, Coleman & Nixon (1985) outline development as,

> '...as a process of improvement with respect to a set of values...The values in question relate to desired conditions in society. Self-evidently, there is no universal agreement about what these desired conditions should be; individuals certainly have different preferences regarding their lifestyle and relationships with the rest of society; and through their political manifestos and the policies operated by government, nations express different collective (majority and minority) views about the desired state of society - views which change through time'

Thus, what constitutes development for a particular society *is a political process and so will ultimately be determined by power relations within that society.*

While this describes what people believe development to mean, or to be, it doesn't answer the more fundamental question of, 'What is development a response to i.e. why have development ?'. Sen (1983), quoting Marx, sees that development is about, 'replacing the domination of circumstances and chance over individuals by the domination of individuals over circumstances and chance'. This definition has the value of introducing two aspects of development omitted from the definitions above. The first is the idea of *uncertainty* (chance), and the second the idea of *control* (circumstance):

- **uncertainty** - particularly the chance that outcomes will be worse than expected. This is especially critical where adverse outcomes threaten survival. In the 'developed' west, we are well provided for with both market and state mechanisms that mitigate uncertainty (e.g. insurance, welfare). In poor third world countries neither of these option exist or are well-developed, but other strategies of dealing with uncertainty do exist (e.g. extended family, high birth rate) and these may be key determinants of economic behaviour and social organisation.

- **control** - can be seen at many levels from basic personal freedoms to control over environment. It can be manifest at the level of the individual, the local community, regionally or nationally. Control is about people - at whichever level of aggregation, taking responsibility for their own lives and having

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[1] For an interesting discussion of Rawls' Theory of Justice in relation to environment and sustainability, see Penn (1990).

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the 'personal and institutional capacities' (Carley & Christie, op.cit) to do so in a way that they would regard as successful.

It seems these latter two themes of development may offer a more insightful approach to development, especially in the context of a turbulent environment and for marginal communities heavily dependent on renewable natural resources.

Development planning

Development planning *per se* arose as the method of practical application of development economics - the body of thought and literature that arose in the 50's and 60's and was most closely associated with the work of Prebisch, Singer, Lewis, Myrdal, Rostow etc. Development economics was primarily concerned with national economic growth and how state intervention could foster conditions to bring about growth in a more reliable and quicker way that might occur with *laisse-faire* capitalism. As such, the success of the central planning experiment in the Soviet Union was very influential.

Development planning advocated a centralised planning structure in which the nation state was the focus of development efforts and improvements in aggregate national indices, especially Gross National Product (GNP), the goal. The state at national level commanded, and controlled through lower-level state institutions and organisations. The development process started at the top and meant to hand development down to the supposed beneficiaries at the bottom. It was a system widely advocated in an atmosphere of great optimism about the benefits it could bring. It was practised from the fifties up to the 1980s and many aspects of the system still survive today.

However, development planning was seen to fail for a number of reason, which Lal (1992) summarizes concisely and effectively:
- both people and institutions tend to act in line with the economic behaviour assumed in neo-classical theory i.e. in response to economic incentives
- bureaucracies are just as prone - if not more so - to failure than are markets
- it is a more risky and less reliable strategy to rely on a single central authority to make judgements about the future than it is to rely on many private judgements about the future within a market
- the assumption that an equitable distribution of income is either necessarily consistent with the alleviation of poverty or the desired outcome of an ethical consensus within society is fallacious

> 'In seeking to improve the outcomes of an imperfect market economy, the *dirigisme* (Lal's term and italics) to which numerous development economists have lent intellectual support has led to policy-induced distortions that are more serious than, and indeed compound, the supposed distortions of the market economy they were designed to cure' (Lal, 1992, p.35).

Carley & Christie (op.cit) list a number of reasons for bureaucratic failure within the development planning system, which are still relevant today even though the theoretical battle ended with the breakdown of communism:
- *failure of command and control* - management systems now have to deal with *unplanned change* but were designed to cope with planned change in a more stable environment. A looser more flexible system is required, which can also progress from specific environmental management tasks to longer term sustainable development objectives.
- *failure of policy integration* - policy tends to be seen from the viewpoint of one science - economics, agriculture, biology etc discrete disciplines with partial views of the world. What is missing is a higher order of analysis, a multi-discipline analysis that also combines scientific knowledge with social, economic, cultural and intuitive knowledge - anything relevant to the complexity of the issue.
- *administrative trap* - the division of the bureaucracy into distinct disciplines causes symptoms of complex problems to be dealt with discreetly as problems in themselves. Additionally, bureaucratic divisions often have competing views and objectives. This problem has been exacerbated by competitive donor intervention in the eighties.
- *failure of vertical integration* - a link, knowledge, understanding, a dialogue - is invariably missing between government bureaucracies and household level producers, making environmental policy

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both ill-informed and unworkable. This is compounded by the economic and cultural gap between elite policy-makers and ordinary people, and also by the difference in objectives between these levels.

- *failure of rewards in bureaucracies* - initiatives in integrated management are passively discouraged by poor salaries unconnected to performance and by stratified bureaucracies which don't recognise or appreciate cross-bureaucracy efforts.
- *failure of institutional reform* - is often undertaken as a search for the right organisational arrangement without the realisation that a more flexible and dynamic approach is needed. Even the creation of environmental ministries may just be a new addition to an old and inappropriate structure.
- *failure to learn from experience* - is not a process which receives reward in most bureaucracies. But it is a key part of a feedback mechanism and lessons learnt as you go along - outside of formal evaluations - are a key developmental resource.

Market orthodoxy
By 1985, the message of Lal and others had been fully adopted by the World Bank and development had a new orthodoxy:

> '...the record of development and the growing store of empirical research have heightened recognition of the importance of markets and incentives - and of the limits of government intervention and central planning. The new vision of growth is that markets and incentives can work in developing countries. But they are filtered through government policies and agencies, which, if inappropriate, can reduce or even negate the possible benefits....the economic policies of governments, and the distortions they induce, are now a major focus of the analysis of development policy.'(quoted in Toye, 1987, p.48)

Development - still especially in terms of aggregate economic growth - was seen as resulting from a macro-economic environment in which markets were allowed to work freely. Under the general banners of 'structural adjustment' and 'trade liberalisation', third world governments were coerced into liberalising economies, dismantling the system of incentives that protected inefficient domestic producers and open up the economies to the discipline of the world market.

Long-term development issues became a luxury many developing countries couldn't afford in the 1980s as they were forced into the position of having to deal simultaneously with short term crises and long-term debt reduction. The eighties represented the triumph of international capital over development and was a decade in which, for many, development went in reverse and their conditions of life worsened. Consequently, criticism of the new orthodoxy and of structural adjustment in particular became widespread and vocal (e.g. Bourguignon et al, 1991; Bulmer-Thomas, 1996).[2]

The new market orthodoxy didn't offer a development paradigm as such, just the magnanimity of the guiding hand. This has some development strengths. Firstly, it offers an efficient way of allocating the particularly scarce resources in developing economies. Secondly, the organisational structure of the market allows a much greater flexibility of response to turbulence than the fixed bureaucratic structure of the state sector. Thirdly, it can be argued that a market approach is more democratic than centralised planning structures.

Development weaknesses are also apparent. Firstly, it has increased - not reduced - uncertainty, especially in relation to commodity prices, which are of particular importance to many developing nations. Secondly, it fails as an allocation system where property rights are not clearly assigned - a particular problem in many developing countries, especially in relation to natural resources and environmental goods. Thirdly, control may have increased for those with access to capital, but for the majority control may have reduced as they increasingly become wage labourers subject to the vagaries of the capitalist system. This is one aspect of the greatest criticism of the market approach - the

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[2] For a discussion of the effects of the new market orthodoxy on fisheries development in Latin America, see Thorpe et al (1999).

distributional issue - that, in particular, it provides no benefits to the weakest sections of society and may even make their position worse absolutely, as well as relatively.

Wider criticisms of 'development'
Wiarda (1983), provides the valuable services of presenting a developing country critique of the western development model, a brief survey of and reflection of 'indigenous' alternative models, and criteria for development of a non-ethnocentric model. The criticisms are damning and largely irrefutable:

- the western model is ethnocentric and inapplicable to societies with quite different traditions, histories, and cultural patterns
- the timing, sequence, and stages of development in the West may not necessarily be replicable in their own areas
- the international context is now completely different to that faced by the West
- the role of traditional institutions has been ignored, or worse, derided
- the euro-centric bias in development models has distorted even the Third World's view of itself, let alone others' views of it
- 'Third World' nations do change and develop, but not necessarily in a way favoured by the West
- the western development model is a means of securing the 'Third World'under western influence.

However, the 'most harmful' aspect of euro-centric development - and the one which ranks foremost in Wiarda's criteria for a new approach - is the harm it has done to indigenous 'Third World' institutions. It is worth quoting Wiarda at length here;

> '...what concerns us here is the role development has had in undermining such viable institutions as extended family networks, patronage ties, clan and tribal loyalties, corporate group linkages, churches and religious movements, historic authority relations and the like. By undermining and often eliminating these traditional institutions before any more modern ones were created, development helped destroy some of the only agencies in many Third World nations that might have enabled them to make a genuine transition to real modernity. The destruction, in the name of modernisation, of such traditional institutions throughout the Third World may well be one of the most important legacies that development left behind, and it will powerfully affect our future relations with them. For by our actions and our patronizing, condescending, and ethnocentric efforts to promote development among the LDCs, we may have denied them the possibility of real development while at the same time destroying the very indigenous and at one time viable institutions they are now attempting, perhaps futilely and to late, to resurrect.'

An alternative approach to development
People are marginalised by not having the requisite power/capability to gain what they need and desire in life within the systems of social and behavioural organisation and resource allocation within which they live.

With a state system, success in the system is based upon political power and favour. Those without power lack favour and receive no 'goods' from the system (but probably many 'bads'). Thus, they are marginalised because of a lack of power.

With a market system, success in the system is based upon command over factors of production (land, labour, capital) and the translation of this, through the market, into effective demand - the willingness and ability to pay . Those commanding few factors or those with little market value, receive few goods from the system. They are marginalised because of lack of effective demand, because of lack of command over factors.

These two scenarios can be unified through Sen's 'Entitlements approach', originally developed with respect to famines (Sen, 1976). A persons 'entitlement' to goods and services from a system of resource allocation depend upon their initial 'endowment' of exchangeable resources, and the 'entitlement mappings' which determine what these endowments will translate into in terms of goods and

services. A person is marginalised (receives few goods from the system) if he has insufficient endowments or if he faces adverse entitlement mappings, or both.

There are two conclusion to be drawn from this if the goal is for the marginalised to loose that status and come to benefit from development:

- these factors must be corrected for in order for the marginalised to succeed *within* these systems (their endowments must increase and entitlement mappings improve)
- the marginalised must set up alternative systems, based on different precepts to overcome their marginalisation (they create a new system or sub-system which improves both their stock of endowments and their entitlement mappings)

It is from this realisation that a third sector (non-state, non-market) has grown up. It is associated with organisations such as Non-Governmental Organisation (NGOs), Grass Roots Organisations (GROs), Peoples Voluntary Organisation (PVOs) and the like. It is characterised by voluntary and collective action providing goods and services as a substitute for state or market provision. The importance of this 'collective action' has forced itself into the development debate due to:

- the burgeoning number of such organisations, especially in the 1980s & 90s
- the many development successes they have had
- the growing theoretical foundations and consensus developing over the methods used.

It has been instrumental in developing a number of themes that have come to represent a new agenda for development planning. These are listed in Box 1, below.

Box 1 - Themes of the collective action sector

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self-help - the realisation that, despite its rhetoric, the state cannot be relied on to provide necessary goods and services to the people, but that, collectively, people can help themselves. This is a fundamental change of outlook, as relevant to the marginalised in the developed as in the developing countries.

people-based - self-help is all about pooling the capacities of individual people and groups, and in doing so, creating new resources on which to draw. It recognises that people are the basic resource from which all things come and attempts to energise people and not wait for a technical solution.

voluntary - the basis of cooperation and compliance is different from both that of the market and the state sector.

collective - a recognition that development will only be achieved by people coming together, working together, and speaking with a collective voice.

local - a recognition that the most appropriate level for many development efforts is a local level, a level in which people operate and understand. Also a recognition that a geographical focus is appropriate for development (local, regional, river basin etc), rather than a functional one as is implied by both market and state systems.

democratic - a recognition that the collective action is part of a broader agenda for real democracy - perhaps 'through the back door'.

bottom-up - a recognition that development should begin with the 'target beneficiaries'and end there, not come from functionally distinct planners at the top, down.

participation - a recognition that development should be active, not passive. Target beneficiaries should *do development'*, not be *given* development.

process - a recognition that development is a process, not an end point or an end product. That in a turbulent world, sustainable development is achieved only by building a continually self-regenerating process.

learning - a recognition that development is about learning, about increasing personal and organisational capacities, not about a technical fix.

commitment - a recognition that gaining the commitment of people and organisations leads to successful development. Brought about by participation and 'ownership'of the process.

gender - a recognition that development needs to actively include women in the process (see Agarwal, 1997; Meinzen-dick et al, 1997)

social capital - a recognition that social capital is a key resource for successful development.

organisation / empowerment - a recognition that the interests of the majority of marginalised people will ultimately only be met if existing power relations are changed, giving the marginalised a voice in the decision making process. Empowerment is achieved through organisation.

Uphoff (1993) provides the valuable service of placing this third sector - which he terms the collective action sector - on the same footing as both the state and the market sectors and clarifying its nature and constitution. He provides an invaluable framework for analysing the relationships between agencies within a country, at the level of the sector - state/market/collective action - at the level of decision

making - from international to individual - and with respect to the institutions and organisations within this framework.

The key thing that distinguishes the three sectors from each other is the system of incentives used to gain cooperation or compliance. Uphoff shows the three different systems to have distinct theoretical bases in a range of social science literature, representing three different principles of organisation and behaviour within society (see Table 1, below). He also identifies ten levels of decision making within society - which have obvious, but important, spacial implications (see Box 2, below). Combining the two, he makes a matrix showing how each sector can be represented at each decision making level by different organisations or institutions. It presents a good picture of the variety of types of organisations and/or institutions that may be relevant to different development scenarios, defined by decision making level and with reference to underlying principles of behaviour (see Table 2, below).

Table 1 - Alternative principles of social organisation and behaviour

Literature	I	II	III
Types of organisation Sociology - Etzioni 1961	Coercive	Remunerative	Normative
Types of power Sociology - French and Raven, 1959	Coercive power	Reward power	Referent power Legitimate power
Kinds of systems Economics - Boulding, 1964, 1989	Threat systems	Exchange systems	Integrative systems
Kinds of power Economics - Galbraith 1983	Condign power	Compensatory power	Conditioned power
Game theory outcomes - e.g. Rappoport 1969	Negative -sum	Zero-sum	Positive-sum
Relationships of utility functions Ecoonomics	Interdependent (negative)	Independent	Interdependent (positive)
Behavioural alternatives - Hirshman 1970	Exit (desired, but may be prevented by coersion)	Voice (critisism and bargaining)	Loyalty (acceptance of some disutilities)
Most strongly associated sector	State	Market (Collective action) (State)	Collective action (State)

Source: after Uphoff, 1993, table 1, p.612.

Box 2 - Levels of decision making and action

Individual
|
Household
|
Group
Self-identified set of people with common interest e.g. occupation, gender, ethnicity. May be people
in a small residential area such as a neighbourhood
|
Community
An established socio-economic residential unit, most often village
|
Locality
A set of communities having social and economic relations, usually with interactions centred around
a market town; can correspond to the Sub-district where a market town is a
sub-district centre
|
Sub-district
|
District
|
Regional
|
National
|
International

Source: after Uphoff, 1993, Fig.1, p.608.

Table 2 - Organisations and institutions in a decision-making and sector framework

Decision-making level	State (public) sector	Collective-action sector	Market (private) sector
International	UN agencies, multi/bi-lateral agencies	WWF, IUCN	Multi-nationals, external private voluntary organisations (PVO) e.g. Rotary
National	State ministries, parastatals	National cooperatives federation, national women's association	National firms, national PVO, PVO coordinating body
Regional	Regional admin. bodies, regional development authorities	Regional cooperative assembly, watershed assembly	Regional firms, regional PVO, PVO councils
District	District councils, district admin. offices	District supply cooperative, soil conservation forum	District firms, charitable organisations
Sub-district	Sub-district councils and admin. offices	Sub-district marketing cooperative, area sports club	Rural enterprise, private hospital, bank branch office
Locality	Division counil, health clinic, secondary school, extension office	Whole cooperative society; forest protection association	Market town businesses, service clubs
Community	Village council, post office, primary school, extension workers	Primary cooperative society, village dike patrol, parent-teacher association	Village shop, mosque or church welfare committee
Group	Caste panchayat, ward or neighbourhood assembly	Tubewell users association, mothers club, savings groups	Microenterprises
Individual	Citizen, voter, taxpayer, services recipient	Member	Customer, client, employee, beneficiary

Source: after Uphoff (ibid.), Figure 3, p.615.

The burgeoning of collective action organisations has taken place at all decision-making levels, but particular interest has been shown in organisations at the three 'local' decision making levels, as these are seen as being instrumental in reaching the nominal beneficiaries of development interventions, who previously have been by-passed or suffered through 'development'. In part, this is a return to modes of social organisation that existed before the advent of developing planning.

A new development paradigm ?
A key question for development planning now is, how will these three sectors interact ?

Nugent (1993), Bardham (1993) and Uphoff (1993), all argue in a special issue of World Development (Vol 21, No.4, 1993) that a complementary relationship exists between the collective action sector and the state and market sectors, not a substitutional one i.e. a positive-sum interaction, not zero-sum interaction. Clark (1995) speaking particularly about NGO's, asserts the developmental advantages to be gained in good NGO-government relations, and outlines some of the factors which are conducive and antagonistic towards this goal.

> 'It appears that where the voluntary (collective action) sector is not only sizeable but also where it interacts with the public and private sectors it is able to achieve a significant multiplier effect on its own efforts' p.594.

Clark sees the collective action sector having a 'demand-side' role, articulating between the people - especially at local level - and the state, at all levels. This is, however, seen as a complement to enactment of a 'good governance' agenda within the state sector. Without such, the opportunities for beneficial interaction are much less.

Evans (1996) draws on five articles in a special issue of World Development (Vol.24, No.6), all of which support the proposition that cooperation between the collective action sector and the state sector can be a catalyst for development. He terms this 'synergy'- mutually reinforcing relations between governments and groups of engaged citizens - and suggests that finding out how it works and how it can be encouraged should be a major goal of development research. Synergy, he argues, can come about in two analytically distinct ways - 'complementarity' and 'embeddedness'- and is characterised by a combination of the two.

Complementarity is seen as complementary, though independent, actions by the state and the collective action sector. It is the conventional case where the state provides certain public goods, such as law, road infrastructure, etc., private actors provide private goods (legal services, vehicles), and the combination is mutually reinforcing. Just as the state has a role to provide basic rule structures in which markets can operate more efficiently, so it does for the collective-action sector as well - a framework of freedom of assembly and organisation is essential to encouraging the positive contribution the sector can make. He also argues that one of the benefits of complementarity is that it can lead to the formation of social capital, creating both better reasons for market and collective-action sector agents to work together, and a greater area of goodwill between state and other sectors.

Embeddedness is about cooperation across the public / private divide, state sector and organised citizens working together for mutually desirable ends. He argues this does not have to lead to corruption and rent-seeking, but can lead to the creation of developmentally valuable social capital. He uses the example of Taiwanese irrigation systems. Local state officials and local farmers input the relevant information to the state. The state sector then constructs the overall plan of water delivery (subsidiarity). The local state administrator in collaboration with local farmers make the local level allocation decisions and are responsible for local level maintenance. Also, the local level state manager is invariably from that locality himself and is fully a part of the local society and may even be a farmer as well. Thus, embeddedness binds the local state structure into the local community, so that they can take on the goals of each other.

Embeddedness between state and market sectors has also been seen as the key to the successful industrialisation of Japan, the S.E.Asian countries, and now China. Networks between state officials and private entrepreneurs - often members of local elites - makes industrialisation and development a joint project.

The implications are that development is more likely to occur where a range of different organisations and institutions in the different sectors and at different decision-making levels, operate with synergistic relationships characterised by both complementarity and embeddeness.

A key question to ask, therefore, is whether synergy is constructable or whether it depends on existing socio-cultural endowments, such as: social capital, government institutions, the level of equality/inequality, the nature of the political regime.

The constraints to synergy seem not so much to be the existing endowment of social capital at micro level (this is available in most third world countries), but in the process of 'scaling-up' this social capital to a higher level spatially and within the decision making hierarchy. The state structure can have an instrumental role in this scaling up, both in complementarity - allowing say regional associations to form, and embeddedness - actively facilitating them. This can either be from a developmentally-minded state, or through key reformists/personnel within a less favourable regime.

> 'If synergy can regularly emerge out of communities that seem quite ordinary in terms
> of their stock of social capital, but governments vary dramatically in terms of their ability

to act as counterparts in the creation of developmentally effective civic organisations, then perhaps the limits to synergy are located in government rather than in civil society.'(Evans 1996, p.1125.)

This provides a rationale for the 'Good Governance' agenda, pursued, for example by the UK's Department for International Development, and other development agents. The two basic approaches to good governance are (i) the Weberian approach, where the state bureaucracy must be characterised by meritocracy, competitive salaries, good rewards for career commitment and hard sanctions against violations of the public code, and (ii) the decentralisation approach, opening up state bureaucracy to inputs from below. Evans states:

> 'The effective delivery of public services is only valued if citizens reactions make a difference in the eyes of government leaders' (Evans, p.1127.)

To this end, political pluralism - either between parties or within a single party - is beneficial to the state-collective-action connection. But even the potentially beneficial effects of political plurality require an effective state apparatus to deliver results.

Relatively egalitarian structures are also conducive to synergy, such as in Taiwan, where this is based on equitable ownership of land - a property rights issue.

> 'To the extent that egalitarian structures facilitate synergy, social structure may be an important obstacle to constructing synergistic relations...with subordinate groups....In most third world countries, the interests of the privileged intrude fundamentally between the state and less privileged groups. The ways in which public officials deal with elites and the conflicting interests that separate elites from the rest of the citizenry have to be factored into the equation'. (Evans, p.1128.)

Thus, at base, the prospects for synergy are a problem of political economy, about which Evans is pessimistic. However, to the extent that synergy is constructable, the key elements are:

- changing peoples perceptions of themselves and others, so that common ties and interests can come to replace divisive elements i.e. perspective to find a common interests
- careful design of organisation and institutions can facilitate synergy e.g. recruiting local level officials locally and then not moving them to other areas
- redefining problems can lead to synergy
- participatory research can play an important role in promoting synergy.

A new development planning ?
Is there a concept and method of planning which can respond to turbulent conditions and foster the synergy sought by the new development paradigm ?

Carley & Christie (1992) suggest that the only response to the turbulent environment is seen as permanent innovation. The key requirements of a such an approach are seen as:
- holistic viewpoint, including organisation-environment interaction
- importance of boundaries between the two
- constructive feedback (learning)
- 'requisite variety' - environmental complexity requires an equal complexity in organisational response.

They present their formulation of a new development planning as 'action-centred networks'. These 'networks' have three aspects:
- growing constituencies for sustainable development - which is seen as an on-going process of mediation and consensus building,
- a new partnership between government, business and non-governmental or community groups,
- groups of natural and social scientists and public administrators committed to mutual learning and development of new management skills.

These networks may have a range of functions - far wider than conventional development thinking would have considered:

- *regulation* - of current relationships and activities, establishing ground rules and maintaining values
- *appreciation* - of emergent trends and issues, developing a shared image of a desirable future
- *mutual problem solving* - using the greater range of expertise offered by the network
- *infrastructural support* - providing resources, research, information and support of innovation
- *mobilisation of resources* - financial, political, information, legal...
- *developing external networks* - of wider supportive relations

They also argue that an 'action-centred network' is distinguished by having a 'linking-pin' organisation which provides a central focus to a network and which does not engage in management *per se* but is a centre of communication, coordination and 'drive'. The linking-pin organisation may perform various functions:
- *communication* - channel between organisations in the network and between the network and the wider world
- *services & resources* - supplier to network organisations
- *catalyst* - to drive the network forward in its task or objectives

The function of organisations and the action-centred networks in which they collaborate is to create a culture and capability of learning to learn - or 'action learning'.

Gow & Morss (1988) suggests that a key aspect of a planning system is the arrangements for interaction between different decision-making levels of the system, especially the link binding individuals and households into organisations that can articulate with the rest of the system. A key point is that representation of people is broadly equitable, which requires widespread and extensive work at building local level organisations and institutions - empowerment of people and real democratisation. This process can in some circumstances happen spontaneously and independently, but more often than not will require outside impetus.

Sagasti (1988) suggests

> 'Development planning should not be viewed as a centralised and technocratic exercise, but rather as a loose cooperative learning process that involves a multiplicity of actors throughout the whole fabric of society, that seeks to attain increasing levels of shared perceptions on the objectives and goals, and that aims at agreeing on specific

anticipatory and actual decisions on the basis of temporary consensus. Moreover, in this social learning process it will be impossible to eliminate all inconsistencies and to attain perfect rationality; it will be enough to agree on lines of action that provide a reasonably coherent framework for action'.

The institutional design required for a new approach to development planning is that of an evolving network that should be flexible, open and capable of restructuring itself over time. The planning units that compose the network would not conform to a hierarchical organisation and each would relate to the structure of political authority and power in a variety of ways that are also likely to change over time. Thus, planning is 'a social learning process' which accepts irrationality.

Sagasti suggests three requirements for the new development planning:

- *enlarge the scope of anticipatory decisions in the planning process* - five areas in which developing planning can operate are outlined (see Table 3, below). Traditional development planning is confined to Activities and Resources. The new development planning includes the area to the left of these. He suggests the need to develop, test and disseminate planning methodologies and procedures for Desired future, Contextual and Institutional areas for planning decisions - a development planning research agenda.

Table 3 - Areas of development planning decision making

Areas in which development planning can operate	Desired future	Contextual	Institutional	Activity	Resource
	Decisions that define long-term ideals	*Decisions about interaction with the increasingly turbulent environment*	*Decisions about institutional structure*	*Decisions about activities to pursue and priorities*	*Decisions about resource allocation*
Conditioning influences	Value systems and preferences; long-term possibilities	International setting; technical, sociological, political, ecological change; increasing turbulence	Current institutional constraints; possibilities for institutional development; organisational ecology	Existing and potential capabilities; dynamics of processes	Availability of resources; possibilities for directing resource allocations
Emphasis on...	Alternative futures; desired images; identification of values and aspirations	Insertion in international setting; convergence of policies and plans	Defining entitlement claims and payment systems; establish organisational structures	Defining areas for concentration of activities; evaluation of past performance	Influencing or controlling resource allocation
Type of process	Exploratory; consultative; participatory	Monitoring; coordinating; negotiating	setting the organisational 'fabric'; legislative and regulatory	Diagnosing; target setting; balancing; learning	Allocative and distributive; experimental
Procedures used	Establishing ideal standards; proposing broad directions; establishing dialogue with all stakeholders	Make explicit relevant implicit policies; resolve contradictions; use of indirect instruments for implementing plans	Creation/modification of institutions; define performance measures; set 'rules of the game'; establish compliance systems	Establish objectives; defining orientation; set operational procedures	Acquire and distribute resources; establish priorities for allocation; define specific aims and goals; generate databases

Source: Adapted from Sagasti, 1988, Table 1, p.439.

- *redefinition of planning, as a process of constantly changing anticipatory decisions* - Fixed time horizons should not bound the planning process with end points. Different problems will have different time horizons, defined by the extent to which the inertia of the existing system limits possible futures. Given the increasing pace of change, the long-term is constantly shortening, - all possible futures can increasingly be considered.
- *disperse and disseminate planning capabilities throughout society* - sees development planning as a broad-based social learning exercise amongst all interested groups and individuals (stakeholders).

Further, he suggests that the institutional structure will also need to be:
- capable to processing a vast amount of information
- resilient and able to cope with rapid change and instability
- and have a high response capacity to restructure and re-compose itself as is required.

Ramirez (1983) presents an 'action learning approach' to planning, as a model appropriate to turbulent conditions faced by organisations today. Action learning strategies have two distinct characteristics:
- there is agreement amongst stakeholders - however reached - that they need to cooperate in some way to solve intractable problems in conditions of turbulence
- all stakeholders (experts or laymen) learn together through taking actions to resolve the problem in a process where policy and implementation are simultaneous, not sequential.

The action learning approach changes the perspective of, planning, management and research:
- Planning is re-framed from a goal-setting end-state determining process to one in which the limits of the learning process are continually identified, redefined and decided upon
- Management is re-framed from a control exercise to one of facilitating a co-learning process
- Research is re-framed from an answer-oriented endeavour to a problem-posing endeavour providing opportunities for learning

Turbulence is seen to manifest itself as gaps between outcomes and expectations, termed 'errors'. Action learning is an approach to finding and correcting these errors - mainly through the agency of changing expectation.

Ramirez therefore turns planning on its head, and instead of planning formulating the future in terms of past and present expectations, planning seeks to re-frame the past from the hindsight of the present and our present view of the future. Action learning seeks to re-frame past experience, change expectations, induce acceptance of outcomes, match expectation with outcomes, correct errors and so cope with change.

> 'Action learning strategies activate the ingenuity, curiosity, spontaneity, intelligence, self-reliance, confidence, and dignity of those who engage in them. As such, action learning reflects some aspects of folk wisdom and commonsense. In considering collaboration to be the higher logical type and competition the lower one, it returns us to some of our more indigenous forms of self-help and collegiality'(Ramirez, op.cit, p.739.)

Morgan (1982) suggests that systems which learn and evolve do so by avoiding undesirable states rather than pursuing those they actively desired, thus, a new principle of organisation is suggested in which the traditional idea that sound organisation is goal oriented and backed by control is replaced with the importance of contextual appreciation, organisational learning and collaboration.

Finger & Verlaan (1995) propose *Social-Environmental Learning* as the only adequate response to the global ecological crisis. Social-Environmental Learning is collective and collaborative learning that links the biophysical to the social, cultural and political spheres, the local to the global arenas, and action to reflection and research. They employ three pedagogies from adult education theory in their Social-Environmental Learning system:
- *Perspective transformation* - Requires, first deconstructing existing national and sectoral perspectives in order to come up with more inclusive perspectives and see the partiality of their existing perspectives. They would also come to understand - explicitly - their own perspectives

better. Perspective transformation is not an end in itself, but a means to informed action.

- *Collaborative problem solving* - called Action-Reflection Learning (ARL). Problems are collectively defined, impediments and solutions identified. Learning is individual but goes beyond skills acquisition.
- *Participatory Action Research* (PAR) - is collective and collaborative research used as an individual and group learning process, leading to the acquisition of skills and perspective transformation. Can also lead onto realistic action plans for the research area.

In summary, we find that the whole structure and terminology of development planning is replaced by a process of discussion and debate that gradually broadens and deepens into action. The distinction between policy formulation, planning, implementation and management becomes more blurred. A new development planning is characterised as:

- *Collective* - self-development and self-management
- *Collaborative* - building synergy between the state, market and collective-action sectors, each fulfilling its appropriate role within a coordinated network
- *Participatory* - from first principles. Active participation in conditions of equality, based on teamwork to produce non-ethnocentric development
- *Learning-by-doing* - active learning to develop new individual and organisational perceptions, capacities and confidence
- *Contextualisation* - new perspectives and an holistic view, based on an understanding of the turbulent environment and a growing appreciation of human ecology.
- *Process* - of continual innovation, of fluid relations, of defining and redefining problems and opportunities for learning
- *Organisational* / institutional focus, building on existing organisations where appropriate and evolving new ones where they are not

This new approach to planning has particular significance for the state sector, structured around centralised command and control planning strategies. The new development paradigm requires state sector planning efforts to aim at decentralisation/devolution, encouraging diversity in institutions - both with respect to compliance mechanisms and decision-making level, encouraging synergy within the system, and identifying a new role for itself as catalyst and facilitator. This amounts to reinventing the public sector: its outlook, its organisation structure, its role, its procedures. A modern development state would act in a way to enable and to catalyse the new development paradigm into being.

Caveat
At this point, it is prudent to ask whether, once again, we are running the risk of having great optimism in a new approach to development planning, hail it as the new 'answer', put all our trust in it, prescribe it widely, only eventually to find out that it wasn't 'the answer', that our optimism and confidence was misplaced, that it was seen to fail as others before it, that it fails to address the really key issues as others before it, and that we are back at the drawing board again ? It is difficult to escape your own time in history.

Finger & Verlann argue that,

> '...sustainable development is a conceptually weak vision and does not constitute an alternative to the industrial development process and paradigm that have brought us today's global ecological crisis to begin with. Indeed, the concept of "sustainable development" is somewhat a contradiction in terms'. (Finger & Verlann, 1995)

Uphoff sounds a warning about current faith in the collective-action section as means to development,

> 'The "populist" fallacy is as mistaken as the "paternalist" fallacy when it comes to assessing the virtues of grassroots or non-governmental organisations. GROs/NGOs are limited, often flawed channels for promoting development.' (Uphoff, 1993)

Clark (1995) presents a number of factors that can and do stand in the way of synergistic relations between state and collective-action sections, factors within the policy environment, the government, NGO's and donor organisations.

Thompson (1995) warns that, 'Institutionalizing and operationalizing participatory approaches is undoubtedly an extremely complex and problematic business'. Ramirez (1983) concurs:

> 'While it remains unclear how much turbulence is required to compel changes in the pattern of thought (a paradigm shift) in organisational strategies, it is clear that action learning entails enough of a demand for change in the thought pattern so as to cause not only desperation, but also its fair amount of controversy, resistance, and actual rejection among those who remain *inactive, reactive,* or even *pro-active* amid the emerging turbulence instead of becoming *interactive* action learners.'(Ramirez, 1983, p.738)

Evans is downbeat,

> 'Overall, looking at the political and social structural factors positively associated with synergy ...most of the Third World offers arid prospects. Since highly inegalitarian social structures presided over by fragile, fragmented government apparatuses are the general rule, it is no wonder that most studies of state-society relations abound in negative examples.' (Evans, 1996)

Gow and Morss (1988), in a detailed study, analyse what factors frustrated USAID's attempts to encourage development. They list a number of critical factors:

- *Political, economic and environmental constraints* - all governments have overriding political objectives (particularly maintaining power) which may run contrary to development objectives. They also have macro-economic objectives which, in the short to medium term at least, may run contrary to development objectives.
- *Institutional realities* - a realisation that the institutional set-up in which development interventions take place is of crucial importance, especially in sustaining project outputs. Of particular importance are:
  - local administrative capacity
  - structures to support information flow, horizontally between line and technical agencies, and vertically between beneficiaries, local government and higher jurisdictions
  - selection of agencies conducting project work
  - institutions'access to resources
- *Personnel constraints* - developing countries often have limited trained manpower available, who are therefore overburdened.
- *Technical assistance shortcomings* - results from personnel constraints, but creates the impression that, (i) development is only about technical knowledge, and (ii) only (usually) western people have this. Both tend to enforce the notion that development is something that is done for people and that is outside the scope of ordinary people.
- *Decentralisation and participation* - have rarely been pursued simultaneously, and one does not necessarily imply the other. Also, they have failed to live up to expectation due to:
  - lack of political commitment
  - bureaucratic resistance
  - inadequate resources
- *Differing agendas* - of the many different actors in development intervention, from external agencies and national governments, to beneficiaries and others. These may prove critical in the field but are never made explicit at the outset. They thus remain 'hidden agendas' and are the real motivations for people's actions. (see Table 4, below)

Sustaining project benefits - up until the 1980s, this was not a criteria of project design, thus few projects provided benefits after they closed, or still do. Sustainability was optimistically 'assumed'. The important financial, political, economic and institutional factors for sustainability were not considered.

Table 4 - Real agendas in development interventions

Actors	Agenda	Influence on intervention
Donor agency	Programme monies for develpoment activities that comply with substantive directives and procedural regulations	Intervention plan will be written to obtain approval; as a result, possible implementation problems will be surpressed
National ministries Lower-level government structures	Each wants to maximise control over resources and how they are used	Decision making not participatory; no networked collaboration - remains in remit of implementing agency
Lower-level politicians	Want to take credit for project and ensure that existing power structures remain intact	Distribution of benefits of intervention dependent on existing power structure
Foreign technicians	Want to perform in their chosen area of expertise	Ignore broader perspectives and higher orders of analysis, neglect capacity building and technology transfer, reduce chances of sustainability
Local project staff	Want career advancement and opportunities offered by the centre, no interest in the periphery	Rapid turnover, little motivation, reduces chances of sustainability
Intended project beneficiaries	Reluctant to adopt new techniques, concerned about existing local power relations	Resistance to change, intervention fails at point of delivery
Other members of the local population	Threatened by or envious of intervention activities and benefits	Constrains success of intervention, diminishes chance of widespread impact

Source: after Gow & Morss (ibid.), Table 3, p.1412.

Clearly, development is a complex problem and we should therefore be circumspect in declaring a new development paradigm, a new 'answer', especially where that depends on deconstructing existing forms of power.

Fisheries in developing countries: A planning need ?
We saw development as being particularly about reducing uncertainty and increasing control. A number of means are available for reducing uncertainty in fisheries:
- pooling/sharing uncertainty
- fishing within ecologically sustainable parameters
- stabilising returns from fishing
- reducing dependence on fisheries

The first two are the subject of management measures within the fishery sector. The task of development planning here is to facilitate development of suitable management structures and procedures. The third involves development within the fishery sector, but outside of the harvesting sub-sector. The fourth involves development outside the fisheries sector which leads to substitution of income from fisheries by income from other sources.

Increasing control in fisheries can also be pursued through a number of means:

- the further articulation of property rights over fisheries within national EEZs
- more inclusive management arrangements
- devolution of management to more local levels
- better coordination of management between state, private and collective-action sectors

The first is a fundamental pre-requisite to developing control over fisheries and the incomes derived from them. The remaining three, again require development planning to facilitate better management practices coming into being.

We also saw that in a turbulent environment, we need to develop an organisational culture that can constantly respondto change for developmental ends. That implies developing personal and institutional capacities that are wide-spread throughout society. However, both Pomeroy & Berks (1997) in the case of fisheries, and Carley & Christie (1992) in the general case, recognise that this is precisely where development planning is weakest at present. They see,

> 'a widely recognised 'managerial gap'... between the demand for and supply of indigenous management talent at nearly all levels, and this gap constitutes a major, if not the major, constraint in achieving economic and social development' (Carley & Christie ,1992). Thus. development planning needs to, on the one hand, enhance, 'leadership, skills, resources, and capabilities of local-level organisations and institutions' and on the other, lead to 'restructuring of national laws and policies, as well as national fisheries agencies and bureaucracies'(Pomeroy & Berks, p.477).

While this presents a planning agenda for the fisheries sector, 'action-centred networks' present a possible model for a planning structure and 'social-environment learning' presents a suitable model for how that might be brought into being. But as we commented earlier 'What constitutes development for a particular society is a political process and so will ultimately be determined by power relations within that society'. Here, the great mass of small-scale fishers in developing countries may seem at their weakest.

However, with the intensive levels of resource usage now typical in developing country fisheries, small changes in circumstances can instantly become critical for the large numbers of people dependent on fisheries who no longer have any bountiful wildernesses left to turn to. That creates a great sensitivity within communities and societies to negative impacts on their livelihoods and the resources on which they depend. The very threat these changes pose to their survival is reciprocated in the strength of their protest. This has been shown in many examples e.g. Fishers protests against trawling in Kerela State, India (Kurien, 1993); fisherfolks protest against trawling in Indonesia (Bailey, 1987); protests by artisanal fishermen in the Gulf of Fonseca, Honduras (Stonich, 1995), and numerous other grass roots protest movements worldwide.

These make it perfectly clear that the broad mass of people who depend on fisheries for their livelihoods are a constituency that *can* have political power and that must be incorporated into the mainstream of development. It is a failure of development policy if they only become a recognised constituency through protest movements. As the state sector is remote from these people and the market sector has other private objectives, it clearly falls to the remit of the collective-action sector to organise small scale fishers to ensure their participation in the political process. Further, as it is the fishers who have the most to lose, and so the most to gain from development, it seems clear that they should be the main participants in any development planning process.

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